U.S. Supreme Court consideration
===
Certiorari and
amicus curiae briefs === The university requested that the U.S. Supreme Court stay the order requiring Bakke's admission pending its filing of a petition asking for a review. U.S. Supreme Court Justice
William Rehnquist, as
circuit justice for the
Ninth Circuit (California is within the Ninth Circuit) granted the stay for the court in November 1976. The university filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari in December 1976. The parties duly filed their briefs. The university's legal team was now headed by former
U.S. Solicitor General and
Watergate special prosecutor
Archibald Cox, who had argued many cases before the Supreme Court. Cox wrote much of the brief, and contended in it that "the outcome of this controversy will decide for future generations whether blacks, Chicanos, and other insular minorities are to have meaningful access to higher education and real opportunities to enter the learned professions". The university also took the position that Bakke had been rejected because he was unqualified. Reynold Colvin, for Bakke, argued that his client's rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to equal protection of the laws had been violated by the special admission program. Fifty-eight
amicus curiae briefs were filed, establishing a record for the Supreme Court that would stand until broken in the 1989 abortion case
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. Future justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg signed the
ACLU's brief supporting reversal in favor of the Regents; Marco deFunis, the petitioner in the 1974 case dismissed for mootness, wrote the brief for
Young Americans for Freedom supporting affirmation in favor of Bakke. In addition to the various other
amici curiae, the United States filed a brief through the Solicitor General, as it may without leave of court under the
Supreme Court's rules. When consideration of
Bakke began in the new
administration of President Jimmy Carter, early drafts of the brief both supported affirmative action and indicated that the program should be struck down and Bakke admitted. This stance reflected the mixed support of affirmative action at that time by the
Democrats. Minorities and others in that party complained, and, in late July 1977, Carter announced that the government's brief would firmly support affirmative action. That document, filed October 3, 1977 (nine days before the oral argument), stated that the government supported programs tailored to make up for past discrimination, but opposed rigid set-asides. While the case was awaiting argument, another white student, Rita Clancy, sued for admission to UC Davis Medical School on the same grounds as Bakke had. In September 1977, she was ordered admitted pending the outcome of the
Bakke case. After
Bakke was decided, the university dropped efforts to oust her, stating that, as she had successfully completed one year of medical school, she should remain.
Argument and deliberation Oral argument in
Bakke took place on October 12, 1977. There was intense public interest in the case; prospective attendees began to line up the afternoon before. The court session took two hours, with Cox arguing for the university, Colvin for Bakke, and Solicitor General
Wade H. McCree for the United States. Colvin was admonished by Justice
Lewis Franklin Powell for arguing the facts, rather than the Constitution. Cox provided one of the few moments of levity during the argument when Justice
Harry A. Blackmun wondered whether the set-aside seats could be compared to athletic scholarships. Cox was willing to agree but noted that he was a Harvard graduate, and as for sporting success, "I don't know whether it's our aim, but we don't do very well." Deliberation began with the justices lobbying each other through written memorandum. At a conference held among justices on October 15, 1977, they decided to request further briefing from the parties on the applicability of Title VI. The supplemental brief for the university was filed on November 16, and argued that Title VI was a statutory version of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and did not allow private plaintiffs, such as Bakke, to pursue a claim under it. Bakke's brief, submitted by Colvin, claimed that Bakke did have a private right of action and that his client did not want the university to suffer the remedy prescribed under Title VI for discriminatory institutions, that is the loss of federal funding, and that he wanted to be admitted to the medical school. In November, Justice Blackmun absented himself to have prostate surgery at the
Mayo Clinic. On November 22, Justice
Lewis Powell submitted a memo that analyzed the university's minority admissions program under the
strict scrutiny standard which is often applied when the government treats some citizens differently based on a
suspect classification such as race. He concluded that the program did not meet the standard and must be struck down. Powell's memorandum stated that affirmative action was permissible under some circumstances; this view eventually formed much of his final opinion. On December 9, at a conference, with Blackmun still absent, the justices considered the case. Four justices (Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger, and Justices
Potter Stewart, Rehnquist, and
John Paul Stevens) favored affirming the California Supreme Court's decision. Three justices (Brennan, White, and
Thurgood Marshall) wanted to uphold the program. Powell stated his views, after which Brennan, hoping to cobble together a five-justice majority to support the program, or at least to support the general principle of affirmative action, suggested to Powell that applying Powell's standard meant that the lower court decision would be affirmed in part and reversed in part. Powell agreed. When Blackmun returned in early 1978. he was slow to make his position on
Bakke known. On May 1, he circulated a memorandum to his colleagues indicating that he would join Brennan's bloc in support of affirmative action and the university's program. This meant that Powell's vote would decide the majority opinion. Over the following eight weeks, Powell fine-tuned his opinion to secure the willingness of each group to join part of it. The other justices began work on opinions that would set forth their views.
Decision |alt=monochrome photographic portrait of a white man in late middle age in judicial robes. He wears glasses and has thinning hair. The Supreme Court's decision in
Bakke was announced on June 28, 1978. The justices penned six opinions; none of them, in full, had the support of a majority of the court. In a
plurality opinion, Justice Powell delivered the judgment of the court. Four justices (Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens) joined with him to strike down the minority admissions program and admit Bakke. The other four justices (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun) dissented from that portion of the decision, but joined with Powell to find affirmative action permissible under some circumstances, though subject to an intermediate scrutiny standard of analysis. They also joined with Powell to reverse that portion of the judgment of the California Supreme Court that forbade the university to consider race in the admissions process.
Powell's opinion Justice Powell based a significant portion of his diversity rationale in the decision on the First Amendment, which has been significantly emphasized by later scholars. Justice Powell, after setting forth the facts of the case, discussed and found it unnecessary to decide whether Bakke had a private right of action under Title VI, assuming that was so for purposes of the case. He then discussed the scope of Title VI, opining that it barred only those racial classifications forbidden by the Constitution. Turning to the program itself, Powell determined that it was not simply a goal, as the university had contended, but a racial qualification—assuming that UC Davis could find sixteen minimally qualified minority students, there were only 84 seats in the freshman class open to white students, whereas minorities could compete for any spot in the 100-member class. He traced the history of the jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause, and concluded that it protected all, not merely African Americans or only minorities. Only if it served a
compelling interest could the government treat members of different races differently. Powell noted that the university, in its briefs, had cited decisions where there had been race-conscious remedies, such as in the school desegregation cases, but found them inapposite as there was no history of racial discrimination at the University of California-Davis Medical School to remedy. He cited precedent that when an individual was entirely foreclosed from opportunities or benefits provided by the government and enjoyed by those of a different background or race, this was a
suspect classification. Such discrimination was only justifiable when necessary to a compelling governmental interest. He rejected assertions by the university that government had a compelling interest in boosting the number of minority doctors, and deemed too nebulous the argument that the special admissions program would help bring doctors to underserved parts of California—after all, that purpose would also be served by admitting white applicants interested in practicing in minority communities. Nevertheless, Powell opined that government had a compelling interest in a racially diverse student body. In a part of the opinion concurred in by Chief Justice Burger and his allies, Powell found that the program, with its set-aside of a specific number of seats for minorities, did discriminate against Bakke, as less restrictive programs, such as making race one of several factors in admission, would serve the same purpose. Powell offered the example (set out in an appendix) of the admissions program at Harvard University as one he believed would pass constitutional muster—that institution did not set rigid quotas for minorities, but actively recruited them and sought to include them as more than a token part of a racially and culturally diverse student body. Although a white student might still lose out to a minority with lesser academic qualifications, both white and minority students might gain from non-objective factors such as the ability to play sports or a musical instrument. Accordingly, there was no constitutional violation in using race as one of several factors. Powell opined that, because the university had admitted that it could not prove that Bakke would not have been admitted even had there been no special admissions program, the portion of the California Supreme Court's decision ordering Bakke's admission was proper, and was upheld. Nevertheless, the state was entitled to consider race as one of several factors, and the portion of the California court's judgment that had ordered the contrary was overruled.
Other opinions Brennan delivered the joint statement of four justices: Marshall, White, Blackmun and himself. In verbally introducing their opinion in the Supreme Court courtroom, Brennan stated that the "central meaning" of the
Bakke decision was that there was a majority of the court in favor of the continuation of affirmative action. In the joint opinion, those four justices wrote, "government may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice". They suggested that any admissions program with the intention of remedying past race discrimination would be constitutional, whether that involved adding bonus points for race, or setting aside a specific number of places for them. White issued an opinion expressing his view that there was not a private right of action under Title VI. Thurgood Marshall also wrote separately, recounting at length the history of discrimination against African Americans, and concluding, "I do not believe that anyone can truly look into America's past and still find that a remedy for the effects of that past is impermissible." Blackmun subscribed to the idea of
color consciousness, declaring that, "in order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot—we dare not—let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial superiority." Justice Stevens, joined by Burger, Stewart and Rehnquist, concurring in part and dissenting in part in the judgment, found it unnecessary to determine whether a racial preference was ever allowed under the Constitution. A narrow finding that the university had discriminated against Bakke, violating Title VI, was sufficient, and the court was correct to admit him. "It is therefore perfectly clear that the question whether race can ever be used as a factor in an admissions decision is not an issue in this case, and that discussion of that issue is inappropriate." According to Stevens, "[t]he meaning of the Title VI ban on exclusion is crystal clear: Race cannot be the basis of excluding anyone from a federally funded program". He concluded, "I concur in the Court's judgment insofar as it affirms the judgment of the Supreme Court of California. To the extent that it purports to do anything else, I respectfully dissent." == Reaction ==