At the outset of the German invasion the 156th was part of 9th Rifle Corps, which also contained the
106th Rifle and
32nd Cavalry Divisions, for a strength of about 35,000 personnel, all under command of Lt. Gen.
P. I. Batov. The Corps was tasked with defending the Crimea and preparing for amphibious operations elsewhere in the
Black Sea. On August 20 the Corps was subordinated to 51st Army. Before the Axis forces arrived General Chernyaev left the division to take up duties in
Separate Coastal Army and was replaced Col. Aleksandr Ivanovich Danilin on September 1. Chernyaev would be killed by artillery fire on June 22, 1942, in the
Donbas. Danilin had been in command of the 85th Rifle Regiment,
29th Rifle Division, when he was arrested in July 1938 during the
Great Purge. He remained under arrest until December 1939, and was reinstated in the Red Army in February 1940. Before taking command of the 156th he was serving as deputy commander of the
74th Rifle Division. 51st Army, with a strength of some 95,000, was placed under command of Col. Gen.
F. I. Kuznetsov, who began preparing a defense of the Isthmus of Perekop in mid-August with most of his assigned forces, apart from 9th Corps, still
en route. Roughly 30,000 civilians were drafted into building defenses alongside the Red Army troops on the Perekop and the Chongar Peninsula. His deployment was badly affected by faulty intelligence from the
STAVKA in General Staff Order No. 001033 of August 18 which stated in part:In fact, the Axis had no amphibious capability to speak of, and the German airborne force had been devastated on Crete in May, so it was odd that this information was given credence. It led Kuznetsov to deploy 40,000 troops to defend the coast against landings that were effectively impossible, while a further 25,000 were in the Crimean interior on anti-paratroop duty. Just 30,000 were left to defend the northern approaches, including Danilin's 7,000 at Perekop. The Army was not initially assigned any tanks, so
Southern Front managed to scrape up ten
T-34s and 56
T-37s from repair facilities to form the 5th Tank Regiment under command of Maj. S. P. Baranov, giving Kuznetsov a small mobile reserve. On August 30 the German 11th Army forced a crossing of the
Dniepr River at
Beryslav in the face of resistance from Southern Front's
9th Army. The attackers broke out on September 9–10, forcing a shattered 9th Army back toward
Melitopol and opening the approaches to the Crimea. The 11th Army commander, Gen.
E. Ritter von Schobert, directed his
LIV Army Corps toward Perekop, without any clear idea of what that force would face; in fact German intelligence had not yet identified 51st Army. Schobert directed the Corps commander, Gen.
E. Hansen, to form a forward detachment in an effort to take the Perekop by
coup de main, just before Schobert was killed in an air crash on September 12. Gen. E. von Manstein was appointed by Hitler as his successor, but he would not arrive for five days. On the day of Schobert's death the reconnaissance battalion of
Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, under command of
Sturmbannführer K. Meyer, made a 35 km dash from Beryslav toward Perekop, followed by the 22nd Reconnaissance Battalion, and reached the village of Preobrazhenka, 8 km north of the ancient Tatar Wall, at around 0600 hours. Meyer's force consisted of motorcycle infantry, a few armored cars, and a battery of towed
Pak 36 antitank guns, but no engineers and no other heavy weapons. As it entered the village his lead company took 76mm artillery fire from the
armored train Voykovets as well as small arms fire from the 2nd Battalion of the 361st Rifle Regiment entrenched at the nearby Chervonyi Chaban
Sovkhoz. Meyer could see that extensive fortifications continued to the south and as he retreated he reported back to Hansen that "coup against Perekop impossible."
Battle of Perekop Manstein arrived at
Mykolaiv on September 17 and found that Hansen had moved up his
46th and
73rd Infantry Divisions toward the Perekop but had not attempted to reduce the Soviet defenses. Furthermore,
XXX Army Corps had sealed off the
Chonhar Peninsula and the
Arabat Spit with
Leibstandarte but had also made no effort to push into the Crimea. The 156th had constructed three defensive lines across the Perekop, with the main line making use of the Tatar Wall. In the forward line two battalions of the 361st Regiment held strongpoints, each with an artillery battalion of the 434th Regiment in support. Behind this advanced position was a recently dug antitank ditch some 2m deep and four lines of tanglefoot-type barbed-wire obstacles. Within the main line of resistance concrete and timber/stone bunkers had been dug for
76mm regimental guns and
45mm antitank guns, plus several dug-in tanks. The Tatar Wall itself was fronted by the old moat, now 12m deep and 33m wide; the Wall sat on 5m-high earthen berm. The surrounding countryside was barren of trees and other vegetation, completely open to Soviet observation. Most concerning for the attackers, however, was the extensive employment of antipersonnel mines, including thousands of wooden PMDs which could not be found by conventional detectors, plus improvised devices including aerial bombs and naval mines. Remote-control buried flamethrowers were also in service. Overall, the German Army had not had to penetrate such a defence to date in the war. Manstein was keen to avoid a frontal assault and set 11th Army's engineers to find some way to bypass these lines. One possibility was cross the shallow
Syvash as had been done by the Red Army in 1920, but due to the tidal conditions and soft bottom at this time German engineers trying to wade across quickly sank to their hips. The use of
Sturmbooten was also considered, but rejected. In addition, Kuznetsov was expecting this move and had ordered Danilin to deploy two battalions of the 530th Rifle Regiment on the Litovskii Peninsula where the 1920 crossing had occurred. On the Chonhar the railroad bridge had been destroyed and obstacles plance in the water below, while the Arabat was so long, narrow and exposed that it could only be crossed if unopposed. Facing the prospect of a frontal assault, Manstein took steps to add combat multipliers to his forces. Limited armor support was available from the
StuG III Ausf B assault guns of Sturm Battalion 190. Heavy artillery was in short supply, mostly Czech-built pieces with very limited ammunition. LIV Corps had a total of about 152 guns, and its divisions had been brought up to full strength with infantry replacements. The artillery preparation began at 0500 hours on September 24 with over 2,500 rounds fired, as well as limited air support. At 0730 the assault groups of 46th and 73rd Infantry moved to attack the outer defenses of the 156th; each employed four or five battalions with engineers,
20mm antiaircraft guns,
Panzerjägers, and StuGs in support. The 213th Infantry Regiment of 73rd Infantry struck the 2nd Battalion of the 361st, which was led by Cpt. E. K. Ivashin. The German engineers led the attack, breaching the obstacle belt and creating a bridgehead at the cost of heavy losses. Using the cover of smoke grenades two battalions closed in on the
Sovkhoz strongpoint, leading to close combat with flamethrowers and demolition charges used to destroy bunkers. Gradually the 2nd Battalion was wiped out piece by piece, with the strongpoint overrun after being bombed by
Ju 88s. The attack cost the German regiment 770 casualties, including four company commanders. To the east the 1st Battalion of the 361st had held the 46th Infantry to minor gains and cost it 329 killed and wounded. Manstein had directed the
22nd Infantry Division and
Leibstandarte to make diversionary actions at Chonhar and the Syvash, but Kuznetsov disregarded them. Correctly convinced that the true attack was being made at the Perekop he ordered the 106th Division to send its 442nd Rifle Regiment to replace the 156th's losses.
The Tatar Wall The attack resumed at dawn on September 25, as the 46th and 73rd Divisions mopped up the advance battalions of the 361st Regiment, and continued to suffer heavy casualties from Soviet artillery and machine gun fire on the flat terrain. They were now nearing the main defense line at the Tatar Wall, and Danilin decided to preempt this with an attack by his reserve 530th Rifle Regiment and 5th Tank Regiment. Major Baranov decided to commit only his light tanks, holding back his T-34s, and lost eight of these light vehicles to
Panzerjäger fire. The counterattack was a failure, and while German casualties for the day were 322, the 156th had now lost about a third of its infantry. The assault on the Tatar Wall began on the morning of September 26 with a massive artillery preparation which expended most of the remaining large calibre ammunition, as well as dive bombing from
Ju 87s. While the 46th and 73rd Infantry were both exhausted by two days of intense combat the 156th was also in poor shape. The main defense of the Wall fell on the 3rd Battalion of the 361st. Manstein provided reinforcements of engineers and artillery from
Leibstandarte. Under cover of smoke and heavy weapons fire assault squads arrived at the ditch around 0900 hours and used boards to reach the top of the opposite side, which was covered with barbed wire. Riflemen of the 361st threw grenades from their trenches into the ditch, causing heavy casualties among the engineers; however, intense supporting fire kept their heads down and the assault troops gradually fought their way to the top. Despite spirited resistance, by 1030 the defense of the 3rd Battalion was collapsing, and soon broke completely west of Fort Perekop. German storm groups pushed through the gap, overran mortar and antitank positions, and reached as far as
Armiansk where they began house-to-house fighting with remnants of the 156th which were dug in at a brick factory. By 1100 hours the two German divisions were over the Wall in strength. Kuznetsov now committed Group Batov of three rifle regiments to counterattack, and despite a lack of artillery support, forced the 46th Infantry back to the Wall, while the 73rd was forced out of Armiansk. At this point General Hansen replied with a battlegroup of
50th Infantry Division, recently arrived from
Odesa. Along with timely air support this tipped the fighting in German favor. By dusk all of Armiansk was back in their hands, and while the eastern part of the Wall was still held by elements of the 156th, Kuznetsov had no further reserves and little to prevent Hansen from advancing on the reserve line at Ishun. The
STAVKA had expected Kuznetsov to hold the Tatar Wall far longer, if not indefinitely, and ordered him to continue counterattacking. Group Batov retook most of Armiansk early on September 27, forcing the 73rd Infantry back to the brick factory where it held on the rest of the day. Meanwhile, German engineers, under costly artillery fire, were building a 16-tonne wooden bridge over the western part of the Tatar Ditch, allowing several StuGs to cross. These, in support of 50th Infantry and with Ju 87s overhead, retook most of Armiansk. Batov made a further effort at dawn the next day with Baranov's T-34s, some of which reached the Wall, while the riflemen again occupied the town. But Group Batov had now shot its bolt and late in the evening Armiansk changed hands yet again. Kuznetsov now pleaded for permission to pull back to Ishun, and while the
STAVKA had grave, and justified, doubts about his leadership abilities it authorized the withdrawal, which was covered by Baranov's tankers over the next few days, with only one vehicle lost. While LIV Corps had taken considerable casualties, especially among its junior officers, and had a good deal of equipment destroyed, it claimed 10,019 prisoners taken, along with 32 tanks and 68 artillery pieces. As most of these were from the 156th, the division had been largely destroyed in the fighting.
Battle of Ishun 51st Army now gained a reprieve as Manstein was forced to react to a crisis west of
Melitopol. The
STAVKA was also forced to react to the situation in the Crimea by abandoning Odesa, which it had been successfully holding. Kuznetsov soon received the
157th Rifle Division at Sevastopol, and by mid-October the Separate Coastal Army had been delivered by the
Black Sea Fleet almost intact. Kuznetsov would need these forces to hold at Ishun; his Army still had some 50,000 personnel, but after deducting forces covering Chonhar and the Syvash only 15,000-20,000 were available, many being militiamen of
1st and
2nd Crimean Divisions. German reconnaissance was learning that the position at Ishun was nearly as formidable as that at the Perekop. The small town had three large salt lakes and the Black Sea on its flanks, leaving just three potential routes to the south, the widest of which, along the rail line, spanned just 1,300m. The landscape was equally barren and flat, as well as being marshy. This sector was assigned to what remained of the 361st Regiment, a battalion of
172nd Rifle Division, and a pair of naval infantry battalions. The remainder of the 156th was positioned between Lake Staroe and Lake Krasnoe, anchored on a strongpoint built in and around a
bromide factory. The 106th and
271st Rifle Divisions held between Lake Krasnoe and the Syvash, as Kuznetsov continued to fear a crossing operation on this flank. Baranov still had nine T-34s operational, but artillery support was much reduced, consisting mostly of older 76mm guns. The
Voykovets would soon be joined by the
Smyert fashizmu armored train. 11th Army was now tasked exclusively with the conquest of the Crimea, but was also reduced to just six divisions. Since maneuver was impossible, Manstein chose to mislead Kuznetsov by attacking on all three axes, beginning in the east with 22nd Infantry before shifting to the west with the 73rd; the 46th would conduct holding attacks in the center. Artillery was still in short supply, so air support would be more essential than before. The preparation began at 0600 hours on October 18 and lasted two hours. On the east flank two battalions of the 22nd waded through 460m of shallow water and took the 106th's 442nd Regiment by surprise, tearing apart Kuznetsov's right flank. However, the 397th Rifle Regiment, dug in on the Tumulus Assis burial mound, stopped two further battalions cold, with heavy losses, when they attempted a frontal attack over open ground. In the center the 156th's 417th Rifle Regiment lost some ground to the 46th Infantry in an indecisive battle, while the 73rd Infantry also made only modest gains on the left. Soviet artillery provided effective support, as did the armored trains. The next day fortunes turned in German favor. A renewed attack on Tumulus Assis with StuG support gained a surprising success, and the 106th and 271st Divisions fell back to reserve positions. The 73rd Infantry won a greater success on the west flank when the German heavy guns managed to destroy the obstacles in front of the 361st Regiment. Two battalions attacked through this breach, backed by another battery of StuGs. The artillery suppressed the fire of the riflemen and they were quickly overrun, which led to the loss of the fortified village of Krasnoperekopsk and the isolation of the two naval infantry battalions and one battalion of the 172nd against the Black Sea coast. The resistance of the 156th, as well as 51st Army as a whole, began to collapse; 5th Tank Regiment in reserve in Ishun were suddenly under attack by
Panzerjägers and lost two T-34s immobilized and captured before retreating to the south. Once they crossed the Chatyrlyk River the German infantry had advanced 8 km through the heart of the 51st Army's defense, losing only 150 casualties in the process. Kuznetsov's force was effectively broken by evening, but the 157th Division was marching up from Sevastopol. On the morning of October 20 two of its regiments attacked Ishun with artillery support and Baranov's remaining T-34s. The 73rd Infantry was forced out of the town, but this brought the 157th out into the open where it was struck with artillery and air attacks, bringing it to a halt before the 73rd counterattacked and retook Ishun. Heavy rain ended the fighting and the two sides exchanged attacks over the next day with little result. Kuznetsov was relieved of command on October 22; oddly enough the
STAVKA now placed Vice-Adm.
G. I. Levchenko in charge of all land, air and naval forces in the Crimea. Levchenko sent in a large scale counterattack on the morning of October 24, using the evacuated units from Odesa and the remnants of 51st Army, now under Batov. While the 73rd was short on riflemen it still had plenty of machine guns and mortars, which caused heavy casualties to the attackers, and the effort failed. A further attack was mounted the next day but the losses were too great. Hansen sensed a weakness and committed the fresh
170th Infantry Division south of Ishun and the Soviet defense began to collapse. On October 26 Manstein reinforced success with the 132nd Infantry Division and by the end of the day most of 51st Army was retreating in disorder, although some units continued to hold on to strongpoints. 11th Army had won the battles for the Perekop, at the cost of over 12,000 casualties, but 51st and Coastal Armies had lost some 25 percent, including 16,000 prisoners taken at Ishun. The 51st had also lost roughly 200 artillery pieces. Batov led his defeated Army toward
Dzhankoi, hoping to link up with the
276th Rifle Division which had been guarding the south side of the Chonhar. Efforts to establish rearguards were mostly knocked aside before they could dig in, leading to more men being captured. 46th Infantry burst into Dzhankoi before a defense was organized and the retreat became a rout. South of the city Colonel Danilin with most of his staff were scooped up by a patrol of the 170th Infantry at 1100 hours on October 30. Danilin was interrogated by an intelligence officer of LIV Corps and apparently gave up information on the direction of the retreat and the command and control difficulties in the Soviet command structure. Subsequently, he and his staff disappeared into German captivity, and his fate is unknown. Officially he remained in command until November 26 when he was replaced by Col. Akhmet-Aln Melik-oglu Aliyev. This
Azeri officer had been in command of the 2nd Crimean/321st Rifle Division. By this time the 156th, with a remaining strength of 2,733 personnel, had retreated to
Kerch and been evacuated to the
Taman Peninsula, where 51st Army came under command of
Transcaucasus Front.
Battle of the Kerch Peninsula At the start of 1942 the division was under direct command of the renamed
Caucasus Front, as it struggled to rebuild; one rifle regiment (likely the 361st) was reformed from personnel of the 276th Division when it was temporarily disbanded. Meanwhile, in December the
STAVKA had begun planning an operation to recross the Kerch Strait and land forces that would take back the Crimea while also reestablishing land communications with Separate Coastal Army, holed up in Sevastopol. This proved to be a surprising success, particularly the
coup-de-main at
Feodosia by
44th Army on December 29. By New Year's Day Caucasus Front's (soon renamed
Crimean Front) 44th and 51st Armies had complete control of the
Kerch Peninsula, although efforts to advance on Sevastopol were beaten back. As of April 1 the 156th was still under Front command in Taman, but during the month it was shipped back to the Crimea to form part of the Front reserves near Kerch. In April, Manstein began planning a new operation to retake the Peninsula, to be called
Trappenjagd ("Bustard Hunt"). This began on the morning of May 8 with an initial strike against the rebuilt 276th and the
63rd Mountain Rifle Division of 44th Army at the south end of the defense line at the Parpach Narrows. The two divisions were heavily hit by artillery fire and air attacks and were shattered within hours. By late on May 9 Manstein was able to commit the 200 tanks of
22nd Panzer Division and at noon the next day the entire 51st Army was cut off and trapped against the coast of the
Sea of Azov. Soviet command and control broke down in another rout, now toward Kerch. As part of the Front reserve the 156th attempted to provide rearguards, but these were bypassed and on May 13 German forces were across the so-called "Turkish Rampart" in strength. Colonel Aliyev decided to withdraw, given the circumstances, and led the 361st Regiment in a rearguard action but was seriously wounded that evening near the village of Churubash Tatarsky and left on the field. He would live undercover for the next year and a half, eventually joining the partisans, but was arrested in December 1943 and soon sent to Germany where he was liberated in May 1945. He was reinstated to the Red Army after a counterintelligence check but died at
Baku in 1953. He was replaced in command of the 156th on May 17 by Col. Yakov Yakovlevich Verbov. This officer had led the just-disbanded
400th Rifle Division through its brief career. The 156th had again been evacuated over the Kerch Strait, but with significant losses along with the rest of its Front. == Case Blue ==