In 1260, Hulegu sent envoys to
Qutuz in
Cairo with a letter demanding his surrender. Qutuz responded, however, by killing the envoys and displaying their heads on
Bab Zuweila, one of the gates of Cairo. Hulegu withdrew from the
Levant with the bulk of his army, leaving his forces west of the
Euphrates with only one
tumen (nominally 10,000 men, but usually fewer), and a handful of vassal troops under the
Naiman Nestorian Christian general Kitbuqa. Contemporary Mamluk chronicler
al-Yunini's
Dhayl Mirat Al-Zaman states that the Mongol army under Kitbuqa, including vassals, numbered 100,000 men in total, but this was likely an exaggeration. Upon receiving news of Hulegu's departure, Mamluk Sultan Qutuz quickly assembled a large army at Cairo and departed on July 26, 1260, and traveled to al-Salihiyya. Al-Nasir Yusuf's Syrian battalions and the Egyptian army proper, along with the Shahraziriyya, Arabs, and Turcomans, made up his forces. However, al-Magrizi claims that the amirs at al-Salihiyya declined to pursue Qutuz's attack on the Mongols. After then, the sultan had to use a powerful speech to overcome their opposition. Baybars was subsequently elevated by Qutuz to head the vanguard in order to scout the enemy's movements. With the soldiers he commanded, Baybars advanced on Gaza, which was then a Mongol outpost. Upon his approach, Baydara, the Mongol commander, dispatched an urgent report to Kitbugha. However, before Baydara received orders from Kitbugha to hold Gaza and await the main Mongol force, the town had been taken by Baybars, and Qutuz's Egyptian army had already entered Gaza. Deflated, Baydara was forced to retreat. An advance to the north was required if Kitbugha's main Mongol force was to be routed and expelled from Syria following this initial victory. The Palestinian coast was by far the most practical path for a sizable army during the hot season, and it also ensured that the army would have access to water. However, this road went through Jerusalem, which was part of the Frankish realm. In order to secure the right of free passage for his army from the Acre administration, or more likely to gain the support from the Franks Qutuz dispatched negotiators there. There were lengthy discussion of how to react. The Franks have long viewed their Muslim neighbors as close trading partners and more or less calculating rivals. The rulers of Acre, in contrast to Bohemond VI, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, viewed the Mongols as barbarians and preferred the Muslims. The Franks had not been unimpressed by the Mongols' recent conquest and looting of Sidon. As Egypt's rulers since 1250, the Mamluks, on the other hand, had not yet taken on the appearance of being a threat to the Franks. They eventually remained neutral but allowed Qutuz to march through their territories, and supplied his army with provisions while it was encamped on the plain of Acre. Qutuz led his army from Acre to the interior against the Mongols after securing the Franks' neutrality, which relieved him of the concern that they might stab him in the back. Rashid al-Din claims that Kitbugha was lodging at Ba'labakk when he learned of the Egyptian army's impending arrival. Yunini claims that he initially set his camp in the Biga' plain. While still in the Biqac valley, Ketbugha heard that the Mamluks had invaded Syria and were moving north. Then he marched south, gathering his dispersed men, probably scattered for grazing and garrison chores. His prudence appears to have sprung from his awareness of Qutuz's strength and his limited men. Ketbugha seems to have had between 10,000 and 12,000 soldiers left. In addition to the Georgian and Lesser Armenian battalions, the army also included contingents of two Ayyubid princes, al-Ashraf Musa and al-Said Hasan, as well as local levies who had previously served the Syrian Ayyubids. Ketbugha chose to make a stand near Ayn Jalut. The evidence strongly indicates the Mongols arrived first and took up their positions: when Baybars reached a nearby height, he found their camp already in place.
The battlefield Ayn Jalut is a perennial spring at the northwestern foot of Mount Gilboa, about 15 km north-northwest of Baysan, just west of today's Gidona; the spring is now called 'Ayn or Ma'yan Harod. For the Mongols, it was a sensible defensive choice. Wadi (Nahr) Jalut runs along the northern base of Gilboa, providing ample water for the horses, while the adjacent valley offered pasture and favorable ground for cavalry operations. Additional benefits were clear: the slopes of Gilboa secured a flank and supplied commanding observation points, as did the nearby Hill of Moreh (
Givat HaMoreh). ==Battle==