Amalrik was best known in the Western world for his essay
Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?, published in 1970. The book predicts the country's eventual breakup under the weight of social and ethnic antagonisms and a disastrous war with China. This was in direct contrast to
Andrei Sakharov's famous essay "Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom", published only two years before, which argued that a convergence between Soviet and western systems was already taking place, while Amalrik's essay argued that the two systems were in fact growing further apart. The essay was written following the
Damanskii/Zhenbao island incident with China. Amalrik predicted the collapse of the regime would occur between 1980 and 1985. Amalrik said in his book: {{quote|text=I must emphasize that my essay is based not on scholarly research but only on observation. From an academic point of view, it may appear to be only empty chatter. But for Western students of the Soviet Union, at any rate, this discussion should have the same interest that a fish would have for an
ichthyologist if it suddenly began to talk. As 1984 drew nearer, Amalrik revised the timetable but still predicted that the Soviet Union would eventually collapse. and had little impact on mainstream
Sovietology. "Amalrik's essay was welcomed as a piece of brilliant literature in the West" but "[v]irtually no one tended to take it at face value as a piece of political prediction."
Post-USSR views Of those few who foresaw the fall of the Soviet Union, including Andrei Amalrik, author
Walter Laqueur argued in 1995 that they were largely accidental prophets, possessors of both brilliant insight into the regime's weaknesses and even more brilliant luck. On an essay published in
Foreign Affairs, Charles King called Amalrik's predictions "deserving of an award", praising his logical method for exploring the historical outcomes that arise from a nation's tendency to bet in its own prolonged stability — "
to consider, for a moment, how some future historian might recast implausible concerns as inevitable ones.", as well as his insight into what the post-Soviet geopolitic scenario would look like. King argues that, while Amalrik was wrong about the likelihood of conflict with China, the
Soviet–Afghan War played out perfectly as a stand-in for what Amalrik predicted: "
a drawn-out, exhausting war, prosecuted by decrepit leaders, which drained the Soviet government of resources and legitimacy". ==Second prison sentence==