African Standby Force

Before the founding of the African Union (AU) in 2001, its predecessor Organisation of African Unity (OAU) did not provide appropriate tools for a collective and comprehensive acting of African states in times of violent crisis, mostly due to the shared value of non-interference into the internal affairs of states. During the 1990s, a series of violent conflicts in Africa, most importantly the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, urged the African states for a change in their common security collaboration. After the establishment of the AU in 2001, the non-interference clause of OAU was not longer valid. The Constitutive Act now gave the AU the right to intervene in a member state in grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The same year, a new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was presented, in order to build and strengthen African capacities for managing and resolving conflicts on the continent. The APSA comprises five pillars that complement one another: A Peace and Security Council, a Continental Early Warning System, a Panel of the Wise, a Peace Fund, and an African Standby Force. The ASF is therefore a constituting element of the APSA. The same document defined six ASF deployment Scenarios. The ASF Policy Framework Document from May 2003 aimed the development of the ASF in two phases: • Phase Two (1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010): By the year 2010, the AU planned to have developed the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while the RECs/Regions will continue to develop the capacity to deploy a Mission Headquarters (HQs) for Scenario 4, involving AU/Regional peacekeeping forces. • Roadmap I (adopted in March 2005) covered the period from June 2006 to March 2008 • Roadmap II (adopted in April 2008) covered the period from April 2008 to December 2010 • Roadmap III (adopted in December 2010) covered the period from December 2010 to December 2015 The ASF Roadmap III recognized that most goals of Phase One were not met until 2010 and therefore set the date for the achievement of the Full Operational Capability (FOC) to 2015. In December 2013, an assessment of the African Standby Force by an AU Panel of Experts concluded that the ASF is unlikely to achieve FOC in 2015 without major efforts made by all stakeholders. == Composition ==

Article 13 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) foresaw an ASF to be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. For that purpose, the protocol urged the member states to take steps to establish standby contingents for participation in peace support missions decided on by the PSC or intervention authorized by the AU Assembly. The strength and types of such contingents, their degree of readiness and general location should be determined in so-called Peace Support Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and shall be subject to periodic reviews depending on prevailing crisis and conflict situations. == Mandate ==

According to the PSC Protocol, signed in 2002, the ASF should enable the PSC to perform its responsibilities. Article 13 of the protocol specifically directs the following functions to the ASF: :* observation and monitoring missions; :* other types of peace support missions; :* intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act; :* preventive deployment in order to prevent ::i. a dispute or a conflict from escalating, ::ii. an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighboring areas or States, and ::iii. the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement.; :* peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; :* humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and :* any other functions as may be mandated by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly. According to the protocol, the ASF is suggested to cooperate with the United Nations and its Agencies, other relevant international organizations and regional organizations, as well as with national authorities and NGOs, where appropriate. The detailed tasks of the ASF and its modus operandi for each authorized mission are to be considered and approved by the Peace and Security Council upon recommendation of the commission. == Mission scenarios ==

The Maputo Report and The Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF from May 2003 mentions six scenarios for the deployment of the regional contingents of the Force in Peace Support Operations (PSOs), ascending in their complexity of structures, management efforts and resources for deployment and sustainment. :::Scenario 1: AU/Regional military advice to a political mission :::Scenario 2: AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission :::Scenario 3: Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission :::Scenario 4: AU/Regional Peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace-building) :::Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping force for complex multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers :::Scenario 6: AU intervention, e.g. in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly As long-term goals for the deployment of the Force, it was planned that scenario 1-4 should be able to deploy in 30 days (possible only if pre-mandate actions have been taken), scenario 5 should complete deployment in 90 days, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days (possible only if pre-mandate actions have been undertaken), and finally, Scenario 6, implied that will be important the AU can deploy a robust military force in 14 days. The ASF Roadmap III demanded the six mission scenarios for PSOs to be revised and adopted to new paradigms of Peacekeeping. == Rapid Deployment Capability ==

The ASF Policy Framework and the Roadmap for the Operationalization of the ASF called for the establishment of a "Rapid Deployment Capability" (RDC) capable of intervening, within fourteen days, in cases of genocide and gross human rights abuses under Scenario 6. The RDC was decided to be an integral part of the regional Standby Forces to be deployed at the entry point, as a precursor to the deployment of a larger mission. At the end of 2013, the Expert Panel of the AU stated that the goal, recommended in Roadmap III, to test, evaluate and operationalize the RDC by 2012, was not met. == Current status ==

Exercises From 2008 until 2010, the training and capacity building cycle AMANI AFRICA I (meaning “peace in Africa,” in Swahili), designed to evaluate the effectiveness ASF for an AU mandated peace support operation (PSO) was conducted by the African Union in collaboration with the European Union. It climaxed in the first continental exercise, called a Command Post Exercise (CPX), of this kind in Addis Ababa. AMANI AFRICA I focused mostly on validating policies and processes, at the continental strategic level, in employing the African Standby Force within the broader African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). According to the AU, it provided objective evidence to support proposals for further organizational and operational developments of training, procedures and multidimensional capacities of the ASF. The African Union Commission (AUC) is planning to conduct a field training exercise (FTX) in October 2014 in Lesotho at the climax of an ongoing training cycle known as AMANI AFRICA II. According to the AU, the AMANI AFRICA II cycle aims at enabling the ASF to achieve its FOC by 2015 and especially at "validating the capacity of the African Union to grant a mandate for the use of a Rapid Deployment Capability, as an initial operation for scenario six and lead in the process, a fully-fledged multidimensional peace operation (scenario 5)." Hassan later died, and as of 2007(?) (2013?) no replacement had been found. The position was vacant for at least three years. North African Regional Capacity The North African Regional Capacity or North African Region Capability was created to fill a sub-regional vacuum in North Africa. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) has been dormant since its establishment in 1989. Throughout the last two decades, revitalizing the AMU proved to be very difficult due to political dynamics amongst member states. Thus, there was a need to create a regional mechanism to enable North African countries to contribute to the African Standby Force. This is why in mid 2007 a memorandum of understanding was drafted to establish NARC. In the absence of a joint secretariat to coordinate cooperation amongst NARC member states, Libya voluntarily played this role during the initial phase of starting up NARC which lasted for three years (2005-2008). Later on, the second meeting of NARC Ministers of Defence held in Tripoli in December 2008 approved a recommendation to establish an executive secretariat to be located in Tripoli. Subsequently, the NARC Executive Secretariat and Planning Element were inaugurated in April 2009. It was however, expected that staff from other member states will join the Executive Secretariat and PLANELM in September 2010. While both Egypt and Algeria had identified staff for the two elements, these countries were yet to sign the hosting agreement with Libya, and in some cases the deployment of staff was constrained by domestic considerations including promotions and retirements. Meanwhile, progress in generating the civilian officers for the PLANELM lagged even further behind; this essentially meant that the NARC PLANELM was purely military in 2010. On 28 May 2010, the NARC Executive Secretary, Major-General Ahmed Oun, signed, on behalf of NARC, the memorandum of understanding on cooperation between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa, at the Headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa. It was reported in January 2011 by Magharebia that Algeria was to host the NARC headquarters. Under an agreement made on Tuesday, January 25, 2011, Algeria was planned to become the seat of both NARC headquarters and the force's administration. The "Arab Spring" (2011) led to a major setback in the establishment of the NARC. Members include Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Western Sahara. Morocco and Mauritania are now more closely associated with ECOWAS peace efforts, and Tunisia did not become actively involved in the NARC. ECOWAS Standby Force :Members: Ghana, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Senegal, Niger, Burkina Faso, Gambia, and Cape Verde The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) is a standby arrangement made up of military, police and civilian components and which is consistent with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter which provides for regional peace and security arrangements. A partial legal basis is given by Article 21 of the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of December 1999. Members include São Tomé and Príncipe, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of the Congo, Angola, Burundi, and Democratic Republic of the Congo. Made up of military contingents from ECCAS member states, its aim is to carry out peace, security and humanitarian aid missions. It is called upon to intervene in particular in the event of aggression or conflicts in any Member State, internal conflicts or in the event of overthrow of the constitutional institutions of a Member State. The ECCAS Standby Force, or in French, Force Multinationale de l’Afrique Centrale (FOMAC), was established in 2006 at the ECCAS Yaoundé Summit. It was established under the framework of ECCAS’ Peace and Security Council, known as COPAX. The COPAX is the decision making organ of the ECCAS on all issues concerning peace and security. All 10 EASF Members States are represented within the PLANELM. with 1,290 participants (military, police, civilian), to test EASF's deployment and mission implementation capability. SADC Standby Brigade The SADC Standby Brigade was launched on August 17, 2007, in Lusaka, Zambia, with, initially, a military and police component. A civilian component was added later. The members who have signed the initial agreement include Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Madagascar, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. Internal Revision The ASF Roadmap III recognized major difficulties in the establishment of the ASF. Most importantly, it recognized that ASF was not able to reach its Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2010, a goal that was set in previous Roadmaps and key documents. Therefore, the experts set the new date for the FOC to 2015. Furthermore, in the policy document it is observed that the ASF still lacked the ability to manage complex peacekeeping operations as specified in the ASF Roadmap II. Similarly, the AU experts ascertain that the RECs/RMs did not reach the full capacity to deploy a mission headquarters for Scenario 4 involving AU/regional forces. Other problems were seen in a low level of awareness and commitment among the different stakeholders as well as a lack of institutional capacity and effective coordination between the AU and RECs/RMs. Additionally, there was a slow development of the civil component in comparison with the other components. Concerning the political process, the Roadmap mentions that there was at the time no written procedure governing AU political decision making and subsequent Mission planning. Therefore, the experts stressed the need for the finalization and adoption of a comprehensive memorandum of understanding on the use of the ASF for AU mandated missions in order to clarify the relationship between the AU, RECs/RMs and member states. The Roadmap also outlined several fields of progress in the development of the ASF. These achievements include the production of a set of common policy documents, an annual continental training program, and improved training standards within nations and standby forces that could be used collectively, albeit at an initial operational capability at the moment, mainly for logistic and institutional reasons. Notable progress was also ascertained in the development of a harmonized Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) concept. Lastly, the Roadmap saw progress in the evolution of the police component, notably in the area of policy development and the establishment of management capabilities at the strategic level of the AU and the operational level of the RECs/RMs. Achievements in the development of the Force to be reached in the period between 2010 and 2015, as stated in the Roadmap, are an "ASF Vision to be presented to AU Summit in January/February 2012; a staffed, trained and fully operational PSOD by December 2011; a fully operational RDC by December 2012, to be confirmed by the continental exercise AMANI AFRICA II; and finally, a fully operational ASF by December 2015 to be confirmed by the continental exercise AMANI AFRICA III." From July to December 2013, the AU conducted an assessment of the status of development of the ASF through an Independent Panel of Experts. One of the findings of the assessment was that it would be unlikely for the ASF to reach its FOC until December 2015 without major efforts by all stakeholders. == Criticism ==

One important criticism of the ASF is the accusation that, due to the delay in its establishment, the Force could not be used as a tool of peacemaking in the latest occurrence of crises in Africa, such as the fight against the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, the war in Somalia, as well as the ongoing conflict in Eastern D.R. Congo. Another criticism is the fact that the RECs/RMs have very different perceptions on whether the AU or the UN should mandate the employment of the ASF. For instance, SADC and ECOWAS tend to prefer UN Security Council authorization. This lack of consensus on the mandatory authority leads to the AU's current inability to mandate a mission. Furthermore, it was claimed that the UNSC would tend to caution against regional interventions without its authorization, whereas the AU would have interpreted the status of the PSC as a legitimate authority within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter relating to Regional Arrangements. One major obstacle to assessing the achievement of ASF's FOC is a missing clear definition of the FOC. ==See also==