Planning , December 1867 In the eyes of
Alan Moorehead, "There has never been in modern times a colonial campaign quite like the British expedition to Ethiopia in 1868. It proceeds from first to last with the decorum and heavy inevitability of a Victorian state banquet, complete with ponderous speeches at the end. And yet it was a fearsome undertaking; for hundreds of years the country had never been invaded, and the savage nature of the terrain alone was enough to promote failure." Planning the expedition was difficult for the British as this war was not on the sea. They later mentioned that Ethiopia had "no seaboard; has, consequently, no cities or forts to bombard, no vessels to attack, and no commerce to appropriate." The task was given to the
Bombay Army, and command of the expeditionary force to Lieutenant-General
Sir Robert Napier. This was a very unusual decision as it was the first time a campaign had been entrusted to an officer from the
Corps of Royal Engineers. It was also a very sensible decision, as the whole campaign would rely on engineering skills to succeed. Intelligence was carefully gathered about Ethiopia while the size of the army was calculated and its needs estimated before the massive effort was begun. Moorehead describes it: "Thus, for example, forty-four trained elephants were to be sent from India to carry the heavy guns on the march, while hiring commissions were dispatched all over the Mediterranean and the Near East to obtain mules and camels to handle the lighter gear. A railway, complete with locomotives and some of track, was to be laid across the coastal plain, and at the landing place large piers, lighthouses and warehouses were to be built." Given the long supply lines and limited resources of their own, the British understood that they were extremely dependent on a constant and reliable local supply of food for the men and forage for the animals. Accordingly, they decided to not plunder along the route but instead to pay for all needed supplies. To this end, the expedition took with it a sizable sum of the most commonly used currency in 19th century Ethiopia, the
Maria Theresa Thaler. in camp The force consisted of 13,000 British and Indian soldiers, 26,000 camp followers and over 40,000 animals, including the elephants. In addition, there was a sizable contingent of embedded journalists, including the journalist
Henry Morton Stanley as well as several European observers, translators, artists and photographers. The force set sail from Bombay in upwards of 280 steam and sailing ships. The
advance guard of engineers landed at
Zula on the Red Sea, about south of Massawa, and began to construct a port in mid-October 1867. By the end of the first month they had completed a pier, long; they completed a second one by the first week of December. The railway was already reaching into the interior, with eight iron girder bridges built. At the same time an advance guard, under Sir
William Lockyer Merewether, had pushed up the dry bed of the
Kumayli River to the
Suru Pass, where again the engineers were busy at work building a road to
Senafe long, rising to for the elephants, gun-carriages, and carts. The demand for water was enormous; the Zula camp using 200 tons a day, which was created using condensation from steamship boilers in the harbour. As the force moved inland, wells had to be dug. These tubewells, versions of the Norton
tube well technology, were so successful at providing groundwater for the British forces that they became known as "Abyssinian wells" and were widely adopted in England and elsewhere for providing reliable water supplies From Senafe, Merewether sent out two letters from Lieutenant-General Napier: one to Emperor Tewodros, demanding the release of the hostages (which Rassam intercepted and destroyed, afraid this ultimatum might enrage Tewodros against the prisoners); the other to the people of Ethiopia, proclaiming that he was there purely to free the captives and that he had hostile intentions only towards those who sought to oppose him. Napier arrived at Zula on 2 January 1868, and finished his plan of advance before leaving on 25 January for Senafe.
Advance It took the British forces three months to trek over of mountainous terrain to the foot of the Emperor's fortress at Magdala. At
Antalo, Napier parleyed with Dajamach Kassai (later Emperor
Yohannes IV), and won his support, which the British needed in their single-minded march to Magdala; without the help, or at least indifference, of the local peoples, the British expedition would have had greater difficulty in reaching its goal deep within the
Ethiopian Highlands. On 17 March, the army reached
Lake Ashangi, from their goal, and here, to further lighten their loads, the troops were put on half-rations. At this point, Emperor Tewodros's strength had already been dissolving. At the beginning of 1865 he controlled little more than
Begemder,
Wadla, and
Delanta (wherein the fortress of Magdala lay). He struggled to keep up the size of his army—which Sven Rubenson points out was his only "instrument of power"—but by mid-1867 defections from his army had reduced its size to 10,000 men. Harold Marcus observes, "For a total cost of about £9,000,000 Napier set out to defeat a man who could muster only a few thousand troops and had long ago ceased to be Ethiopia's leader in anything but title." The British were also aided by their diplomatic and political agreements with the native population, local potentates, and important provincial princes to protect the march from the coast to Magdala and to provide a reliable supply of food and forage. Additionally, Napier's pronouncement to the governors, the chiefs, the religious orders and the people of Abyssinia read: It is known to you that Theodorus, King of Abyssinia, detains in captivity the British Council Cameron, the British Envoy Rassam and many others, in violation of the laws of all civilized nations. All friendly persuasion having failed to obtain their release, my Sovereign has commanded me to lead an Army to liberate them. All who befriend the prisoners or assist in their liberation shall be well rewarded, but those who may injure them shall be severely punished. When the time shall arrive for the march of a British Army through your country, bear in mind, People of Abyssinia, that the Queen of England has no unfriendly feelings towards you, and no design against your country or your Liberty. Your religious establishments, your persons and your property shall be carefully protected. All supplies required for my soldiers shall be paid for. No peaceable inhabitant shall be molested. The sole object for which the British Force has been sent to Abyssinia is the liberation of Her Majesty's subjects. There is no intention to occupy permanently any portion of the Abyssinian Territory, or to interfere with the government of the country. The three most powerful Ethiopian princes in the north,
Dajamach Kassai of
Tigray,
Wagshum Gobeze of
Lasta and
Menelik II of
Shewa pledged to cooperate and aid the British Army, thus transforming an apparent invasion of Abyssinia into a conquest of a single mountain fortress defended by only a few thousand warriors in the employ of an unpopular ruler. Additionally, the British secured the support of two Oromo Queens, Werkait and Mostiat, to block all escape routes from Magdala.
Tewodros' movements At the same time the British marched south to Magdala, Tewodros advanced from the west, up the course of the
Bashilo River, with the cannons (including his prize creation, the massive
Sebastopol) that he had induced the European missionaries and foreign artisans to build for him at Gafat. The Emperor intended to arrive at Magdala before the British, and although he had a shorter distance to cross and had started his journey ten days before Napier left Zula, his success was not certain, and he only arrived at his fortress ten days before his opponents. Rubenson notes that it was Tewodros, not the British expedition, which had to travel through hostile territory, for Tewodros's soldiers had marched under the threat of attacks from
Gobeze's numerically superior forces, and had been obliged to defend themselves against hostile enemies on the way to Magdala. Tewodros's problems of provisioning for his army and transporting his artillery had also been much greater than Napier's. Most important of all, Tewodros could not trust even the four thousand soldiers who still followed him. Given the opportunity, they might abandon him as so many had already done. Tewodros provided one last demonstration of his lack of diplomatic skills on 17 February, when after accepting the submission of the inhabitants of
Delanta, he asked them why they had waited until he appeared with his army. When they answered that they had been prevented by rebellious Oromo and Gobeze, "he told them they were as bad as the others, and ordered them to be plundered. ... Consequently, when the King [Tewodros] further ordered them to be attacked, they all fought bravely, and, in conjunction with the inhabitants of Dawunt, killed a great number of his soldiers and seized their arms and mules." Not only had Tewodros isolated himself for several days in a hostile territory within sight of his last stronghold, a deputation from the Yejju, who were coming to him to offer their submission, upon hearing Tewodros's savagery promptly turned around.
Arrival of the British On 9 April, the lead elements of the British force reached the Bashilo, "and on the following morning, Good Friday, they crossed the stream barefooted, stopping to fill their water-bottles on the way." On the afternoon of that Good Friday, the decisive
Battle of Magdala began outside the fortress. The British had to get past the plateau at
Arogye, which lay across the only open route to Magdala. The way was barred by thousands of armed Ethiopian soldiers camped around the hillsides with up to 30 artillery pieces. The British, not expecting the Ethiopians to leave their defences and attack them, paid little attention to them as they formed up to deploy. Tewodros, however, ordered an attack, and thousands of soldiers, many of them armed only with spears, charged the British positions. The British quickly deployed to meet the charging mass, and poured devastating fire into their ranks, including rockets from the Naval Brigade and Mountain gun artillery fire, as well as rifle fire. Of the rocket fire, Captain Hozier remarked "Many a charred mass and mangled heap showed how terrible was the havoc, how awful the death". During the fighting, an advance guard unit overpowered some of the Ethiopian artillery crews and captured their artillery pieces. After a chaotic 90-minute battle, the defeated Ethiopians retreated back to Magdala. Altogether, about 700 to 800 Ethiopian warriors were killed and 1,200 to 1,500 wounded, most of them seriously, while on the British side there were only twenty casualties, two fatally wounded men, nine seriously wounded, and nine lightly wounded. As such, the Arogye battle was far more bloody and consequential than the subsequent day's siege of the hill-top fort at Magdala.
Siege of Magdala After repelling the Ethiopian attack, the British force moved onto Magdala the following day. As the British approached, Tewodros released two hostages on parole to offer terms. Napier insisted on release of the hostages and an unconditional surrender. Tewodros refused to unconditionally surrender, but released the European hostages over the next two days, while the native hostages had their hands and feet amputated before being thrown over the edge of the precipice surrounding the plateau. The British continued their advance on 13 April, and laid siege to the fortress of Magdala. The British attack began with a bombardment with mortars, rockets, and artillery. Infantry units then opened fire to provide cover for the
Royal Engineers as they blew up the gates of the fortress at 4pm. British infantry then poured in and opened fire, and advanced with fixed bayonets, forcing the defenders to retreat to the second gate. The British then advanced and took the second gate, where they found Tewodros dead inside. Tewodros had committed suicide with a pistol that had originally been a gift from Queen Victoria, rather than face captivity. When his death was announced, resistance from the defenders ceased. A modern commentator states "When Tewodros preferred self-inflicted death to captivity, he deprived the British of this ultimate satisfaction and laid the foundation for his own resurrection as a symbol of the defiant independence of the Ethiopian." Lieutenant Stumm, an eyewitness, described the discovery of Tewodros's body: Tewodros's body was cremated and his ashes buried inside a local church by the priests. The church itself was guarded by soldiers of the 33rd Regiment, who looted it, taking away a variety of gold, silver, and brass crosses, as well as
filigree works and rare
tabots. The casualties in the Battle for Magdala were comparatively small: the British artillery's bombardment killed about twenty Ethiopian warriors and civilians and wounded about 120, whereas a further forty-five Ethiopians were killed by rifle fire during the infantry assault. Altogether, the British troops' casualties included only ten seriously wounded and five lightly wounded. These deaths are noticeably fewer than the previous day's massacre at Arogye which proved to be the decisive engagement of the campaign. Before the British abandoned Magdala, Sir Robert ordered the destruction of Tewodros's artillery. He also permitted his troops to loot and burn the fortress, including its churches, as a punitive measure. The troops collected many historical and religious artefacts that were taken back to Britain, many of which can now be seen in the
British Library and the
British Museum. Fifteen elephants and almost 200 mules were required to carry away the booty. ==Aftermath==