Exploration and discovery In 1901,
William Knox D'Arcy, a millionaire
London socialite, negotiated an
oil concession with
Mozaffar al-Din Shah Qajar of
Persia. He financed this with capital he had made from his shares in the highly profitable
Mount Morgan Mine in
Queensland, Australia. D'Arcy assumed exclusive rights to prospect for oil for 60 years in a vast tract of territory including most of Persia. In exchange the Shah received £20,000 (£ million today), an equal amount in shares of D'Arcy's company, and a promise of 16% of future profits. D'Arcy hired geologist
George Bernard Reynolds to do the prospecting in the Persian desert. Conditions were extremely harsh: "small pox raged, bandits and warlords ruled, water was all but unavailable, and temperatures often soared past 50°C". After several years of prospecting, D'Arcy's fortune dwindled away and he was forced to sell most of his rights to a Glasgow-based syndicate, the
Burmah Oil Company. By 1908, having sunk more than £500,000 into their Persian venture and found no oil, D'Arcy and Burmah decided to abandon exploration in Persia. In early May 1908, they sent Reynolds a telegram telling him that they had run out of money and ordering him to "cease work, dismiss the staff, dismantle anything worth the cost of transporting to the coast for re-shipment, and come home." Reynolds delayed following these orders and in a stroke of luck, struck oil shortly after, on 26 May 1908.
Creation of APOC On 14 April 1909, Burmah Oil created the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) as a subsidiary and also sold shares to the public. Volume production of Persian
oil products eventually started in 1913 from a refinery built at
Abadan, for its first 50 years the largest oil refinery in the world (see
Abadan Refinery). In 1913, shortly before World War I, APOC managers negotiated with a new customer,
Winston Churchill, who was then
First Lord of the Admiralty. Churchill, as a part of a three-year expansion program, sought to modernise Britain's
Royal Navy by abandoning the use of coal-fired steamships and adopting oil as fuel for its ships instead. Although Britain had large reserves of coal, oil had the advantage of greater energy density, allowing a longer steaming range for a ship for the same
bunker capacity. Furthermore, Churchill wanted to free Britain from its reliance on the
Standard Oil and
Royal Dutch Shell oil companies. In exchange for secure oil supplies for its ships, the British government injected new capital into the company and, in doing so, acquired a controlling interest in APOC. The contract that was set up between the British Government and APOC was to hold for 20 years. The British government also became a de facto hidden power behind the oil company. APOC took a 50% share in a new
Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) organised in 1912 by
Calouste Gulbenkian to explore and develop oil resources in the
Ottoman Empire. After a hiatus caused by
World War I, it reformed and struck an immense
gusher at
Kirkuk,
Mandatory Iraq in 1927, renaming itself the
Iraq Petroleum Company. In 1920, the APOC also acquired a northern oil concession that had been formally granted in 1916 to a former Russian subject, the Georgian
Akaki Khoshtaria. To manage this new acquisition, the APOC formed a new subsidiary, the North Persia Oil Company. Persia, however, refused to accept the new company, giving rise to a lingering dispute over the northern Persian oil. In 1923, oil was found at the Iraqi/Persian border in
Naft Khana/Naft-i-Shah (now
Diyala Province), which was considered a "transferred territory" along the
Persia-Iraq border. The Khanaqin Oil Company was registered in London as an APOC subsidiary. The quantities henceforth produced in the field were rather insignificant. Naft Khana reverted to the Iraqi government in 1958 after failing to achieve a contractual obligation of 40,000 bbl/day. During this period, Persian popular opposition to the D'Arcy oil concession and royalty terms whereby Persia only received 16% of net profits was widespread. Since industrial development and planning, as well as other fundamental reforms were predicated on oil revenues, the government's lack of control over the oil industry served to accentuate the
Persian government's misgivings regarding the manner in which APOC conducted its affairs in Persia. Such a pervasive atmosphere of dissatisfaction seemed to suggest that a radical revision of the concession terms would be possible. Moreover, owing to the introduction of reforms that improved fiscal order in Persia, APOC's past practice of cutting off advances in oil royalties when its demands were not met had lost much of its sting. In 1923, Burmah employed Winston Churchill as a paid consultant to lobby the British government to allow APOC to have exclusive rights to Persian oil resources, which were subsequently granted. In 1925, TPC received concession in the
Mesopotamian oil resources from the Iraqi government under British mandate. TPC finally struck oil in Iraq on 14 October 1927. In 1928, the APOC's shareholding in TPC, which by now was named
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), would be reduced to 23.75%; as the result of the changing geopolitics post
Ottoman Empire break-up, and the
Red Line Agreement. AIOC was a 50% co-owner and responsible for the operation of the refinery completed in 1939 at the Haifa terminal of the IPC-owned
Kirkuk-Haifa oil pipeline.
Renegotiating of terms by Iran The attempt to revise the terms of the oil concession on a more favourable basis for Persia led to protracted negotiations that took place in Tehran, Lausanne, London and Paris between
Abdolhossein Teymourtash, Persia/Iran's Minister of Court 1925–32 and its nominal Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Chairman of APOC,
John Cadman, spanned 1928–32. The overarching argument for revisiting the terms of the D'Arcy Agreement on the Persian side was that its national wealth was being squandered by a concession that was granted in 1901 by a previous non-constitutional government forced to agree to inequitable terms under duress. In order to buttress his position in talks with the British, Teymourtash retained the expertise of French and Swiss oil experts. Persia demanded a revision of the terms whereby Persia would be granted 25% of APOC's total shares. To counter British objections, Teymourtash would state that "if this had been a new concession, the Persian Government would have insisted not on 25 percent but on a 50–50 basis. Teymourtash also asked for a minimum guaranteed interest of 12.5% on dividends from the shares of the company, plus two shillings per ton of oil produced. In addition, he specified that the company was to reduce the existing area of the concession. The intent behind reducing the area of the concession was to push APOC operations to the southwest of the country so as to make it possible for Persia to approach and lure other oil companies to develop oilfields on more equitable terms in areas not part of APOC's area of concession. Apart from demanding a more equitable share of the profits of the company, an issue that did not escape Teymourtash's attention was that the flow of transactions between APOC and its various subsidiaries deprived Iran of gaining an accurate and reliable appreciation of APOC's full profits. As such, he demanded that the company register itself in Tehran as well as London, and the exclusive rights of transportation of the oil be returned to the Iranian government. In fact in the midst of the negotiations in 1930, the Iranian
National Consultative Assembly approved a bill whereby foreign companies would be required to pay a 4 percent tax on prospective profits earned in Iran. In 1931, Teymourtash, while travelling to Europe to enroll Crown Prince
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi at a Swiss boarding school, decided to use the occasion to attempt to conclude the negotiations. According to Cadman, Teymourtash worked feverishly and diligently to resolve all outstanding issues, but succeeded only in securing an agreement in principle while key figures and lump sum payments were not settled. However, while Teymourtash was led to believe that after four years of exhaustive and detailed discussions, he had succeeded in navigating the negotiations on the road to a conclusive end; the latest negotiations in London were to prove nothing more than a cul de sac. Matters came to a head in 1931, when the combined effects of over-abundant oil supplies on the global markets and the economic destabilization of the
Great Depression, led to fluctuations which drastically reduced annual payments accruing to Iran to a fifth of what it had received in the previous year. In that year APOC informed the Iranian government that its royalties for the year would amount to a mere £366,782 while in the same period the company's income taxes paid to the British government amounted to approximately £1,000,000. Furthermore, while the company's profits declined 36 percent for the year, the revenues paid to the Iranian government pursuant to the company's accounting practices decreased by 76 percent. Such a precipitous drop in royalties appeared to confirm suspicions of bad faith, and Teymourtash indicated that the parties would have to revisit negotiations. However, Reza Shah was soon to assert his authority by dramatically inserting himself into the negotiations. The monarch attended a meeting of the Council of Ministers in November 1932, and after publicly rebuking Teymourtash for his failure to secure an agreement, dictated a letter to cabinet cancelling the D'Arcy Agreement. The Iranian government notified APOC that it would cease further negotiations and demanded cancellation of the D'Arcy concession. Rejecting the cancellation, the British government espoused the claim on behalf of APOC and brought the dispute before the
Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague, asserting that it regarded itself "as entitled to take all such measures as the situation may demand for the Company's protection." The Permanent Court of International Justice was a tool of the
League of Nations which, in turn, was dominated by the victors of World War I. At this point,
Hassan Taqizadeh, had been appointed the new Iranian Minister entrusted with the task of assuming responsibility for the oil dossier. In modern political history, Taqizadeh is known as a
secular politician who believed that "outwardly and inwardly, in body and in spirit, Iran must become Europeanized". Taqizadeh was to intimate to the British that the cancellation was simply meant to expedite negotiations and that it would constitute political suicide for Iran to withdraw from negotiations. After the dispute between the two countries was taken up at the Hague, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister who was appointed mediator put the matter into abeyance to allow the contending parties to attempt to resolve the dispute. Ironically,
Reza Shah who had stood firm in demanding the abolishment of the D'Arcy concession, suddenly acquiesced to British demands, much to the chagrin and disappointment of his Cabinet. A new agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was agreed to after Cadman visited Iran in April 1933 and was granted a private audience with the Shah. A new agreement was ratified by the National Consultative Assembly on May 28, 1933, and received Royal assent the following day.
1933 agreement According to
Daniel Yergin, "By the end of April 1933, a new agreement was finally forged. The concession area was reduced by three-quarters. Persia was guaranteed a fixed royalty of four shillings per ton, which protected it against fluctuations in oil prices. At the same time, it would receive 20 percent of the company's worldwide profits that were actually distributed to shareholders above a certain minimum sum. In addition, a minimum annual payment of £750,000, irrespective of other developments, was guaranteed. The royalties for 1931 and 1932 were to be recalculated on the new basis, and the 'Persianization' of the workforce was to be accelerated. Meanwhile, the duration of the concession was extended from 1961 to 1993." By 1950, Abadan had become the world's largest refinery. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company continued its large Persian operations although it changed its name to the AIOC in 1935. In spite of diversification the AIOC still relied heavily on its Iranian oil fields for three-quarters of its supplies, and controlled all oil in Iran. ==Nationalisation and coup==