Although most
industrialized countries have seen a drop in unionization rates, the drop in union density (the unionized proportion of the working population) has been more significant in the United States than elsewhere. First, it ended organizing on the grand, 1930s scale. It outlawed mass picketing, secondary strikes of neutral employers, sit downs: in short, everything
CIO founder John L.]
Lewis did in the 1930s. The second effect of Taft–Hartley was subtler and slower-working. It was to hold up any new organizing at all, even on a quiet, low-key scale. For example, Taft–Hartley ended "card checks." … Taft–Hartley required hearings, campaign periods, secret-ballot elections, and sometimes more hearings, before a union could be officially recognized. It also allowed and even encouraged employers to threaten workers who want to organize. Employers could hold "
captive meetings," bring workers into the office and chew them out for thinking about the Union. And Taft–Hartley led to the "union-busting" that started in the late 1960s and continues today. It started when a new "profession" of labor consultants began to convince employers that they could violate the [pro-labor 1935] Wagner Act, fire workers at will, fire them deliberately for exercising their legal rights, and nothing would happen. The Wagner Act had never had any real sanctions. So why hadn't employers been violating the Wagner Act all along? Well, at first, in the 1930s and 1940s, they tried, and they got riots in the streets: mass picketing, secondary strikes, etc. But after Taft–Hartley, unions couldn't retaliate like this, or they would end up with penalty fines and jail sentences.
Employer strategies and has continued since. Studies focusing more narrowly on the U.S. labor movement corroborate the comparative findings about the importance of structural factors, but tend to emphasize the effects of changing labor markets due to globalization to a greater extent. Bronfenbrenner notes that changes in the economy, such as increased global competition,
capital flight, and the transitions from a manufacturing to a service economy and to a greater reliance on transitory and contingent workers, accounts for only a third of the decline in union density. Bronfenbrenner claims that the federal government in the 1980s was largely responsible for giving employers the perception that they could engage in aggressive strategies to repress the formation of unions. Richard Freeman also points to the role of repressive employer strategies in reducing unionization, and highlights the way in which a state ideology of antiunionism tacitly accepted these strategies He writes that the threat of production shifts reduces unions' bargaining power even if it does not eliminate them, and also claims that most of the effects of globalization on labor's strength are indirect. They are most present in change towards a
neoliberal political context that has promoted the
deregulation and
privatization of some industries and accepted increased employer flexibility in labor markets.
Global trends The US Bureau of Labor Statistics surveyed the histories of union membership rates in industrialized countries from 1970 to 2003, and found that of 20 advanced economies which had union density statistics going back to 1970, 16 of them had experienced drops in union density from 1970 to 2003. Over the same period during which union density in the US declined from 23.5 percent to 12.4 percent, some countries saw even steeper drops. Australian unionization fell from 50.2 percent in 1970 to 22.9 percent in 2003, in New Zealand it dropped from 55.2 percent to 22.1 percent, and in Austria union participation fell from 62.8 percent down to 35.4 percent. All the English-speaking countries studied saw union membership decline to some degree. In the United Kingdom, union participation fell from 44.8 percent in 1970 to 29.3 percent in 2003. In Ireland the decline was from 53.7 percent down to 35.3 percent. Canada had one of the smallest declines over the period, going from 31.6 percent in 1970 to 28.4 percent in 2003. Most of the countries studied started in 1970 with higher participation rates than the US, but France, which in 1970 had a union participation rate of 21.7 percent, by 2003 had fallen to 8.3 percent. The remaining four countries which had gained in union density were Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Belgium.
Institutional environments A broad range of forces have been identified as potential contributors to the drop in union density across countries. Sano and Williamson outline quantitative studies that assess the relevance of these factors across countries. The first relevant set of factors relate to the receptiveness of unions' institutional environments. For example, the presence of a
Ghent system (where unions are responsible for the distribution of unemployment insurance) and of centralized collective bargaining (organized at a national or industry level as opposed to local or firm level) have both been shown to give unions more bargaining power and to correlate positively to higher rates of union density. with occupations thought to offer influence on society that would otherwise be available only to capital owners. As the
educational attainment and
white-collar employment of the United States has increased,
blue-collar employment that was previously unionized has decreased.
Thomas Frank argued in his 2016 book
Listen, Liberal: Or, What Ever Happened to the Party of the People? that the
Democratic Party changed over time to support the
professional class instead of unions.
Popularity Public approval of unions climbed during the 1980s much as it did in other industrialized nations, but declined to below 50% for the first time in 2009 during the
Great Recession. It is not clear if this is a long-term trend or a function of a high unemployment rate which historically correlates with lower public approval of labor unions. One explanation for loss of public support is simply the lack of union power or critical mass. No longer do a sizable percentage of American workers belong to unions, or have family members who do. Unions no longer carry the "threat effect": the power of unions to raise wages of non-union shops by virtue of the threat of unions to organize those shops. A
Gallup poll released on March 9, 2011, showed that Americans were more likely to support limiting the collective bargaining powers of state employee unions to balance a state's budget (49%) than disapprove of such a measure (45%), while 6% had no opinion. 66% of Republicans approved of such a measure as did 51% of independents. Only 31% of Democrats approved. A
Gallup poll released on March 11, 2011, showed that nationwide, Americans were more likely to give unions a negative word or phrase when describing them (38%) than a positive word or phrase (34%). 17% were neutral and 12% didn't know. Republicans were much more likely to say a negative term (58%) than Democrats (19%). Democrats were much more likely to say a positive term (49%) than Republicans (18%). A nationwide
Gallup poll (margin of error ±4%) released on April 1, 2011, showed the following; • When asked if they supported the labor unions or the governors in state disputes; 48% said they supported the unions, 39% said the governors, 4% said neither, and 9% had no opinion. • Women supported the governors much less than men. 45% of men said they supported the governors, while 46% said they supported the unions. This compares to only 33% of women who said they supported the governors and 50% who said they supported the unions. • All areas of the US (East, Midwest, South, West) were more likely to support unions than the governors. The largest gap being in the East with 35% supporting the governors and 52% supporting the unions, and the smallest gap being in the West with 41% supporting the governors and 44% the unions. • 18- to 34-year-olds were much more likely to support unions than those over 34 years of age. Only 27% of 18- to 34-year-olds supported the governors, while 61% supported the unions. Americans ages 35 to 54 slightly supported the unions more than governors, with 40% supporting the governors and 43% the unions. Americans 55 and older were tied when asked, with 45% supporting the governors and 45% the unions. • Republicans were much more likely to support the governors when asked with 65% supporting the governors and 25% the unions. Independents slightly supported unions more, with 40% supporting the governors and 45% the unions. Democrats were overwhelmingly in support of the unions. 70% of Democrats supported the unions, while only 19% supported the governors. • Those who said they were following the situation not too closely or not at all supported the unions over governors, with a 14–point (45% to 31%) margin. Those who said they were following the situation somewhat closely supported the unions over governors by a 52–41 margin. Those who said that they were following the situation very closely were only slightly more likely to support the unions over the governors, with a 49–48 margin. A nationwide
Gallup poll released on August 31, 2011, revealed the following: • 52% of Americans approved of labor unions, unchanged from 2010. • 78% of Democrats approved of labor unions, up from 71% in 2010. • 52% of Independents approved of labor unions, up from 49% in 2010. • 26% of Republicans approved of labor unions, down from 34% in 2010. A nationwide
Gallup poll released on September 1, 2011, revealed the following: • 55% of Americans believed that labor unions will become weaker in the United States as time goes by, an all-time high. This compared to 22% who said their power would stay the same, and 20% who said they would get stronger. • The majority of Republicans and Independents believed labor unions would further weaken by a 58% and 57% percentage margin respectively. A
plurality of Democrats believed the same, at 46%. • 42% of Americans want labor unions to have less influence, tied for the all-time high set in 2009. 30% wanted more influence and 25% wanted the same amount of influence. • The majority of Republicans wanted labor unions to have less influence, at 69%. • A plurality of Independents wanted labor unions to have less influence, at 40%. • A plurality of Democrats wanted labor unions to have more influence, at 45%. • The majority of Americans believed labor unions mostly helped members of unions by a 68 to 28 margin. • A plurality of Americans believed labor unions mostly helped the companies where workers are unionized by a 48–44 margin. • A plurality of Americans believed labor unions mostly helped state and local governments by a 47–45 margin. • A plurality of Americans believed labor unions mostly hurt the US economy in general by a 49–45 margin. • The majority of Americans believed labor unions mostly hurt workers who are not members of unions by a 56–34 margin.
Economic globalization More recently, as unions have become increasingly concerned with the impacts of market integration on their well-being, scholars have begun to assess whether popular concerns about a global "race to the bottom" are reflected in cross-country comparisons of union strength. These scholars use
foreign direct investment (FDI) and the size of a country's international trade as a percentage of its
GDP to assess a country's relative degree of market integration. These researchers typically find that
globalization does affect union density, but is dependent on other factors, such as unions' access to the workplace and the centralization of bargaining. Sano and Williamson argue that globalization's impact is conditional upon a country's labor history. In the United States in particular, which has traditionally had relatively low levels of union density, globalization did not appear to significantly affect union density.
Union responses to globalization Regardless of the actual impact of market integration on union density or on workers themselves, organized labor has been engaged in a variety of strategies to limit the agenda of globalization and to promote labor regulations in an international context. Labor rights had failed to be included in international trade negotiations in
Geneva in 1948 and in
Tokyo in 1978. But they eventually were brought up by the US in the
Uruguay Round in 1994 and were decidedly left to the jurisdiction of the
International Labor Organization. While this may be true, Summers argues that US exports tend to be capital-intensive, while imports tend to be labor-intensive, and thus deals like NAFTA would further contribute to the trend of more jobs being lost than created. However, Mayer has written that it was precisely unions' opposition to NAFTA overall that jeopardized organized labor's ability to influence the debate on labor standards in a significant way. During Clinton's presidential campaign, labor unions wanted NAFTA to include a side deal to provide for a kind of international social charter, a set of standards that would be enforceable both in domestic courts and through international institutions.
Mickey Kantor, then U.S. trade representative, had strong ties to organized labor and believed that he could get unions to come along with the agreement, particularly if they were given a strong voice in the negotiation process. Graubart writes that, despite unions' open disappointment with the outcome of this labor-side negotiation, labor activists, including the AFL–CIO have used the NAALC's citizen petition, containing a unique cross-border mechanism, to highlight ongoing political campaigns and struggles in their home countries. He claims that despite the relative weakness of the legal provisions themselves, the side-agreement has served a legitimizing functioning, giving certain social struggles a new kind of standing. Kay argues that in the process of fighting NAFTA, activists groups had gained a "power-to"—the power of mobilizing and creating transnational networks, which ultimately helped them to defeat the
Multilateral Agreements on Investment in 1998 as well as the
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas in 2005. They worry that these codes could have legitimizing effects on companies that do not actually live up to good practices, and that companies could use codes to excuse or distract attention from the repression of unions. Braun and Gearhart note that although unions do participate in the structure of a number of these agreements, their original interest in codes of conduct differed from the interests of human rights and other non-governmental activists. Unions believed that codes of conduct would be important first steps in creating written principles that a company would be compelled to comply with in later organizing contracts, but did not foresee the establishment of monitoring systems such as the Fair Labor Association. These authors point out that such organizations are motivated by power, want to gain insider status politically and are accountable to a constituency that requires them to provide them with direct benefits. In contrast, activists from the non-governmental sector are motivated by ideals, are free of accountability and gain legitimacy from being political outsiders. Therefore, the interests of unions are not likely to align well with the interests of those who draft and monitor corporate codes of conduct. Arguing against the idea that high union wages necessarily make manufacturing uncompetitive in a globalized economy was labor lawyer
Thomas Geoghegan. Busting unions, in the U.S. manner, as the prime way of competing with China and other countries [does not work]. It's no accident that the social democracies, Sweden, France, and Germany, which kept on paying high wages, now have more industry than the U.S. or the UK. … [T]hat's what the U.S. and the UK did: they smashed the unions, in the belief that they had to compete on cost. The result? They quickly ended up wrecking their industrial base. Unions have made some attempts to organize across borders. Eder observed that transnational organizing is not a new phenomenon but has been facilitated by technological change. Nevertheless, he claimed that while unions pay lip service to global solidarity, they still act largely in their national self-interest. He argued that unions in the global North are becoming increasingly depoliticized while those in the South grow politically, and that global differentiation of production processes leads to divergent strategies and interests in different regions of the world. These structural differences tend to hinder effective global solidarity. However, in light of the weakness of international labor, Herod wrote that globalization of production need not be met by a globalization of union strategies in order to be contained. Herod also pointed out that local strategies, such as the United Auto Workers' strike against General Motors in 1998, can sometimes effectively interrupt global production processes in ways that they could not before the advent of widespread market integration. Thus, workers need not be connected organizationally to others around the world to effectively influence the behavior of a transnational corporation. ==Impact and criticism==