Wreckage recovery and analysis : The spiral "wire" wrapped around the threaded portion is the remnant of the internal
screw thread stripped from the acme nut. The
USS Cleveland (LPD-7) assisted in recovery operations. for transport from the on February 3, 2000. Using
side-scan sonar,
remotely operated vehicles, and a commercial fishing trawler, workers recovered about 85% of the fuselage (including the tail section) and a majority of the wing components. In addition, both engines, as well as the
flight data recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder, were retrieved. All wreckage recovered from the crash site was unloaded at the
Seabees'
Naval Construction Battalion Center Port Hueneme, California, for examination and documentation by NTSB investigators. Both the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew (also referred to as "
acme screw") and the corresponding acme nut, through which the jackscrew turns, were found. The jackscrew was constructed from
case-hardened steel and is long and in diameter. The acme nut was constructed from a softer
copper alloy containing
aluminum,
nickel, and
bronze. As the jackscrew rotates, it moves up or down through the (fixed) acme nut, and this linear motion moves the horizontal stabilizer for the trim system. Upon subsequent examination, the jackscrew was found to have metallic filaments wrapped around it, which were later determined to be the remains of the acme nut thread. that was used to conduct an underwater search for the airplane's flight data recorders. . Later analysis determined that approximately 90% of the thread in the acme nut had already worn away before the flight, and that it ultimately stripped while the aircraft was en route to San Francisco. Once the threads failed, the horizontal stabilizer assembly was exposed to aerodynamic forces beyond its design limits, resulting in its complete failure. Based on the interval since the last inspection of the jackscrew assembly, the NTSB concluded that the acme nut threads had worn at a rate of 0.012 inches (0.30 mm) per 1,000 flight hours—significantly higher than the expected rate of 0.001 inches (0.025 mm) per 1,000 flight hours. During the investigation, the NTSB examined several possible causes for this excessive wear, including Alaska Airlines’ substitution—approved by the manufacturer, McDonnell Douglas—of AeroShell 33 grease in place of the previously specified Mobilgrease 28. However, the use of AeroShell 33 was ultimately determined not to have contributed to the accident.. Ultimately, the lack of lubrication of the acme-nut thread and the resultant excessive wear were determined to be the direct causes of the accident. Both of these circumstances resulted from Alaska Airlines' attempts to cut costs.
Inadequate lubrication and end-play checks The investigation sought to examine why scheduled maintenance had failed to adequately lubricate the jackscrew assembly. In interviews with the Alaska Airlines mechanic who last performed the lubrication at SFO, the task was shown to take about one hour, whereas the aircraft manufacturer estimated the task should take four hours. This and other evidence suggested to the NTSB that "the SFO mechanic who was responsible for lubricating the jackscrew assembly in September 1999 did not adequately perform the task." Laboratory tests indicated that the excessive wear of the jackscrew assembly could not have accumulated in just the four-month period between the September 1999 maintenance and the accident flight. Therefore, the NTSB concluded, "more than just the last lubrication was missed or inadequately performed."
John Liotine In 1998, an Alaska Airlines mechanic named John Liotine, who worked in the Alaska Airlines maintenance center in
Oakland, California, told the FAA that supervisors were approving records of maintenance that they were not allowed to approve or that indicated work had been completed when, in fact, it had not. Liotine began working with federal investigators by secretly audio recording his supervisors. On December 22, 1998, federal authorities raided an Alaska Airlines property and seized maintenance records. In August 1999, Alaska Airlines put Liotine on paid leave, and in 2000, Liotine filed a
libel suit against the airline. The crash of AS261 became a part of the federal investigation against Alaska Airlines, because, in 1997, Liotine had recommended that the jackscrew and gimbal nut of the accident aircraft be replaced, but had been overruled by another supervisor. In December 2001, federal prosecutors stated that they were not going to file criminal charges against Alaska Airlines. Around that time, Alaska Airlines agreed to settle the libel suit by paying about $500,000; as part of the settlement, Liotine resigned. ==Conclusions==