Following the loss of Hormuz, Portuguese forces, led by Rui Freire de Andrade, launched several attempts at military reconquest in 1623, 1624, 1625 and 1627, as well as a diplomatic attempt in 1631, but all failed. On the other hand, the Portuguese moved to
Muscat (which became their new central base of operations in the Gulf), in turn establishing a trading post in
Basra in 1623, at the mouth of the
Euphrates River. That same year, Rui Freire de Andrada reconquered the
Fort of Soar, which had been lost the previous year to the Persians, and transformed it into a new base of operations in
Khasab (on the
Musandam peninsula). Gaspar Leite also managed to conquer
Quelba Fort in 1624, and Mateus de Seabra did the same with
Mada Fort. In 1625/1630, following the
Battle of Hormuz (1625), the Portuguese signed a truce with the Persians, who allowed the Portuguese to establish a trading post and fortification at
Bandar Kong, which is located on the coast of Iran. Then, in 1631, the Portuguese built the
Julfar fort (but it would be
lost in 1633), a strategic point of great importance on the Musandam peninsula, and which experienced a period of great prosperity during the Portuguese occupation, serving as a large warehouse of regional trade. The main character of the Luso-Persian war, Rui Freire de Andrada, died in September 1633, and was buried in the church of San Agustín (Muscat). After his death, peace treaties were concluded with the Persians and the English in 1635. The Portuguese empire in the Persian Gulf would end up stabilizing again, despite the fall of the fortress of Hormuz. New fortifications and trading posts were founded, such as those of Soar, Julfar, Doba, Libédia, Mada, Corfação, Caçapo, Congo (Bandar Congo), and Basra.
Political impact Within the Hispanic Monarchy, the event led to the Council of Portugal radicalizing its warlike stance having been influenced by the local governors and advisors opposing any attempt to develop an alliance between the Portuguese and English in the
East Indies. In Madrid there was a desire to declare war on those who challenged the Portuguese monopoly in the Indian Ocean trade notably the English and the Dutch since the Portuguese feared that its reputation of their Empire would be tarnished among the natives of Asia. There was a fear that giving concessions to the "northern nations" would make the English to be more daring, with less respect for the power of the King of Spain. In addition, there was a concern that
France and
Poland-Lithuania would take advantage and also trade in India. This was perceived as serious damage to Portuguese trade and its monopoly based on the papal bulls of the
Treaty of Tordesillas. However, after many discussions, and with Castilian pressure (who emphasized the impossibility of obtaining the resources and forces to fight the Protestant companies alone in the State of India), finally the Council of Portugal would come to consider an alliance with the English at the time. the evident logistical weakness being demonstrated, although declaring it as "forced and obligatory". Although such rapprochement with the English was under the Portuguese condition that the economic damages for the loss of Hormuz be compensated (ideally, the English state was expected to send its ships to help recover Hormuz from what was an illegal act of the East India Company), something that, for the majority of ministers of the Spanish Council of State, was not worth requesting, since they saw it as unrealistic, in the words of Don
Pedro de Toledo "Asking the King of England for things impossible for him would be of little effect to us", since it would not be possible to force the English to give up the vast commercial benefits they were receiving from the Persians. No rapprochement with the English was achieved because the
Thirty Years' War broke out and once again Spain and England were on opposite sides after the end of the
Twelve Years' Truce. On the other hand, it was seen as condemnable and disloyal that the English had supported the Persians at a time when relations between Spain and England were trying to improve (largely because the
Spanish Habsburgs wanted to solve their financial problems), at a time which Don Pedro de Toledo considered "of such friendship between the [Castilian and English] crowns." Spanish-English relations would only be ruined again after the failure of talks between both monarchies to consolidate an alliance through the marriage of
Maria Ana of Spain (sister of
Philip IV of Spain) with Prince
Charles I of England, such failure reestablished the rivalry, although the events in the Persian Gulf contributed to souring relations between the
Spanish and
English empires. In turn, during the
Portuguese Restoration War, the Portuguese separatists saw the loss of Hormuz as an event with which to propagandize against the
Spanish Monarchy, designing a rhetoric blaming all the failures of the Portuguese Empire in the Persian Gulf on the Castilian leadership, evading own responsibility. However, the documentation of the
Spanish Council of State shows that the conflict was not treated negligently, but was in the constant interest of the Spanish, who dealt with a transnational geopolitics that integrated (rather than excluded) Portuguese overseas affairs, and for which Hormuz, despite its strategic importance, was not the center of interest of Spanish global politics (as if it were the balance with the Ottomans and having good relations with Persia), which is why the shipment of a Luso-Castilian navy to the Indian Ocean was denied, while being aware of more important matters in the Atlantic. ==See also==