1969 EC-121 shootdown incident

Beggar Shadow Mission The code name "Beggar Shadow" was used to describe the late-1960s Cold War reconnaissance program by the United States Navy that collected intelligence about and communications between Soviet Bloc nations while remaining safely (at least according to international laws) in international waters. At 07:00 local time on Tuesday, 15 April 1969, an EC-121M of the U.S. Navy's Fleet Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron One (VQ-1) took off from NAS Atsugi, Japan, on an intelligence-gathering reconnaissance mission. The aircraft, Bureau number 135749, c/n 4316, bore the tail code "PR-21" and used the radio call sign Deep Sea 129. Aboard were 8 officers and 23 enlisted men under the command of LCDR James Overstreet. Nine of the crew, including one Marine NCO, were Naval Security Group cryptologic technicians (CTs) and linguists in Russian and Korean. Its flight profile involved taking off from NAS Atsugi then flying northwest over the Sea of Japan until it came to an area off Musu Point, where the EC-121M would turn northeast toward the Soviet Union and orbit along a long elliptical track similar to that of a racetrack; once the mission was complete, they were to return to Osan Air Base, South Korea. LCDR Overstreet's orders included a prohibition from approaching closer than to the North Korean coast. VQ-1 had flown the route and orbit for two years, and the mission had been graded as being of "minimal risk." During the first three months of 1969, nearly 200 similar missions had been flown by both Navy and U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft off North Korea's east coast without incident. near Wonsan and tracked them, assuming that they were responding in some fashion to the mission of Deep Sea 129. In the meantime the EC-121 filed a scheduled activity report by radio on time at 13:00 and did not indicate anything out of the ordinary, but this was the last message sent from the plane. Twenty-two minutes later, the radars lost the picture of the MiGs and did not reacquire it until 13:37, when they were closing in on Deep Sea 129 for a probable intercept. The communications that this activity generated within the National Security network were monitored by the EC-121's parent unit, VQ-1, which sent Deep Sea 129 a "Condition 3" alert by radio at 13:44, indicating it might be under attack. LCDR Overstreet acknowledged the warning and complied with procedures to abort the mission and return to base. Approaching from the northeastern coast at supersonic speed, however, the MiGs easily overtook the EC-121. The MiGs were armed with 23 mm cannons and AA-2 Atoll missiles; the EC-121 was unarmed and without a fighter escort. At 13:47, the radar tracks of the MiGs merged with that of Deep Sea 129, which disappeared from the radar picture two minutes later. The MiGs had attacked and shot the plane down, and while the details of the incident have never been released to the public, it is assumed that an air-to-air missile was used as the North Korean press mentioned that a "single shot" downed the aircraft. ==Reactions==

Initial North Korean reaction Immediately following the attack, the North Korean forces assumed a state of high alert. Their media broadcast its version of events two hours after the incident. Referring to the EC-121 as the "plane of the insolent U.S. imperialist aggressor army," By 14:20, the Army Security Agency post had become increasingly concerned. It first sent a FLASH message (a high priority intelligence message to be actioned within six minutes) indicating that Deep Sea 129 had disappeared, and then at 14:44, an hour after the shoot-down, sent a CRITIC ("critical intelligence") message (the highest message priority, to be processed and sent within two minutes) to six addressees within the National Command Authority, including President Richard M. Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. Nixon regarded the attack as a total surprise and remained at a loss to explain it. The U.S. bureaucracy and the members of the National Security Council were also unable to understand the attack. Soviet reaction Despite being the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union quickly provided assistance in the recovery efforts. Two Soviet destroyers were sent to the Sea of Japan, and their involvement highlighted Moscow's disapproval of the attack on the EC-121. ==U.S. response==

The US responded by activating Task Force 71 (TF-71) to protect future flights over those international waters. Initially, the Task Force comprised the aircraft carriers , , , and with a screen of cruisers and destroyers that also included the battleship . The ships for TF-71 came mostly from Southeast Asia duty. This deployment became one of the largest shows of force in the area since the Korean War. Following the attack, some, including Representative Mendel Rivers responded to the attack by calling for retaliation against North Korea. In addition to the NSC's ideas, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared several plans to bomb the airfield at Sondok and Wonsan. If all went according to plan, bombers would attack the airfields under the cover of night. CINCPAC proposed the positioning of ships, with missiles capable of taking down planes, in the Sea of Japan with orders to destroy North Korean aircraft, impound other North Korean vessels venturing into international waters (fishing boats, etc.), and fire onto the shore (especially near Wonsan). In the end, no action was taken against the North Koreans in the days following the attack. The new Nixon administration had little to no information about the location and availability of both U.S. and North Korean forces, as the administration had difficulty communicating with those in the Pacific. By the time this information was communicated to the planners, it was too late to react. Both Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger were ashamed at the outcome of the event, with Kissinger describing "our conduct in the EC-121 crisis as weak, indecisive, and disorganized." Once it became clear that no action would be taken against the North Koreans, Nixon promised that "they'll (i.e., North Koreans) never get away with it again," and ordered a "resumption of aerial reconnaissance flights." Task Force 71, 1969 ==Motivation for the attack==

A few theories have arisen to explain the unprompted take down of the EC-121, but all revolve around North Korea as a rogue entity. Nixon and his administration assumed that North Korea would behave within the standards of international law. Similar to the Pueblo incident, Pyongyang took action against the EC-121 plane despite it being located well outside North Korean territory. Other sources claim that this attack may have taken place to honor Kim Il Sung, as his birthday fell on April 15, but not enough evidence exists to support this statement. Some also believe that this may have been an accidental shooting, but many disagree because of the promptness of the media coverage in North Korea as well as its story that the plane had entered far into North Korean airspace. In the end, not enough information is available outside of North Korea to discern the true motive. ==See also==