On the same day the division again joined the active army, now in the 44th Army of the new Crimean Front. It was at virtually full strength, as follows: • 13,240 personnel (of 14,158 authorized) • 6,576 horses (of 6,742 authorized) • 369 motor vehicles (of 418 authorized) • 90
sub-machine guns (of 1,413 authorized) • 334
light machine guns (of 348 authorized) • 101
heavy machine guns (of 110 authorized) • 28 antiaircraft machine guns (as authorized) • 120 mortars (as authorized) • 23
76mm mountain guns (of 32 authorized) • 24
122mm howitzers (as authorized) • 8
45mm antitank guns (as authorized) • 4
37mm antiaircraft guns (of 8 authorized) • 36 radios (of 56 authorized) • 2 armored cars (not authorized) Crimean Front began its operations to retake the
Kerch Peninsula overnight on December 25/26 with landings in the vicinity of Kerch itself. This was followed on December 28/29 with further landings at the port city of Feodosia which took the defending German
XXXXII Army Corps utterly by surprise. The assault was led by naval infantry detachments plus the 633rd Rifle Regiment of the
157th Rifle Division and by 0730 hours the German forces had completely lost control of the port. By the end of the day elements of three Red Army divisions were ashore, including the 251st and 291st Mountain Regiments. The response of the German Corps commander, Lt. Gen.
H. von Sponeck, was one of near panic as the communications of his own
46th Infantry Division were in immediate danger of being cut off from the rest of the Crimea. He disobeyed orders from the headquarters of
11th Army and directed the 46th to retreat from the Kerch area despite the fact that nearly 20,000 Romanian troops were on hand to counterattack Feodosia. Sponeck ordered two Romanian brigades to counterattack the Soviet lodgement (now organized as the 9th Rifle Corps) on December 30 but these troops, tired from countermarching and without artillery or air support, were quickly repulsed. 9th Corps now pushed northward to complete the isolation of XXXXII Corps. Over two days the 46th Infantry marched westward in a snowstorm; fuel shortages led to some motor vehicles being abandoned and heavy weapons lagged behind. When its lead elements reached the crossroads town of
Vladislavovka they were shocked to find it held in strength by the 63rd Mountain Division. The German divisional commander ordered his lead regiments to crash through the position but this failed due to exhaustion and lack of artillery. Inexplicably the 9th Corps had left a 9km-wide gap between its pincer and the south shore of the
Sea of Azov through which the German division was able to escape with light losses in personnel. By January 1, 1942 the XXXXII Corps had established a new line roughly west of Feodosia. An attack that day on the Corps command post at
Ismail-Terek by infantry and
T-26 tanks of 44th Army failed with the loss of 16 vehicles knocked out. Despite this setback the Army appeared to be in a good position with 23,000 troops ashore and the Axis forces appearing weak and disorganized. The 236th Rifle Division was holding about west of Feodosia on the Biyuk-Eget ridge while the 63rd Mountain remained on the defense in and around Vladislavovka as the 51st Army moved up from the Kerch area. In fact the 44th Army was overextended and the Crimean Front was hampered by the inept leadership of Lt. Gen.
D. T. Kozlov. By January 13 the commander of 11th Army,
Gen. d. Inf. E. von Manstein, had concentrated more than four divisions outside Feodosia. His counteroffensive began at dawn on January 15, focused on the 236th which was badly defeated in a single day of fighting, in part because Kozlov was convinced the German objective was Vladislavovka and therefore concentrated most of his reserves to this sector. Feodosia fell to the Axis on January 17 and the 63rd Mountain then came under attack, losing its positions and being forced back toward the Black Sea as the
XXX Army Corps attempted to isolate the 236th. The 236th Rifle Division was soon annihilated with the 63rd Mountain and 157th Divisions being forced back to the Parpach Isthmus. After January 20 the two sides dug in along this 17km-wide line which soon acquired the characteristics of a WWI battlefield with extensive trenches, dugouts and barbed wire. 44th Army was effectively crippled and the addition of 51st Army did not allow Crimean Front to do more than hold its ground. On February 24 Lt. Colonel Tsindzenevskii handed his command to Col. Matvei Vasilevich Vinogradov, who would lead the division for the remainder of its existence. By the beginning of February the 9th Rifle Corps had been abolished and the 251st Mountain Regiment was serving as a separate regiment within 44th Army but later that month it returned to divisional command. From February 27 to April 11 Crimean Front launched a series of efforts to break out west of Parpach toward Sevastopol but these had little result beyond heavy Soviet casualties. 51st Army on the northern part of the line did most of this fighting with 44th Army offering diversionary support; as one further result the bulk of the Front's forces ended up massed on this northern flank. At the start of May the Army had the 63rd Mountain, 157th,
276th,
396th and
404th Rifle Divisions under command.
Operation Bustard Hunt Before the last of these offensives ended General von Manstein began planning an operation to destroy all three armies of Crimean Front in one stroke. Operation
Trappenjagd would initially target the 44th Army, which was defending a sector about long with five rifle divisions and two tank brigades. Although defenses in depth had been prepared, almost all the rifle units were deployed within of the front line. They were backed by an 11m-wide antitank ditch across the Parpach Isthmus which was protected by minefields, barbed wire and steel girders planted vertically. When the attack began on May 8 German airstrikes quickly achieved air superiority and a 10-minute artillery preparation on the 63rd Mountain and 276th Divisions began at 0415 hours. The 251st Mountain Regiment held a very strong position on the 40m high "Tatar Hill" north of the FeodosiaKerch road but was not entirely tied in with the 346th Regiment to the south.
Ju 87 dive bombers of
Sturzkampfgeschwader 77 blasted the top of the hill just as troops of the
28th Jäger Division left their start line. Shortly after the air attacks ended one regiment of the
Jäger division, supported by 21
StuG III Ausf. B assault guns and 18 captured Soviet tanks, was able to first bypass and then overwhelm the isolated 346th Regiment. About to the south the lead regiments of the
132nd Infantry Division and 22 assault guns overran the strongpoints of the 291st Regiment on the coast by 0445 hours. After "Tatar Hill" was taken the leading German forces reached the west side of the antitank ditch about an hour later and the 49th
Jäger Regiment had forced a crossing by 0755 hours in the face of scattered resistance from isolated Red Army units. In only three-and-a-half hours the 63rd Mountain's front line regiments had been irreparably shattered. Meanwhile, a flotilla of assault boats landed a German force 1,500m behind the antitank ditch to disrupt the second echelon defenses. Overnight the ditch was bridged, and late on the 9th Manstein was able to commit the
22nd Panzer Division which by the middle of the next day reached the Sea of Azov, cutting off the 51st Army as well as the remnants of the 44th. The what remained of the division was devastated in this mayhem and while some of its men were among the approximately 50,000 evacuated from Crimea to the
Taman peninsula, the 63rd Mountain had already effectively ceased to exist and was officially disbanded on May 13. == References ==