Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida

A bench trial was held December 11–13, 2017 and closing arguments were heard on February 16, 2018, before U.S. District Court Judge Timothy J. Corrigan. On July 26, 2018, Judge Corrigan issued an opinion finding for Kasper, holding that Adams's rights had been violated and that the school policy violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. == Ruling by a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit ==

The school board appealed the ruling to a three-judge panel of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. On August 7, 2020, the opinion of Judge Beverly B. Martin, joined by Judge Jill A. Pryor, again decided in favor of Adams. Judge Martin ruled that a public school may not "harm transgender students by establishing arbitrary, separate rules for their restroom use." Chief Judge William H. Pryor Jr. dissented, arguing that the discrimination was on the basis of sex, not on transgender status, which is valid under Title IX when creating sex-segregated bathrooms. In response to a motion for reconsideration, the panel issued a new opinion on July 14, 2021, limited to the equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, without dealing with the Title IX claim. On August 23, 2021, the 11th Circuit voted to vacate the panel opinion and rehear the case en banc. == En banc ruling by the Eleventh Circuit ==

On December 30, 2022, the en banc 11th Circuit issued an opinion overruling the district court's opinion in a 7–4 decision. Judge Logoa wrote both the majority opinion and also a special concurring opinion. Dissents were written by Judges Wilson, Jordan, Rosenbaum, and Pryor. In the majority opinion Judge Lagoa wrote "Title IX allows schools to provide separate bathrooms on the basis of biological sex." Judge Wilson wrote that the bathroom policy was discriminatory because "[u]nderlying this sex-assigned-at-matriculation bathroom policy, however, is the presumption that biological sex is accurately determinable at birth and that it is a static or permanent biological determination." Judge Jill Pryor wrote that "gender identity is an immutable, biological component of a person's sex" and that "birth-assigned sex and chromosomal structure take a back seat in determining a person's sex when that person's gender identity diverges from those two components." Pryor also wrote that Judge Jordan wrote that the policy "can only be justified by administrative convenience. And when intermediate scrutiny applies, administrative convenience is an insufficient justification for a gender-based classification." == See also ==