Mobilisation In June 1939, as the regiment was forming, the international situation worsened and a partial mobilisation of the TA units in
Anti-Aircraft Command was begun. In a process known as 'couverture', each AA unit did a month's tour of duty in rotation to man selected AA gun and searchlight positions. The whole of AA Command was fully mobilised on 24 August ahead of the declaration of war. 56th LAA Regiment mobilised in
Western Command but was not yet assigned to any formation. During October 1939 the regiment underwent training at
Tuxford and
Hatfield in
Yorkshire, where it came under the command of
39 AA Brigade.
Norway Germany invaded Norway on 9 April 1940, and British and
French forces launched a hastily planned and badly-executed operation to intervene. Because the bulk of Britain's
Regular Army had already deployed to France, most of the troops available for the
Norwegian Campaign were part-time soldiers of the TA. The main
Allied objective was the port of
Narvik. After the German naval forces there had been destroyed, a base was established on the island of
Harstad just outside
Narvikfjord, with an AA allocation of light (LAA) and heavy (HAA) guns under the command of
6 AA Brigade. 56th LAA Regiment was preparing to be deployed to France with the
British Expeditionary Force (BEF), but despite its relative lack of training and its deficiencies in men and equipment, it was hurriedly sent to Norway as part of this force. While the main land force was en route to Narvik, the British Government diverted two infantry brigades to land at
Namsos and
Åndalsnes, north and south of
Trondheim respectively. 166 LAA Battery of 56th LAA Rgt was allocated to
146 (1st West Riding) Brigade ('Mauriceforce') going to Namsos and 168/56 LAA Bty went with
148 (North Midland) Bde ('Sickleforce') to Åndalsnes. Meanwhile, RHQ and 167/56 LAA Bty continued as planned to join 6 AA Bde at Harstad.
Åndalsnes Sickleforce embarked on the
Royal Navy cruisers
Arethusa and
Galatea and a large transport ship at
Rosyth on 14 April expecting to go to Namsos. It was then diverted to Åndalsnes, where the transport could not be used, so part of the force was transshipped to two other cruisers,
Carlisle and
Curacoa and two destroyers. However, the transhipment was done hurriedly under blackout conditions and important stores were left behind, including the
No 3 Predictors for 168 LAA Bty's Bofors guns. The convoy sailed at 07.00 on 17 April and the first flight of Sickleforce began landing at Åndalsnes about midnight on 18 April. The accompanying
Troop of 168 LAA Bty got its Bofors guns smartly ashore on 19 April, and the rest of the battery arrived with the second flight (board the cruisers
Galatea,
Glasgow and
Sheffield) on 21 April. Sickleforce quickly secured its first objective, the railway junction at
Dombås, and prepared to turn north towards Trondheim. However, at the urging of the Norwegians 148 Bde was diverted south to support the Norwegian troops fighting at
Lillehammer, coming under air attack from the
Luftwaffe as they went forward. Unable to operate in the snow off the roads the British troops were soon in trouble.
15 Brigade arrived at Åndalsnes to reinforce Sickleforce on 23 April and advanced with a troop of 168 LAA Bty as far as
Otta where it met the survivors of 148 Bde and became engaged in bitter fighting on 25 April. 168 LAA Battery got three of its Bofors into action, bringing down three enemy aircraft before one of the guns received a direct hit, killing or wounding all of its detachment. As Sickleforce and the Norwegians were forced back, the
Luftwaffe delivered strong harassing attacks, singling out the Bofors guns on the exposed mountain slopes. However, 15 Bde managed to break contact and 168 LAA Bty extracted four Bofors to be sent back to Åndalsnes while the men began a long march through deep snow. Åndalsnes had also been under heavy air attack from above the range of the few Bofors there. The
War Office ordered the evacuation of Åndalsnes, which took place by night on 30 April, aboard the cruisers
Arethusa,
Galatea,
Sheffield and
Southampton. 168 LAA Battery was taken back to
Scapa Flow.
Namsos 146 Bde at
Namsos was allocated 166 LAA Bty among other AA units, but large ships could not berth at the docks and the French AA guns could not be landed for almost a week. The first Bofors troop (without predictors) did not arrive until 26 April, by which time the infantry who had moved towards Trondheim had been subjected to strong enemy attacks, which included artillery and aircraft, and had been pushed back. Namsos itself had been under heavy air attack since 20 April. The Bofors guns went forward and were at once attacked by low-level and dive-bombers; two guns got away, the rest were knocked out. Namsos too was evacuated the day after Åndalsnes.
Narvik For the main attack on Narvik, AA guns were landed at Harstad, an island base just outside Narvikfjord with an anchorage, and at an airstrip at
Skånland on the opposite coast (which never became fit for use). An existing airfield at
Bardufoss at a remote site on the mainland was cleared for fighters, with a small supply port at
Sørreisa. Initial AA defence for Bardufoss was to be provided by 3 LAA Bty, who had to blast packed ice clear before the guns could be emplaced. By 9 May, 3 LAA Bty had its HQ and two guns at Harstad, two guns at Skånstad, two struggling up the mountains to Bardufoss, and a troop of four fighting dive-bomber attacks on the French at
Gratangen – a total spread of 80 miles of land and water. 56th LAA Regiment then arrived with 10 Bofors guns of 167 LAA Bty, and RHQ took over command of 3 LAA Bty. 167 LAA Battery was assigned to defend Sorreisa, but defence of
Tromsø was later added to the force's commitments, and four guns were sent there, the British Army's most northerly deployment at that time. All land movements had to be carried out along steep narrow roads banked with of snow, and the Bofors required two gun tractors in tandem to get up some of the mountain roads, such as the route to Bardufoss. The final Allied attack on Narvik began on 27 May, launched by French, Polish and Norwegian troops, supported by British artillery. However, immediately after its capture, orders were received to destroy the port and evacuate the force to the UK. (The BEF was simultaneously being
evacuated from Dunkirk.) To cover the evacuation, AA units were ordered to maintain maximum activity and especially to prevent reconnaissance overflights. At the same time, 6 AA Bde was ordered by London to recover its 3.7-inch and 40 mm guns as a matter of priority. This was done by progressively thinning out defences. The Bodo force was evacuated at night by naval destroyers after a 100-plus German air raid destroyed the town and airstrip: all equipment there had to be abandoned. However, 6 AA Bde was able to assemble 22 Bofors and five HAA guns from the outlying positions at Harstad, with a number of predictors and heightfinders. 6 AA Brigade ended all AA defence on 6 June and by 8 June the British troops had embarked with their surviving equipment and the convoy sailed for the UK, still under air attack.
Home defence The returning AA units were rapidly reinforced, re-equipped where possible, and redeployed for future integration into existing defence plans. 56th LAA Regiment went to
Dunfermline where it re-equipped with Bofors guns. Then on 24 January 1941 the regiment joined 8th Support Group in the recently formed
8th Armoured Division. Support Groups at the time consisted of a brigade of mobile field, anti-tank (A/T) and LAA artillery together with lorried infantry, intended to support the armoured brigades of the division. The LAA regiment was equipped with towed Bofors guns. The division trained for operations, first in
Northern Command, then in
Southern Command, and finally in South-Eastern Command. On 7 February 1942 56th LAA Rgt was authorised to use the same 'East Lancashire' subtitle as its parent unit. • RHQ + 2 Trps with Hammerforce – under 1st Armoured Division • 1 Trp with HQ X Corps • 168 LAA Bty with
23 Armoured Bde – under
XXX Corps, with one armoured regiment supporting each attacking division (implying 1 Trp of 168 LAA Bty per regiment) • 1 Bty with
24 Armoured Bde – under
10th Armoured Division Alamein Careful consideration was given to AA defence during the build-up for Alamein. Instead of being deployed in circles round vulnerable points (VPs), the LAA guns were sited on the attackers' likely lines of approach; opening fire would not give away the presence of a likely target, and numerous dummy and alternative positions were prepared. Within the divisions the control of LAA batteries was decentralised to brigade level, and a feature of the assault planning was the integration of the LAA guns into ground fire tasks in support of infantry and armour. When the initial artillery bombardment for
Operation Lightfoot began on the night of 23 October, LAA batteries switched from defending the assembly areas to firing
Tracer ammunition to mark the attacking units' boundaries in the dust and darkness. This was important because the armoured divisions were restricted to the lanes they could clear through the extensive minefields, which also held up 23 Armoured Bde with the infantry divisions. Neither 1st nor 10th Armoured divisions were able to break out beyond the minefield by dawn as planned. Over the following nights the attacking formations inched their way forward. The
Desert Air Force (DAF) had air superiority and there was little enemy air activity on X and XXX Corps' fronts during daylight, but on the night of 24/25 October German aircraft bombed 10th Armoured Division and disorganised 24 Armoured Bde's advance. Next day the division was held up by enemy tanks and A/T guns and was withdrawn to reorganise, with 24 Armoured Bde joining 1st Armoured Division. While Eighth Army reorganised for a resumption of the attack (
Operation Supercharge), it drove off a number of ground and air counter-attacks. Launched on 1/2 November, Supercharge achieved the desired breakout, and the armoured divisions began the pursuit, reaching
Mersa Matruh and
Sidi Barrani by 8 November, the
Halfaya Pass by 11 November, and
Tobruk by 13 November.
Pursuit to Tripoli raid during Eighth Army's advance to Tripoli, 29 January 1943. 8th Armoured Division clearly had no future as a fighting formation, and 56th (EL) LAA Rgt formally left it on 6 November; the division was disbanded on 1 January 1943. At this time LAA btys were in the process of converting to the new establishment of 18 x Bofors per battery (
ie three 6-gun troops). As Eighth Army and the DAF advanced rapidly across
Cyrenaica, the AA units spread out behind, defending the captured ports and landing grounds (LGs), and the lengthening
lines of communication. X Corps reached
El Agheila on the far side of Cyrenaica and halted there, while XXX Corps continued the pursuit towards
Tripoli, followed by
2 AA Bde 'leap-frogging' its units forward. By January 1943, RHQ and 168 LAA Bty (11 x Bofors) of 56th (EL) LAA Rgt were with X Corps HQ near El Agheila, while 166 and 167 Btys were under 2 AA Bde assigned to tasks with XXX Corps. Tripoli fell to Eighth Army on 23 January. After the capture of Tripoli 56th (EL) LAA Rgt passed to the command of
12 AA Bde. The role of this formation was to move up behind Eighth Army's advance and defend the DAF's LGs as they came into use, with batteries working under the command of the DAF tactical wing to which they were allocated. The brigade developed an efficient system of providing rolling support for the DAF's tactical wings as they made long shifts forwards to maintain contact with the advancing army. This involved the RAF,
Royal Engineers (RE) airfield construction teams, and local ground defence units as well as the AA units; all were represented in the joint reconnaissance parties that followed closely behind the leading battalions. They selected new sites for landing strips or renovated old ones, maintaining radio contact through RAF or RA channels with the main body so that movement orders could be passed to the following AA batteries. Movement was usually by leap-frogging from previously occupied LGs, though sometimes an AA battery was waiting in a hidden concentration area ready to move forward. RAF transport aircraft flew ground staff, equipment and battery staffs to the new locations. Within a few hours the AA positions were manned and the fighter squadrons would arrive. 12 AA Brigade had 20–30 separate convoys moving on any given day, and it was providing cover for six RAF wings and one
US Army Air Force (USAAF) Group, and also manning dummy airstrips, compete with flare-paths, aircraft, flash simulators and people.
Italy Salerno After the
North African Campaign ended with the capture of
Tunis in May 1943, 56th (EL) LAA Rgt was once again acting as X Corps' LAA regiment. X Corps was not employed in the
Allied invasion of Sicily, but trained for the subsequent assault landings at
Salerno on the Italian mainland (
Operation Avalanche). It had the task of capturing the
Port of Salerno and
Montecorvino Airfield, then turning north to capture
Naples. The landings on 9 September were difficult, but a beachhead was successfully achieved. The first major hitch occurred when Montecorvino Airfield was not captured in the first rush, and continued to be fought over for the next four days. Even then the beachhead battle raged for days within of the shore. The divisional LAA regiments, together with 12 AA Bde, which provided the AA components of the
Beach groups, were landed into this crowded space. However, a breakout was achieved on 16 September and the rest of X Corps could pour ashore. As corps LAA regiment, 56th's role now was to defend HQs, gun areas and other VPs as X Corps first captured
Naples on 1 October, and then moved on to assault the German positions on the
River Volturno on 12 October. The corps then had a stable period as the Allies faced the German
Winter Line.
Garigliano In January 1944 56th (EL) LAA Rgt was still corps LAA regiment to X Corps, which was preparing for the start of operations against the Winter Line under the command of
Fifth US Army. On the night of 17/18 January it carried out an
assault crossing of the Garigliano, the preliminary phase of the
Battle of Monte Cassino. This was successful and the engineers began building bridges. However, the follow-up crossings upstream on 19/20 January failed, and the operations against Monte Cassino descended into stalemate by mid-February. X Corps' attempts to expand its bridgehead came under counter-attack but it had 12 AA Bde's LAA regiments to defend the Garigliano bridges against
Luftwaffe fighter-bomber attacks, while 56th's responsibility was the HQs and gun areas. Because the HAA regiments were largely engaged in ground fire, their
gun-laying radar sets could be used to supplement the single local-warning radar set and pick up the approach of raids using cloud cover before diving to low level.
Anzio Meanwhile, to outflank the Monte Cassino position, Fifth US Army carried out a landing on the coast further north.
1st British Division made the initial
landing at Anzio alongside US troops in Operation Shingle on 21 January. Its
90th LAA Rgt landed a Bofors battery with the first wave and the whole regiment was ashore by D + 5 to defend the field artillery positions. At first all went well, but the commander of the operation waited too long to build up his forces and lost the initiative. The Germans quickly contained the beachhead and by 1 February were driving the Allied troops back towards the sea, and sending over waves of air attacks. 168 LAA Battery was sent from 56th (EL) LAA Rgt to reinforce 90th LAA Rgt and landed on 5 February, followed by the first battery of
100th LAA Rgt on 14 February as
56th (London) Division arrived in the beachhead. These five LAA batteries, coordinated by the commanding officer (CO) of 90th LAA Rgt, had to cover the spread of six British field artillery regiments, which were unable to disperse or find cover in the congested beachhead. Most of the AA effort at Anzio was controlled by 35th US AA Artillery Brigade, but the radar of its single mobile operations room was having trouble giving early warning of attacks by low-flying
Messerschmitt Bf 109 and
Focke-Wulf Fw 190 single-seat fighter-bombers. 90th LAA Regiment's CO asked for help and got some mobile No 4 Mark III lightweight local warning radar sets sent from Salerno. All his batteries prepared concentrations of fire within their sectors, for use by day or night to cover the front. The guns fired on fixed bearings at an elevation of 35 degrees, employing 12-second long-burning tracer ammunition: 'this produced a curtain of bursts at about with sheets of tracer behind it'. These concentrations could be ordered by the gun operations room, by radio, or by a 'master gun' on watch in each troop. By 19 February the other two batteries of 100th LAA Rgt arrived to extend the fire plan. Although it carried out a number of raids, the gravely weakened
Luftwaffe had been unable to influence any of these operations. Meanwhile, British forces in Italy were suffering an acute manpower shortage. In June 1944 the
Chiefs of Staff decided that the AA regiments in Italy must be reduced – LAA regiments shrank from 54 to 36 guns – their surplus personnel being converted to other roles, particularly infantry. As part of the reorganisation, corps LAA regiments were abolished, and those remaining joined the AA brigades. In July, 56th (EL) LAA Rgt joined
8 AA Bde, which had moved up from protecting ports and airfields in the rear to take over defence of the new US airfields in the
Tiber plain. This commitment soon diminished, and the brigade moved across Italy to join Eighth Army. However, 56th (EL) LAA Rgt remained at the airfields under Fifth US Army and joined
62 AA Bde by October. Fifth US Army had been slowly pounding away at the Gothic Line. In December the Germans launched a counter-attack (the
Battle of Garfagnana) between
Lucca and
Pistoia to retake
Livorno, and 62 AA Bde was closely involved in this battle. There was little air activity, and while some of the LAA regiments acted as infantry, 56th (EL) LAA Rgt was used in an anti-tank role equipped with US
M10 tank destroyers mounting 3-inch guns. By late 1944, the
Luftwaffe was suffering from such shortages of pilots, aircraft and fuel that serious air attacks could be discounted. As a result, further cuts could be made in AA units to address the British reinforcement crisis. 56th (East Lancashire) LAA Regiment left 62 AA Bde in February 1945 and together with 166, 167 and 168 LAA Btys entered suspended animation on 6 March 1945. ==Postwar==