Early on 27 February 1994, six pilots from the 92nd Brigade of the RS air force, including the brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel Zvezdan Pešić, were transferred from
Banja Luka to Udbina for a mission. They were joined by two RSK air force pilots. The briefing was conducted by staff from both the RS and RSK air forces. The mission involved two attacks on
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) armament factories located in towns in central Bosnia. One attack was to be conducted by six J-21 Jastreb aircraft on the MMK Bratstvo arms factory at
Novi Travnik, and the second by two Orao's on the
Slavko Rodić weapons plant at
Bugojno. According to the aviation author Bojan Dimitrijević, it was planned that the RS air force command centre in Banja Luka would transmit a codeword to signal that the skies over the target area were clear, but communications problems meant that Pešić had to decide whether to launch the mission without that information. About 06:00 on 28 February, eight aircraft took off from Udbina, turning turned north east. They flew low over the hilly terrain, reaching the area between the towns of
Jajce and
Ključ about 06:21. Visibility was excellent. At this time, a British
airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft–flying over
Hungary as part of the NATO operation–detected at least six aircraft. Its crew warned them via radio to land, exit the no-fly zone, or be engaged, but received no response. About 06:35, the AWACS crew contacted a pair of F-16s from the 526th Fighter Squadron conducting
combat air patrol (CAP) operations over the city of
Mostar about south of Novi Travnik. Low on fuel, the US aircraft nevertheless responded and spotted the attacking Jastrebs. They re-issued the warning, but were also ignored, and the Jastrebs continued their attack. According to Dimitrijević, they did not receive the warnings because their aircraft could not receive the frequency on which the warning was issued. Having delivered their attack, the Jastrebs headed back to base, flying at an altitude of about to reduce radar signature and vulnerability. The attack was a clear violation of the no-fly zone; having been cleared to open fire, Captain Robert G. Wright launched a radar-guided
AIM-120 missile at 06:42 which hit the trailing Jastreb and it crashed just outside the village of Bratstvo. Five minutes later, Wright fired a heat-seeking
AIM-9 missile which hit another Jastreb and it crashed near the village of
Crkveno from Ključ. The Jastrebs scattered, and, about 06:48, Wright scored a direct hit on another Jastreb with an AIM-9 which destroyed the aircraft. His
wingman, Captain
Scott O'Grady, fired an AIM-9 at one of the fleeing Jastrebs but missed. When Wright and O'Grady departed the area to refuel, they handed over the interception to two other 526th Squadron F-16Cs. Captain Stephen L. Allen shot down another Jastreb with an AIM-9 about 06:50, but according to the USAF historian Daniel Haulman, the remaining two Jastrebs escaped into Croatian airspace and returned to Udbina. In contrast, Dimitrijević states that Allen shot down two of the remaining Jastrebs, acknowledging that the USAF only credits him with one. He adds that the remaining Jastreb was entering Croatian airspace and was therefore outside the no-fly zone. He goes on to state that the two Orao's saw two F-16s while they were doing their bombing run at Bugojno, but the US aircraft appeared to have not detected them. The Orao's flew back to Udbina and landed safely. Dimitrijević also states that only one Jastreb returned to Udbina, and that it had been badly damaged by a proximity-fused missile. Its engine shut down on approach to Udbina and the pilot had to conduct an emergency glide landing. Its pilot reported that the other five aircraft had been shot down over Travnik by NATO fighters. None of the Jastreb pilots are believed to have seen the aircraft that shot them down. Three of the Jastreb pilots, including Pešić, were killed. Two others ejected safely. ==Aftermath==