In March 2025, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali further distanced themselves from France by announcing their decisions to withdraw from the
Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), an international organization established in 1970 in Niamey, Niger, to promote the French language and encourage cooperation among French-speaking nations. Although the three AES countries are founding members of the OIF, they were suspended from the organization following the coups that brought military leadership to power, and consider the organization "a politically manipulated instrument".
Anti-French in outlook, the countries removed French as an official language in favour of native tongues, and renamed colonial street names; Mali also suspended teaching of the French Revolution in schools. On 16 December 2025, the United States, under the Trump administration, announced an expanded travel ban affecting several countries, including the AES nations. The ban, starting on 1 January 2026, was justified on the grounds of national security, terrorism risks, visa overstays, and concerns about information sharing. In response, the AES countries invoked the principle of reciprocity and imposed their own travel restrictions on U.S. citizens. As a result, Americans seeking to enter Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger will face the same entry requirements that citizens of those countries encounter when applying to enter the United States. The AES governments emphasized that their decision reflects sovereign equality and mutual respect, applying equivalent measures to U.S. travelers that mirror those placed on their own citizens. On 8 January 2026, The Confederation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) strongly condemned and denounced the United States's "act of aggression" against Venezuela and the illegal abduction of Venezuelan President
Nicolás Maduro and
his wife.
Relations with neighbors Chad Chad has been working to strengthen relationships with AES countries to enhance regional security and counter-terrorism efforts. This move aligns Chad with the AES countries, which have also distanced themselves from France. In May 2025, the Chadian Minister of Communications and government spokesperson stated "I think it would be a good thing for Chad to join the Alliance of Sahel States."
Guinea Mamady Doumbouya's government in Guinea, like those of the AES states, is a
military junta that seized power in a
coup d'état. Guinea has ignored border restrictions imposed by ECOWAS and given the AES access to its ports, which allowed Mali to import Russian grain and fertilizer.
Senegal Senegal's President
Bassirou Diomaye Faye has been urging both ECOWAS and the AES states to engage in dialogue and work together to address common challenges such as terrorism, climate change, and poverty.
Togo Togo has been actively collaborating with AES member countries on security and economic initiatives. In January 2025, Togo's Foreign Minister
Robert Dussey announced that the Togolese government had not ruled out Togo joining the Confederation of Sahel States. He said, "It's not impossible." In March 2025, Robert Dussey reaffirmed that Togo was considering joining the Confederation of Sahel States. This coincided with a poll published in March 2025 stating the majority in Togo favor their country joining the AES. The AES and Togo are working to establish an interconnected customs area. This would also allow the landlocked AES countries to use Togo's
Lomé port without large tariffs. Use of ports has been a source of tension between the AES and the coastal countries in ECOWAS. Togo and Burkina Faso signed an agreement to eliminate roaming charges for incoming calls between the two countries starting 30 May 2025.
Ghana While president-elect
John Dramani Mahama, elected on 7 December 2024, proposed an initiative to support the AES in combating terrorism. On 21 January 2025, Ghana appointed a special envoy to the Confederation of Sahel States,
Larry Gbevlo-Lartey, who was tasked with bridging Ghana's relations with members of the Alliance of Sahel States.
Algeria For many years the Algerian government played a role as a mediator in Mali's internal conflicts, especially with Tuareg rebel groups in northern Mali, but recent developments have distanced the two sides. A Malian drone was shot down near the Algerian border on 31 March 2025. The AES has called the act a violation of international law and "proof" of state-sponsored terrorism by Algeria. Mali's Prime Minister denied Algerian claims that the drone had violated Algerian airspace, adding that Mali would file a complaint with international bodies. Mali has withdrawn its ambassador to Algeria over the issue, stating "The destruction of the drone has the effect, if not the aim of hindering the neutralization of armed groups that have claimed responsibility for terrorist acts.'". This incident highlights rising tensions and a strained relationship between Algeria and the AES.
Foreign partners The AES has been taking actions to diminish the influence and control of
former colonial power France over its resources, territory, diplomatic relations, and trade. and Afghanistan. Russian involvement notably includes a joint satellite program with
Roscosmos, and
military assistance from the Wagner Group to counter insurgencies. In June 2025, Russia signed nuclear cooperation agreements with Burkina Faso and Mali for the peaceful use of atomic energy, infrastructure development, and energy security. The Burkina Faso–Russia Agreement, finalized during the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, includes building a nuclear power plant, developing regulations, and training specialists. Rosatom also pledged scholarships and technical support, aiming to address Burkina Faso's severe electricity shortage. In June 2025 only about 20% of Burkinabes had access to power. The Mali–Russia Agreement, Signed during Assimi Goita's visit to Russia, includes nuclear infrastructure, safety regulations, training, and applications in medicine, agriculture, and industry. The agreement is expected to boost Mali's energy autonomy and reduce reliance on imports. Turkey's foreign, defense, and energy ministers met with their counterparts in Niger to discuss new deals in the areas of security and defense, trade, energy, and mining on 17 July 2024, and had military contractors in Niger as of January 2025. Iran and Niger signed a joint cooperation agreement during the third meeting of their Joint Economic Committee on the sidelines of the Iran Expo 2025 in April 2025.
Accusations of destabilization The leaders of the AES have publicly accused Western countries (especially France) of actions to undermine their security, sovereignty, and political stability. These allegations have become more prominent since the three states expelled French military forces from their territory and withdrew from ECOWAS. Their accusations include claims that Western actors have: • Supported or facilitated the activities of armed groups in the region • Interfered with regional security initiatives • Engaged in covert actions aimed at weakening AES governments • Sought to maintain influence in the Sahel through political or economic pressure • Supported networks involved in political or security-related destabilization These allegations form part of the AES governments’ stated rationale for distancing themselves from Western military partnerships and pursuing alternative security and diplomatic arrangements. Western governments, including France, have consistently denied these accusations. The AES has expressed strong opposition to Ukrainian support of rebels in the Sahel after comments by Ukrainian officials in August 2024 stating they had supported Jihadists in an ambush that killed Malian soldiers. The AES has called on the
United Nations to take action against
Ukraine and accused Ukraine of supporting terrorism in the Sahel. Mali and Niger subsequently cut diplomatic ties with Ukraine. Amid the dispute between Mali and Ukraine,
Sweden’s ambassador to Mali accused the Malian government of supporting an “illegal Russia war” in Ukraine and halted planned financial assistance to Mali. Mali responded by expelling the Swedish ambassador and ending their diplomatic engagement. • Yann Vezilier, a French military officer detained by Malian authorities in August 2025 and accused of involvement in espionage and destabilization activities. French officials have rejected these allegations. • Paul‑Henri Sandaogo Damiba, former transitional president of Burkina Faso, was extradited from Togo to Burkina Faso in January 2026. He faces accusations from Burkinabè authorities of involvement in attempted coups following his removal from power in 2022. These last two cases remain subject to ongoing legal and political processes, and the individuals involved deny wrongdoing. == Symbols ==