Probable source The consensus is that the FMD virus came from infected or contaminated meat that was part of the
swill being fed to pigs at Burnside Farm in Heddon-on-the-Wall. The swill had not been properly heat-sterilized and the virus had thus been allowed to infect the pigs. As the virus was believed to be not present in the UK prior to the outbreak, and given there were import restrictions for meat from countries known to harbour FMD, it is likely that the infected meat had been illegally imported to the UK. Such imports are likely to be for the catering industry and a total ban on the feeding of catering waste containing meat or meat products was introduced early in the epidemic.
Government inquiries As the 2001 outbreak seemed to cause as much harm as
the previous outbreak in 1967, there was a widespread government and public perception that little had been learnt from the previous epizootic (despite the publication in 1968 of a report, the
Northumberland Inquiry, on the previous outbreak). In August 2001 therefore, in an effort to prevent this failure to learn from history from happening again, HM Government launched three inquiries into various aspects of the crisis. They were: •
Inquiry into the lessons to be learned from the foot and mouth disease outbreak of 2001. This inquiry was devoted specifically to the government's handling of the crisis. It was chaired by Sir Iain Anderson CBE, previously a
special adviser to Tony Blair, and reported in July 2002. •
The Royal Society Inquiry into Infectious Diseases in Livestock. This inquiry examined the scientific aspects of the crisis, for instance the efficacy of vaccinations, the way the virus spreads and so on. It was chaired by Sir
Brian Follett and also reported in July 2002. •
Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food. This inquiry focused on the long-term production and delivery of food within the country. It was chaired by
Sir Donald Curry and reported in January 2002. All three inquiries reported their findings to the public. However, the inquiries themselves took place in private. The lack of a full public inquiry into the crisis caused a group of farmers, business leaders and media organisations to lodge an appeal at the
High Court against the government's decision not to hold such an inquiry.
Margaret Beckett,
Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, had ruled out a public inquiry on the grounds that it would be too costly and take too long. After a four-day hearing, the court sided with Beckett and the Government. An
Independent Inquiry into Foot and Mouth Disease in Scotland initiated by the
Royal Society of Edinburgh was chaired by Professor Ian Cunningham. This embraced not only the scientific aspects of the outbreak, but also economic, social and psychological effects of the event. The costs to Scottish agriculture of the FMD outbreak were estimated to be £231m and the loss of gross revenue to tourism to be between £200–250m for Scotland as a whole. It recommended that there should be a regional laboratory in Scotland, and priority be given to the development of testing procedures. The delay in imposing a ban of all movements until the third day after confirmation, the use of less than transparent
modelling techniques and the failure to call on more than a fraction of the considerable relevant scientific expertise available in Scotland were criticised. The case for emergency protective
vaccination, without subsequent slaughter, was supported by the evidence and it was recommended that
contingency plans should include emergency barrier, or ring, vaccination as an adjunct to slaughter in clinical cases. Reservations about the consumption of meat and milk from vaccinated animals were seen to be unjustified. The importance of
biosecurity at all times and throughout the
agricultural industry was emphasised and it stated that SEERAD (The
Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department) should take the lead in establishing standards to be applied in normal times and at the start of an outbreak. A
Chief Veterinary Officer (Scotland) should be appointed and a "Territorial Veterinary Army" formed from professionals to be called upon should need arise. Burial of carcasses, where conditions permit, was identified as the preferred option for disposal of slaughtered animals. The
Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) should have a clear role in contingency planning and management of any future emergency. There was a need for operational guidelines for slaughtermen. In formulating movement restriction, the dispersed nature of many holdings should be taken into account. There should be a clear and consistent strategy for compensation for slaughtered animals. The closing down of the country initially for no more than three weeks and then reopening in non-affected areas was recommended. Great importance was placed on contingency planning, on the need for regular exercises and on the setting up of an independent
standing committee to monitor the maintenance of effective planning. In all, some twenty seven recommendations were made to the
Scottish Executive. The
Farm Animal Welfare Council, an independent advisory body established by the Government in 1979, also published a report. Its recommendations including material from both The Royal Society Inquiry into Infectious Diseases in Livestock and the Independent Inquiry into Foot and Mouth Disease in Scotland. The use of a
vaccine to halt the spread of the disease was repeatedly considered during the outbreak, but the government decided not to use it after pressure from the
National Farmers Union. Although the vaccine was believed to be effective, export rules would prevent the export of British livestock in the future, and it was decided that this was too great a price to pay, although this was controversial because the value of the export industry (£592 million per year) was small compared to losses to tourism resulting from the measures taken. Following the outbreak, the law was changed to permit vaccinations rather than culling. ==Health and social consequences==