Although the airport was closed after the accident, delaying about 400 travellers, it later re-opened with a reduced runway length available due to the tail section wreckage. Larger flights were diverted to Montego Bay's
Sangster International Airport for two days. An investigation into the accident was launched by the
National Transportation Safety Board. They sent a team to assist the
Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority officials in the investigation.
American Airlines also sent a crash team to assist the other investigators. Later reports showed the crew had contacted Jamaica Air Traffic Control to request the
Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach for Runway 12, the designated runway broadcast by the
Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) for arrivals that night. They were, however, advised of
tailwind conditions on Runway 12 and offered a circling approach for landing on Runway 30. "The crew repeated their request for Runway 12 and were subsequently cleared to land on that runway with the controller further advising the crew that the runway was wet." Jamaican Director General of Civil Aviation Col. Oscar Derby, stated in the week following the accident, that the jet touched down about halfway down the runway. He also noted that the 737-800 is equipped with a
head-up display ("HUD"). Other factors that were under investigation included "tailwinds, and a rain soaked runway;" the runway in question was not equipped with rain-dispersing grooves common at larger airports. The aircraft held a relatively heavy fuel load at the time of landing; it was carrying enough fuel for a roundtrip flight back to the US. After the crash it was announced American Airlines was involved in an FAA review of company landing procedures following three landing incidents in two weeks; in the other two instances plane wingtips touched the ground during landing. During the NTSB's investigation, the flight crew informed the NTSB in post-accident interviews that they had not received any training on conducting landings in tailwind conditions. In addition, the NTSB was told by other American Airlines pilots that they were not given simulator training on tailwind landings or given guidance about runway overrun risks associated with tailwind landings. ==Passenger details==