MarketSanctions during the Venezuelan crisis
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Sanctions during the Venezuelan crisis

During the crisis in Venezuela, the European Union (E.U.), Canada, Mexico, Panama and Switzerland applied sanctions against specific Venezuelan government entities and individuals associated with the administration of Nicolás Maduro, along with sanctions applied by the United States. As of 3 March 2025, the Atlantic Council's sanctions tracker listed 209 individuals with links to Venezuela sanctioned by the U.S., 123 by Canada, and 69 by the European Union.

United States
History and legislation in 2016; the former head of intelligence and confidant of Chávez was sanctioned by the U.S. in 2008, arrested in Spain in 2019, and pled guilty to narcoterrorism charges in the U.S. in 2025. Prior to the ongoing crisis in Venezuela, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three current or former Venezuelan government officials in 2008, saying there was evidence they had materially helped the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the illegal drug trade. In 2011, four allies of Hugo Chávez were sanctioned for allegedly helping FARC obtain weapons and smuggle drugs. U.S. President Barack Obama signed the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, imposing sanctions on Venezuelan individuals held responsible by the U.S. for human rights violations during the 2014 Venezuelan protests. it held responsible for human rights abuses, repression and at least 43 deaths during demonstrations. 2017 in 2003, sanctioned by Canada, the European Union, Panama and the United States Tareck El Aissami, Vice President of Economy and Minister for National Industry and Production, and his frontman Samark Jose Lopez Bello were named in February as significant international narcotics traffickers. Five U.S. companies in Florida and an airplane registered in the U.S. were also blocked. Maikel Moreno and seven members of the Venezuelan Supreme Justice Tribunal (TSJ) were sanctioned in May for usurping the functions of the Venezuelan National Assembly and permitting Maduro to govern by decree. In July, thirteen senior officials of the Venezuelan government associated with the 2017 Venezuelan Constituent Assembly elections were sanctioned for what the U.S. labeled as their role in undermining democracy and human rights. Those sanctioned included Tibisay Lucena, President of the Maduro-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE); Néstor Reverol, Minister of Interior and former Commander General of Venezuelan National Guard (GNB); and Tarek William Saab, Ombudsman and President of Moral Council. The U.S. State Department condemned that election and refused to recognize it. The day after the election, the U.S. sanctioned Maduro. The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned eight officials associated with the 2017 Constituent National Assembly (ANC) in August, including Adán Chávez, the brother of Hugo Chávez. 2018 The U.S. Treasury Department said on 5 January 2018 that corruption and repression continued in Venezuela and four senior military officers were sanctioned, followed by four more in March. Just before the May 2018 Venezuelan presidential election, the U.S. sanctioned four Venezuelans and three companies it said were involved in corruption and money laundering including Diosdado Cabello, Chavismo's number two person and President of the ANC, The U.S. Treasury Department seized a private jet and imposed sanctions on Maduro's inner circle in September. Maduro's wife, Cilia Flores, Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, and her brother Jorge Rodríguez, Minister of Communications, were sanctioned. 2019 On 8 January, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned seven individuals who they said were benefitting from a corrupt currency exchange scheme, and the Venezuelan private TV network Globovisión and other companies owned or controlled by Raúl Gorrín and Gustavo Perdomo. On 15 February 2019, officials of Maduro's security and intelligence were sanctioned along with , the head of PDVSA. in 2023 During the February 2019 shipping of humanitarian aid to Venezuela, four Venezuelan state governors were added to the sanctions list. In March, six more military and security forces individuals who the U.S. alleged helped obstruct the delivery of humanitarian aid were blacklisted, followed by the president of Minerven, Venezuela's state-run mining company, Adrian Antonio Perdomo. The U.S. Treasury added sanctions on 17 April to the Central Bank of Venezuela and one of its directors, Iliana Ruzza, Maduro said the sanctions were "totally illegal". On 26 April 2019, the U.S. Treasury accused Maduro's foreign minister Jorge Arreaza and Judge Carol Padilla of exploiting the U.S. financial system to support Maduro, and blacklisted them. Following the Venezuelan uprising on 30 April 2019, the U.S. removed sanctions against former SEBIN chief Manuel Cristopher Figuera, who broke ranks with Maduro. The U.S. sanctioned two former Venezuelan government officials, Luis Alfredo Motta Domínguez and Eustiquio Jose Lugo Gomez, on 27 June alleging they were engaging in significant corruption and fraud. President Maduro's son, Nicolás Maduro Guerra, was sanctioned on 28 June 2019 as a member of Venezuela's Constituent Assembly. Following the June death while in custody of Venezuelan navy captain Rafael Acosta Arévalo, the U.S. sanctioned Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar (DGCIM) and officials, accusing the defense agency of being responsible for his death. Five politicians and security officials, who had earlier been sanctioned by the E.U. or Canada, were added to the U.S. sanctions list on 5 November 2019 for alleged corruption and violence during opposition protests. 2020 , sanctioned by Canada, the European Union, Switzerland and the United States The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned seven individuals for their involvement in the disputed January 2020 Venezuelan National Assembly Delegated Committee election that resulted in two claims for the Presidency of the National Assembly: one by legislator Luis Parra, later supported by Maduro, and one by the incumbent Juan Guaidó. Parra was sanctioned along with Franklyn Duarte, José Brito and others. OFAC sanctioned the president and board chairman, Didier Casimiro, of Rosneft on 18 February, for supporting Maduro's government by operating in the oil sector. On 26 March 2020, the U.S. State Department offered a $15 million reward on Nicolás Maduro (increased to $25 million in 2025 Carvajal pled guilty to all charges in a U.S. court in 2025. Two friends of Maduro and his son, Nicolas Ernesto Maduro Guerra, were sanctioned on 23 July for their alleged role in an illicit gold scheme. On 22 September, the U.S. Treasury described five sanctioned individuals as supporting, manipulating and rigging the upcoming 2020 Venezuelan parliamentary elections. The company Ex-Cle Soluciones Biometricas CA, and individuals associated with it, were sanctioned on 18 December for providing services for that election. 2024 and Edmundo González Urrutia along with his wife in July after the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election Following the declaration without evidence by Venezuela's National Electoral Council (CNE) and validation by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) that Maduro had won the 28 July 2024 presidential election, condemned as fraudulent, the U.S. began reviewing a list of 60 individuals and their family members for possible sanctions. On 12 September 16 individuals associated with Maduro and the subsequent repression were sanctioned. Among the sanctioned were five members of the TSJ, the lower-court judge who issued a warrant for the arrest of opposition candidate Edmundo González, the CNE, and "military and intelligence officials accused of post-election repression". along with Edward Miguel Briceño Cisneros and Luis Ernesto Dueñez Reyes, the judge and prosecutor responsible for the arrest warrant against González In an environment of repression that followed the election, 21 additional senior officials of the Maduro government were sanctioned by the U.S. on 27 November 2024. 2025 Following the disputed July 2024 Venezuelan presidential election, Maduro was inaugurated for a third term as president on 10 January 2025; that day, the U.S., E.U., U.K. and Canada placed new sanctions on Venezuelan individuals. The U.S. also increased the reward for Maduro's arrest to $25 million. In December, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned additional individuals and companies, including model and actress , accusing them of engaging in money laundering for Tren de Aragua. , after their 2015 arrest by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration The day after the 10 December seizure of oil tanker Skipper by the U.S. off the coast of Venezuela, additional sanctions targeting Maduro's family and oil shipments by six vessels and associated companies were imposed. According to the Miami Herald, the sanctions aim to reverse loosening of sanctions under the Biden administration, which failed to help achieve a fair presidential election in 2024, and to "disrupt what the [U.S. Treasury] described as a persistent web of corruption, narcotrafficking and sanctions evasions". Ramon Carretero Napolitano, a Panamanian businessman who the U.S. alleges has profited from oil ventures with relatives of Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, was also sanctioned. Jose Jesus Urdaneta Gonzalez and Empresa Aeronautica Nacional SA were sanctioned on 30 December for trade with Iran of drones. Four Chinese-based tankers, and their owner/operators, were sanctioned on 31 December. Scope of sanctions On individuals As of 7 August 2023, the Congressional Research Service said the U.S. maintained sanctions on more than 110 individuals. The White House saw the measures as a way to "protect the United States financial system from complicity in Venezuela's corruption and in the impoverishment of the Venezuelan people" without disallowing humanitarian aid The U.S. imposed additional sanctions on PDVSA on 28 January 2019 to pressure Maduro to resign during the 2019 Venezuelan presidential crisis. The sanctions prevented PDVSA from being paid for petroleum exports to the U.S., froze $7 billion of PDVSA's U.S. assets and prevented U.S. firms from exporting naphtha to Venezuela. Bolton estimated the expected loss to the Venezuelan economy at more than $11 billion in 2019. In February 2019, Maduro ordered PDVSA to move its European office to Moscow to protect its overseas assets from U.S. sanctions. Exports of Venezuela's heavy crude oil depend on diluents that were imported from the U.S. before sanctions; Rosneft chartered a ship to load thinners from Malta and deliver them to Venezuela on 22 March, and arranged for Venezuelan crude oil to be processed in India. Other companies including India's Reliance Industries Limited, Spain's Repsol, and commodity trading companies Trafigura and Vitol continued to supply Venezuela's oil industry. On 18 February 2020, OFAC sanctioned Rosneft Trading S.A. for supporting Maduro's government by operating in the oil sector, and added a Swiss subsidiary of Rosneft, TNK Trading International S.A., on 12 March. Reuters reported on 18 April 2019 that the Maduro administration was bypassing sanctions by funneling cash from petroleum sales through Russia's Rosneft. Reliance denied reports that it was in violation of U.S. sanctions and stated that its purchases of Venezuelan oil through Rosneft were approved by the U.S. State Department. April oil exports were steady at a million barrels daily, "partially due to inventory drains", with most shipments to buyers from India and China. With sanctions, shipments to Cuba were unchanged. followed by nine more ships and four more shipping companies on 12 April. In response to the arrest of National Assembly members, the U.S. sanctioned on 10 May 2019 two shipping companies and two ships that transported oil from Venezuela to Cuba between late 2018 and March 2019. Sanctions on some shipping companies were lifted later in 2019. Petrocaribe Through Petrocaribe, a regional oil procurement agreement between Venezuela and Caribbean member states, Caribbean countries could finance some of their Venezuelan crude oil purchases at 1% interest and Cuba received free oil in exchange for medical services. Research by the journalism group Connectas said that Petrocaribe countries were intended to protect Venezuela's sovereignty in international organizations like the UN and OAS. Several leaders of Caribbean countries supporting Maduro criticized the US sanctions, saying their support for Maduro was based on principles, not oil, and that sanctions were affecting their countries' supply, debt payments, and the region's stability. Trump promised more investment to the countries supporting Guaidó (Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica and Saint Lucia). Gold Venezuela's third-largest export (after crude oil and refined petroleum products) in 2019 was gold. In mid-February 2019, National Assembly legislator Angel Alvarado said that about eight tons of gold had been taken from the vault while the head of the Central Bank was abroad. In March, Ugandan investigators reported that 7.4 tonnes of gold worth over US$300 million could have been smuggled into that country. The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Minerven, Venezuela's state-run mining company, in March 2019. Between 2013 and 2016, Venezuela shipped US$5.2 billion worth of gold to Switzerland, which froze the assets of Maduro and 35 people close to him in January 2026. On 11 March 2019, the U.S. sanctioned the Russian bank Evrofinance Mosnarbank, stating that the Moscow-based bank was an economic lifeline for Maduro's administration. After the detention of Guaidó's chief of staff, Roberto Marrero, in March 2019, the US Treasury Department responded by placing sanctions on the Venezuelan bank BANDES and its subsidiaries. China Development Bank had paid billions of dollars through BANDES to the Venezuelan government in exchange for crude oil as of March 2019; the sanctions would make it difficult for Venezuela to restructure its US$20 billion debt with China. The U.S. Treasury added sanctions to the Central Bank of Venezuela on 17 April 2019. The Venezuelan banking sanctions caused a ripple effect in that the New York Federal Reserve decided to restrict opening of new accounts in Puerto Rico's offshore banking industry, and planned tighter restrictions in that area. CLAP food subsidy program , with the supplier receiving government funds owned by President Maduro On 25 July 2019, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned 13 companies involved in a Venezuelan food subsidy program called CLAP, along with 10 people including Maduro's stepsons and Colombian businessman Alex Saab. In 2017, the Venezuelan attorney general, Luisa Ortega Díaz, had named Saab as the owner of a Mexican firm that sold food to the CLAP. According to Mnuchin, corruption in the "CLAP program has allowed Maduro and his family members to steal from the Venezuelan people" by using "food as a form of social control, to reward political supporters and punish opponents". Saab and another Colombian businessman were charged in the U.S. with money laundering related to a 2011–2015 scheme to pay bribes to take advantage of Venezuela's government-set exchange rate. U.S. Treasury Department officials had stated in April 2018 that Venezuelan officials pocketed 70% of the proceeds allocated for importation programs destined to alleviate hunger in Venezuela. An April 2019 communication from the U.S. State Department highlighted the 2017 National Assembly investigation finding that the government paid US$42 for food boxes that cost under US$13, and that "Maduro's inner circle kept the difference, which totaled more than $200 million dollars in at least one case", adding that food boxes were "distributed in exchange for votes". On 17 September 2019, the U.S. Treasury Department expanded further sanctions on 16 entities and 3 individuals, accusing them of helping the Venezuelan government profit from food import and distribution. Airline and aircraft The U.S. sanctioned 15 PDVSA aircraft on 21 January 2020, stating that they had "been involved in the harassment of U.S. military flights in Caribbean airspace", and had been used to provide transport to sanctioned individuals. Venezuela's state airline Conviasa (Consorcio Venezolano de Industrias Aeronáuticas y Servicios Aéreos) was blocked under Executive Order 13884 of 5 August 2019 that applied generally to property of the Government of Venezuela, but OFAC explicitly identified it and its fleet of 40 aircraft on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list on 7 February 2020 to assure compliance. The Biden Administration began relaxing sanctions on Conviasa in October 2023 under General License 45 for the purpose of deporting Venezuelan nationals from the U.S. General License 45A, issued in November 2023, further eased restrictions on Conviasa, allowing for maintenance of certain Embraer aircraft and was replaced by General License 45B on 29 February 2024, to allow for Venezuelans from non-U.S. jurisdictions to be repatriated. In November 2023, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security named three companies that it said had circumvented sanctions by smuggling U.S. aviation parts to Venezuela. On 2 September 2024, the U.S. seized Maduro's presidential airplane. Sanctions relief First sanctions relief (2022–2024) , head of CNE, Venezuelan's electoral body, and former Comptroller General, sanctioned by Canada, the European Union, Panama, Switzerland and the United States After Joe Biden took office, in 2022 his administration lowered some of the restrictions in the petroleum sector and allowed Chevron Corporation, which had existing investments in Venezuela, to increase production for sales to the U.S. Crude oil exports by July 2023, driven by Chevron and other new agreements allowed under sanctions, rose to their highest level in over three years. Countries like Cuba, China and Iran continued trading with Venezuela, and China become the main source of Venezuela's petroleum revenue in 2023. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated Maduro would have another month to remove bans on candidates for the 2024 presidential election. On 17 April 2024, the U.S. announced that some of these sanctions would be reinstated because the Barbados Agreement had not been fully honored and the leading opposition candidate María Corina Machado had not been allowed to run in presidential elections. Waivers to operate in spite of the sanctions were extended to companies with existing oil and gas assets and production in Venezuela; in addition to Chevron, these included Spain's Repsol, Italy's Eni, France's Maurel & Prom, After sanctions relief, Spain's 2024 imports through July of Venezuelan petroleum tripled from those of the same period in 2023. == Canada ==
Canada
, Maduro's Foreign Minister, sanctioned by Canada and the United States Canada sanctioned 40 Venezuelan officials, including Maduro, in September 2017 for behaviors that undermined democracy after at least 125 people were killed in the 2017 protests and "in response to the government of Venezuela's deepening descent into dictatorship". November 2017 On 23 November 2017, Canada added sanctions under the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, stating the individuals were "responsible for, or complicit in, gross violations of internationally recognized human rights" and had "committed acts of significant corruption, or both". Three of the 19 individuals added to the Canadian list had already been sanctioned in September (Maduro, Tareck El Aissami and Gustavo González López May 2018 Responding to the 2018 presidential elections, Canada sanctioned 14 more Venezuelans. Canada's Special Economic Measures (Venezuela) Regulations were amended on 30 May 2018 to account for the "economic, political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela" that the Canadian statement said "moves [Venezuela] ever closer to full dictatorship". The government sanctioned Maduro's wife, Cilia Flores, and 13 other members of the ANC and TSJ. April 2019 In April 2019, Canada announced sanctions on 43 more individuals. The government statement said that high-ranking officials were sanctioned for "anti-democratic actions, particularly relating to the repression and persecution of the members of the interim government, censorship, and excessive use of force against civil society, undermining the independence of the judiciary and other democratic institutions." Foreign Minister Freeland stated that the "Maduro dictatorship" was responsible for the crisis. The newly sanctioned Venezuelans included Jorge Arreaza, Maduro's Minister of Foreign Affairs. In March 2025, Canada sanctioned eight government officials which they said had engaged in civil rights violations. == European Union ==
European Union
, Constituent Assembly president, sanctioned by Canada, the European Union, Mexico, Panama, Switzerland, and the United States In 2017, the E.U. approved an embargo on arms and material, adding Venezuela along with North Korea and Syria, to countries where European companies cannot sell material that may be used for repression. In 2018, those sanctions were continued for another year because of "human rights violations and undermining of democracy and the rule of law under President Nicolás Maduro". The E.U. sanctioned seven Venezuela officials on 18 January 2018, stating they were responsible for deteriorating democracy in the country: Diosdado Cabello, Néstor Reverol (Interior Minister), Gustavo González López (Head of Intelligence), Antonio Benavides Torres (National Guard Commander), Tibisay Lucena (Head of Electoral Council), Maikel Moreno (Supreme Court President), and Tarek William Saab (Attorney General). The sanctioned individuals were prohibited from entering the nations of the E.U., and their assets were frozen. Cabello, known as number two in Chavismo, had not been sanctioned by the U.S. when the E.U. sanctioned him. On 25 June 2018, the E.U. sanctioned another eleven officials in response to the May 2018 Venezuelan presidential election, which it described as "neither free nor fair". The additional sanctions brought the total to 18 Venezuelans sanctioned in European nations. In June 2019, the Associated Press reported that the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands were considering imposing sanctions on Maduro and several top officials for the crackdown on political opponents following the 30 April uprising. However, E.U. member states were divided over the timing of any action for fear of derailing a negotiated exit to the country's crisis. The E.U. sanctioned seven intelligence and security officials in September 2019, taking what Reuters described as a more "severe tone" against torture and bringing to 25 the number of individuals sanctioned by the E.U. The E.U. sanctioned eleven individuals on 29 June 2020. following earlier extensions. In its annual review in May 2024, intending to support dialogue ahead of the July 2024 Venezuelan presidential election, the E.U. made an exception and extended its restrictions through 10 January 2025 rather than the full year, recognizing the date the new president-elect would be sworn in. At the same time, the E.U. sought to incentivize free and fair elections, and temporarily lifted sanctions on Elvis Amoroso, head of CNE, the electoral body in Venezuela, and three former officials of that body, Socorro Hernández, Xavier Moreno and Leonardo Morales. Amoroso rejected that easing of restrictions, labeling it immoral, interference in Venezuela's elections and harassment, and demanding that sanctions on everyone in the country be lifted. The Council of the European Union sanctioned another 15 individuals, extended restrictive measures through 10 January 2026, and re-applied the restrictions they had removed in May 2024 on Elvis Amoroso, Socorro Hernández, Xavier Moreno and Leonardo Morales. As of 2025, the EU has sanctioned 69 Venezuelans comprising most of Maduro's inner circle. == Other ==
Other
Panama , Maduro's wife, sanctioned by the U.S. and Canada; Panama sanctioned multiple Venezuelans and companies associated with family members of Flores. On 27 March 2018, Panama sanctioned 55 public officials and 16 businesses that operate in Panama, related to the family of Maduro's wife, Cilia Flores. Panama thus become the first country in Latin America to sanction the Maduro administration, joining the U.S., Canada, the E.U. and Switzerland. The sanctioned businesses had members of the Malpica-Flores family on their boards of directors. Switzerland Switzerland implemented sanctions against Venezuela on 28 March 2018, freezing the assets of seven ministers and high officials. The sanctions mimicked those of the E.U., expressing concern over individual freedoms, illegitimate elections, and separation of powers. The Swiss sanctioned eleven more individuals in on 7 July 2020 for human rights violations. Following the 3 January 2026 capture of Nicolás Maduro, the Swiss froze assets of Maduro and 36 people associated with him Mexico The Mexican Senate froze the assets of officials of the Maduro administration in April 2018 and prohibited them (Antonio Benavides Torres, Delcy Rodríguez, Diosdado Cabello, Maikel Moreno, Néstor Reverol, Tarek William Saab, and Tibisay Lucena) from entering Mexico. In July 2019, the Mexican Ministry of Finance froze bank accounts of 19 companies related to the sale of low quality and over-priced food to the Venezuelan government's CLAP program and opened an investigation relating to money laundering after detecting "irregularities of more than 150 million dollars". Curaçao On 21 June 2019, Curaçao announced a gold import and transit ban on Venezuela. According to prime minister Eugene Rhuggenaath, criminal investigations indicated drug smuggling and money laundering were associated with the Venezuelan gold trade. United Kingdom After its exit from the E.U., the United Kingdom continued to issue sanctions aligned with the E.U. In July 2021 the U.K. issued a series of sanctions that included Colombian businessman Alex Saab, and the freezing of assets and travel bans. Álvaro Enrique Pulido, his associate, was also sanctioned—both for "exploiting two of Venezuela's public programs that were established to provide poor Venezuelans with affordable food and housing", stating that the men had inflated prices for personal enrichment, causing "more suffering to Venezuelans who were already in poverty". Following Maduro's disputed inauguration for a third term as president on 10 January 2025, the U.K. joined the E.U., U.S. and Canada in applying new sanctions. The 15 new individuals sanctioned included the TSJ head and security and military officials held responsible by the UK for undermining democracy. == Entry bans ==
Entry bans
Lima Group After Maduro's second inauguration on 7 January 2019, the Lima Group (except Mexico) announced its member countries would follow Peru's decision to ban the entry of people linked with Maduro's administration. The list—which was not disclosed in its entirely—was headed by Maduro, his wife Flores, Cabello, and Delcy Rodríguez and encompassed Venezuela's military leadership. The decision to ban collaborators of the Maduro administration from entering Colombia came after the Lima Group disavowed Maduro as the legitimate president of Venezuela. Maduro's cousin, Argimiro Maduro Morán, and family were turned back when they sought refuge in Colombia during the 2019 Venezuelan blackouts. Bolivia On 4 January 2026, one day after the capture of Maduro by the United States, Bolivia imposed travel restrictions on members of the Venezuelan security forces and officials and former officials of the Maduro government. == Evasion ==
Evasion
Tareck El Aissami announced in October 2018 in response to U.S. sanctions that all foreign exchange government auctions would be quoted in euros, Chinese yuan and other hard currencies instead of U.S. dollars. He said the government would open bank accounts in Europe and Asia as potential workarounds to financial sanctions and that Venezuela's banking sector would be able to participate in currency auctions three times a week, adding that the government would sell some 2 billion euros amid a rebound in oil prices. In January 2020, despite the entry ban imposed by the E.U., Maduro Vice President Delcy Rodríguez met in the guest area of the Madrid–Barajas Airport with Spain's minister José Luis Ábalos from the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party. Following a five-year investigation of 30 Swiss banks for alleged corruption, as of 2021, five had been reprimanded by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority for laundering money linked to PDVSA, allowing "corrupt members of the Venezuelan government" to evade sanctions and transfer money to Switzerland. Some ships' captains and owners sympathetic to Venezuela turned off their transponder locations to avoid the U.S. sanctions and deliver oil to Russia, China, and India, creating an environmental risk of ship collisions. As of 2020, Mexico defied the U.S. sanctions by allowing fuel shipments, and in spite of sanctions on both Iran and Venezuela, Iran sent five oil tankers to Venezuela. Venezuela continued to send money In April 2022, it sent fuel oil and diesel to Cuba, and paid Saint Vincent and the Grenadines' debt with Petrocaribe, estimated to have been around $189 million. In August 2023, Petróleos de Venezuela increased fuel shipments to Cuba, from 53,000 barrels per day of petroleum products to 65,000 barrels. Following an investigation by the F.B.I. of trading involving Mexican companies, in January 2021, the U.S. sanctioned a network comprising three people, fourteen companies and six ships for evading sanctions on Venezuelan petroleum products. Six months earlier, three Mexicans, eight Mexican-based companies and two ships were sanctioned. == Analysis==
Analysis
Legality In 2019, former UN rapporteur Alfred de Zayas said that US sanctions on Venezuela were illegal as they constituted economic warfare and "could amount to 'crimes against humanity' under international law". His report, which he says was ignored by the UN, was criticized by the Latin America and Caribbean programme director for the International Crisis Group for neglecting to mention the impact of a "difficult business environment on the country", which the director said "was a symptom of Chavismo and the socialist governments' failures", and that "Venezuela could not recover under current government policies even if the sanctions were lifted." Maduro and his administration have stated that the U.S. is responsible for the collapse of the Venezuelan economy. a 2020 WOLA report agreed with that figure. Reporting on Arreaza's statement, the Associated Press said that Maduro was blocking aid on the premise that "Venezuelans are not beggars". After the 2020 U.S. sanctions on Luis Parra, Arreaza stated that the U.S. sanctions were undermining democratic institutions. Guaidó stated in May 2019 that the sanctions had weakened a network of Cuban spies that he said operated in Venezuela. After the announcement of regional elections in 2021, Guaidó announced a "national salvation agreement" and proposed negotiation with Maduro with a schedule for free and fair elections and international support and observers, in exchange for lifting international sanctions. Economists and news reports state that the crisis began, and shortages and high inflation existed in Venezuela, before the sanctions and that sanctions prior to 2019 targeted Maduro and Chavismo "elites" while having little impact on average Venezuelans. The Wall Street Journal said in January 2019 that economists place the blame for Venezuela's economy shrinking by half on policies of the Maduro administration, "including widespread nationalizations, out-of-control spending that sparked inflation, price controls that led to shortages, and widespread graft and mismanagement". WOLA said that Venezuela "was already suffering from a years-long crisis" before the 2017 sanctions. Some economists, scholars and non-governmental organizations state In 2021, the US Government Accountability Office concluded that sanctions "likely contributed to Venezuela's economic decline". The report said that as a result of sanctions, Venezuela is selling less oil, at a higher cost and a lower price. In 2023, Al Jazeera wrote that the sanctions had affected citizens. In 2024, the Financial Times described the sanctions as "crippling". Reuters stated that falling oil prices in 2020 during the COVID-19 recession, alongside the sanctions, contributed to fuel shortages in the country. A Transparencia Venezuela 2020 report stated that an "institutional, political, economic, social and environmental crisis" had "characterized Venezuela for more than a decade", caused by authoritarian administration, while noting that sanctions have impacted the economy. The Council on Foreign Relations called Venezuela "the archetype of a failed petrostate", and said that "oil continues to play the dominant role in the country's fortunes". It said that the fall in oil prices since 2014, due to the 2010s oil glut, "sent Venezuela into an economic and political spiral". Other reports also cited government mismanagement as the cause of or factors in the decline. Two United Nations special rapporteurs had earlier criticized the U.S. sanctions as "economic warfare", stating that their use to "overthrow an elected government is in violation of all norms of international law". 66 Venezuelan NGOs asked her to consider the harmful impact of sanctions in the context of years of repression, corruption and economic mismanagement. In her preliminary report, Douhan said that the economic pressure against Venezuela worsened the crisis, but that Venezuela's economic decline "began in 2014 with the fall in oil prices" and that "mismanagement and corruption had also contributed". She asked the U.S., U.K. and Portugal to release an estimated $6 billion in frozen Venezuelan foreign assets. The government welcomed the report, while the opposition accused her of "playing into the hands of the regime". Douhan's report was criticized, and some NGOs manifested on social media with the hashtag "#Lacrisisfueprimero" (The crisis came first). In 2023, Douhan stated that the sanctions on PDVSA deprived Venezuela's budget of 99% of its external revenue, crippling the country's social programs. Christopher Sabatini, the senior research fellow for Latin America at Chatham House, said in a July 2023 Foreign Policy article that as a result of sanctions, Western investors and institutions were either forbidden or discouraged from purchasing Venezuelan debt, and that the share migrated to "shadowy holders" via the United Arab Emirates and Turkey, among others, suspected to be fronts from buyers from China, Iran, Russia and other US rivals. Swiss hedge fund Mangart Capital estimated that the debt held by US interests decreased from 75% in 2017 to between 35% and 40% in 2023. Sabatini argued that as a result the new bondholders could prevent a democratic transition of the country and prevent it from entering global capital exchanges in the future. Venezuelan economist Francisco Rodríguez said, "If it had not been for sanctions, Venezuela would have experienced a large economic crisis in the last decade, but it would have been more like other large economic crises in Latin America and even in prior Venezuela history (...) It wouldn't have been like what we've seen." Impact on food, medicine and health A 2019 joint report published by Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health stated that most sanctions were focused on abusive officials involved in corruption, did not target the economy, and that the 2017 sanctions allowed exceptions for food and medicine. In 2018, Susana Raffalli had stated that 36% of Venezuelan children had stunted growth prior to sanctions; she cited the PDVAL affair (tons of imported food supplies found rotten during Hugo Chávez's government) as an example of food shortages before sanctions. The Lancet journal editors noted in 2019 that Maduro had used food as a political weapon and resisted humanitarian aid, and that the U.S. had reacted with sanctions that they said resulted in collateral food and medicine shortages. Weisbrot stated that he "could not prove those excess deaths were the result of sanctions, but said the increase ran parallel to the imposition of the measures and an attendant fall in oil production". the US State department, Opposition-aligned academic and Guaido appointee Ricardo Hausmann and Frank Muci published a rebuttal in Americas Quarterly, stating that the analysis took Colombia as a counterfactual for Venezuela, when Colombia and Venezuela are "radically different in other dimensions". Public perception Polling in 2023 by Datanalisis found that 74% of Venezuelans do not support sanctions, 30% attribute Venezuela's problems to the sanctions, and half of Venezuelans agree with the sanctions on some administration officials. == Persons sanctioned ==
Persons sanctioned
Legend: G – Government officials; S – Active or retired military or security officials; O – Other; Person no longer sanctioned == Entities sanctioned ==
Entities sanctioned
Legend: A – Aircraft; C – Company; G – Governmental organization/state institution; S – Ship; Entity no longer sanctioned == See also ==
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