With no great prospects of inheritance, Aehrenthal studied law and politics at the
University of Bonn and the
Charles University in Prague. He began his career in the diplomatic service of the empire, as attaché in Paris under
Count Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust in 1877. He went in 1878 in the same capacity to
Saint Petersburg, Russia, and from 1883 to 1888 he worked at the
Foreign Ministry in Vienna under
Count Gustav Kálnoky, with whom he formed close relations. In 1888, he was sent as councillor of embassy to Saint Petersburg, where he exercised considerable influence with the ambassador, Count
Wolkenstein. Recalled in 1894 to service in the Foreign Ministry, he undertook important duties, and in the following year went to
Bucharest as
Minister to
Romania. Here he succeeded in strengthening the relations between the courts of Vienna and Bucharest by renewing the secret alliance which it had signed in 1883. In 1899, he became ambassador in Saint Petersburg, where he remained until his appointment as Foreign Minister in October 1906. Aehrenthal at this time thought that it was essential for Austria-Hungary to come to an agreement with Russia. In this sense he endeavoured to continue the negotiations successfully begun by his predecessor, Prince
Franz von und zu Liechtenstein, for the bridging over of the differences on Balkan questions between Vienna and Saint Petersburg, in order to create a basis for a permanent friendly relation between Austria-Hungary and Russia. He played a principal part in concluding the
Mürzsteg Agreement of 1903. During the
Russo-Japanese War he took a strong line in favour of a friendly attitude towards Russia. He at first maintained the views which he had professed as ambassador. He was determined to preserve the interests of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, but also showed himself prepared to meet the Russian wishes in the Dardanelles question. However, in the course of the
Bosnian Crisis, he abandoned the idea of a friendly accommodation with Russia. Under the
Treaty of Berlin, The Ottomans controlled the
Dardanelles strait connecting the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The treaty prohibited the passage of any warships from any country into or out of the Black Sea. This treaty bottled up a major portion of the Russian
Black Sea Fleet, making it useless in the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 when it was urgently needed. Izvolsky wanted this changed to allow the passage of Russian ships through the straits. Aehrenthal wanted full control of Bosnia-Herzogovina. Austria-Hungary had
administered the provinces since 1878 but the Ottoman Empire retained nominal sovereignty. Aehrenthal concocted a grand diplomatic deal that proposed major benefits for both sides. Austria-Hungary would gain full possession of Bosnia with Russian approval. The Ottoman Empire would regain full control of the Austrian occupied territory known as the
Sanjak of Novi Pazar, plus financial compensation. Russia would get the right of passage for its warships through the Straits.
Serbia would get zero. Before approaching the Russians, Aehrenthal met with Austrian and Hungarian officials and won the approval of Emperor Franz Joseph I. On September 15–16 Aehrenthal and Izvolsky held a secret meeting. No record was kept—and afterwards both sides remembered it very differently. Aehrenthal assumed he had full Russian approval for his scheme, but without planned dates. Izvolsky assumed he would be informed before any actual move happened. Aehrenthal vaguely informed all the major countries but gave no details. The world was astonished on October 6, 1908, when a press release in Vienna announced that Bosnia was fully annexed. Inside Austria-Hungary there was general approval except in Czech areas—that minority strongly felt its demands had been deliberately ignored. Aehrenthal had expected wide European approval and instead he faced a hostile volcanic eruption from every direction. Izvolsky vehemently denounced the treachery and demanded an international conference on Bosnia. After decades of low level activity, pan-Slavic forces inside Russia suddenly mobilized in opposition. Mass demonstrations broke out across the continent. Rome took advantage of the situation by reversing its friendship with Vienna. Berlin officials were surprised and appalled. The British were especially angry, denouncing the violation of an international agreement signed by both Austria-Hungary and Britain. France denounced the scheme. The Ottoman Empire was surprised by the unexpected development, but was quieted by the cash payment. By far the angriest reaction came from Serbia, which called for revenge, and began setting up secret guerrilla bands, plotting insurrection in Bosnia. All across Europe the chief blame was placed on Berlin, not Vienna. Europeans feared the powerful
Imperial German Army and took the episode as proof of its expansionist intentions. Berlin now realized it stood alone, with Austria-Hungary its only friend. It therefore decided it would firmly support Austria-Hungary despite doubts about the wisdom of annexing Bosnia. Berlin explicitly warned Saint Petersburg that continued demands for an international conference constituted a hostile action that would increase the risk of war with Germany. Coupled with Austrian threats to publish details of the secret meeting between Aehrenthal and Izvolsky, Russia backed down. Thanks to the German intervention, Austria-Hungary scored a complete short-term diplomatic success in taking control of Bosnia. in the long run however, Germany and Austria both made many too enemies, as the battle lines of World War I started to harden. Aehrenthal had started with the assumption that the Slavic minorities could never come together, and the Balkan League would never accomplish any damage to Austria-Hungary. He turned down an Ottoman proposal for an alliance that would include Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Romania. However his policies alienated the
Bulgarians, who turned instead to Russia and Serbia. Although Austria-Hungary had no intention to embark on additional expansion to the south, Aehrenthal encouraged speculation to that effect, expecting it would paralyze the Balkan states. Instead, it incited them to feverish activity to create a defensive block to stop Austria-Hungary. A series of grave miscalculations at the highest level thus significantly strengthened Austria-Hungary's enemies.
Pan-Slavism For Aehrenthal, a German and a staunch monarchist, there was a direct threat in the Pan-Slav emergent nationalism of the kind that a consolidated Yugo (south) Slav Confederation led by Serbia represented. The gradual consolidation of the Yugo-Slavs (in the name of the 'new centuries' idea of national self-determination for all ethnic/racial/religious groups) led by Serbia was a deadly threat to Aehrenthal's Austria-Hungary. For Aehrenthal,
Moravia,
Bohemia, and
Silesia were the crown lands of his Ost-Mark German nobility, which ruled over a host of emergent Slav and Pan-Slav ethnicities: Pole, Czech, Ruthenian, Slovakian, and Ukrainian. In Serbia's consolidation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into herself, there was the clear roadmap to the dissolution of most of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. More importantly, this Pan-Slav self-determinant nationalism pointed the way to the loss of the defendable military, political, and economic boundaries of the empire. Aehrenthal's Hungarian noble half saw an equally strong threat with the loss of
Hungary's historic Slavic provinces should Pan-Slavist ideology take root. It would equally threaten its military security and economic future. Aehrenthal moved quickly, faster than Izvolsky. He acted on 3 October 1908 under the premise that Austria-Hungary was taking control of Bosnia-Herzogovina so that the people there could enjoy the benefits of the empire as a reward for economic advancement since first being administered back in 1878. A seething Serbia could hardly believe this action and demanded Russian intervention. This left Izvolsky holding the bag. He announced his plans for the free passage of Russian warships though the Turkish straits but was shot down by every other signatory to the treaty, especially Britain. The British said they would consider opening up the straits to all warships but would not limit it to Russian ships alone. This is hardly what Izvolsky had in mind since this had the potential of letting belligerent ships into the Black Sea. Germany at first viewed the whole tangle with disdain, taking the Turkish side. The Kaiser had been working on strengthening relations with Turkey and, now with the chance of Ottoman recovery, he wished to stay this course. ==Family==