The accident was investigated by the
Accident Investigation Commission (AIC), assisted by the
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). The AIC could only determine the cause of the crash without access to a
Cockpit Voice recorder or
Flight Data Recorder, as neither recorder were required on a Twin Otter. The lack of both flight data and cockpit voice recorders adversely affected a full understanding of the accident investigation. Alternatively, on board the aircraft was a small electronic GPS tracking and data telemetry device. Using the device's Non-Volatile memory, the ATSB was able to piece together portions of the flight path. The weather in Kokoda Gap at the time was poor. Based on eyewitnesses accounts and photographic evidence retrieved by ATSB, Kokoda Gap was obscured by clouds at the time of the accident, making it difficult for the pilots to know if they were in close to terrain. Given the surrounding mountainous terrain, the evident cloud in the Kokoda Gap, had the potential to severely limit the crew's escape options, increase their workload, and test their situational awareness. A reduction in situational awareness and the presence of mountainous terrain during an approach are known risk factors in instances of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). Later investigation found that only one pilot had an
IFR rating, while the other did not. The co-pilot, First Officer Rodney Souka, had been assessed for instrument approach procedures; however, he was not qualified for flight under the IFR. Although the crew had planned the flight under Instrument flight rules, the forecast cloud in the area should have alerted the crew that under the actual conditions, visual flight in the Kokoda Gap would prove problematic. The visual descent into the Kokoda Gap required 5 km visibility, while at the time of the accident, the visibility was less than 5 km. The Australian ATSB then turned their attentions to Souka. They examined his postmortem and medical history. Investigators found that Souka had critical coronary artery heart disease, and the examining pathologist considered that Souka could have had a medical emergency at any time. Souka's relatives reported that they were not aware of any significant medical condition affecting him. If an emergency occurred in mid-air as the aircraft approached the cloud to the north of the Kokoda Gap would have instantly increased Moala's workload and distracted her from the primary task of flying the aircraft. Both those factors are known to increase the risk of CFIT. Investigators noted that Kokoda Airport was lacking in basic navigation infrastructure. The lack of ground-based navigation aids at Kokoda Airport meant that the only potential navigation assistance for the crew during their approach to Kokoda was from a GPS, or via the ground-based non-directional beacon/distance measuring equipment (NDB/DME) located at
Girua Airport. The investigation concluded that the accident was probably a controlled flight into terrain: that is, an otherwise airworthy aircraft was unintentionally flown into terrain, with little or no awareness by the crew of the impending collision. ==See also==