Before signing the Ottawa Declaration, a footnote was added stating; "The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security". In 2019,
United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that circumstances had changed and "the region has become an arena for power and for competition. And the eight Arctic states must adapt to this new future". The council is often in the middle of security and geopolitical issues since the Arctic has peculiar interests to Member States and Observers. Changes in the Arctic environment and participants of the Arctic Council have led to a reconsideration of the relationship between geopolitical matters and the role of the Arctic Council.. Likewise, the changing nature of the Arctic region has brought into question the role of the Arctic Council. With developments moving the focus to maritime issues rather than terrestrial, the debate is also moved towards questions of jurisdiction and security, outside the scope of the Arctic Council Member states think that the sharing cost of the development of Arctic shipping-lanes, research, etc., by cooperation and good relationships between states is beneficial to all.
Arctic exceptionalism and cooperation The Arctic region was for a long time seen politically as something exceptional. Arctic exceptionalism is the notion that the Arctic was detached from general power politics and geopolitical tension. The Arctic was too remote and the conditions too harsh. Rather, the regional actors sought peace and cooperation with one another, despite some Arctic states being traditional rivals. The Arctic Council is central to the making of Arctic exceptionalism. The Council emerged from a series of initiatives and compromise There are oceanic claims between the United States and Canada in the
Beaufort Sea. The major territorial disputes are over exclusive rights to the seabed under the central Arctic high seas. Due to
climate change and melting of the Arctic sea-ice, more energy resources and
waterways are now becoming accessible. Large reserves of oil, gas and minerals are located within the Arctic. This environmental factor generated territorial disputes among member states. The
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea allows states to extend their exclusive right to exploit resources on and in the continental shelf if they can prove that seabed more than from
baselines is a natural prolongation of the land. Canada, Russia, and Denmark (via Greenland) have all submitted partially overlapping claims to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), which is charged with confirming the continental shelf's outer limits. Once the CLCS makes its rulings, Russia, Denmark, and Canada will need to negotiate to divide their overlapping claims. Disputes also exist over the nature of the
Northwest Passage and the
Northeast Passage /
Northern Sea Route. Canada claims the entire Northwest Passage are
Canadian Internal Waters, which means Canada would have total control over which ships may enter the channel. The United States believes the Passage is an
international strait, which would mean
any ship could transit at any time, and Canada could not close the Passage. Russia's claims over the Northern Sea Route are significantly different. Russia only claims small segments of the Northern Sea Route around straits as internal waters. However, Russia requires all commercial vessels to request and obtain permission to navigate in a large area of the
Russian Arctic exclusive economic zone under Article 234 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which grants coastal states greater powers over ice-covered waters. Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage arouses substantial public concern in Canada. A poll indicated that half of Canadian respondents said Canada should try to assert its full sovereignty rights over the
Beaufort Sea compared to just 10 percent of Americans. New commercial trans-
Arctic shipping routes can be another factor of conflicts. A poll found that Canadians perceive the Northwest Passage as their internal Canadian waterway whereas other countries assert it is an
international waterway. This response highlighted deeper divisions between Russia and the Western bloc within the Council, straining the inclusivity that had previously characterized its operations. Despite these challenges, the Council successfully transitioned its chairmanship from Russia to Norway in 2023, demonstrating its capacity to maintain institutional continuity under difficult circumstances. This was in part due to the Council’s soft nature as a consensus seeking forum. Because there were no legal obligations requiring a full suspension. Rather it allowed diplomatic channels to stay open and for dialogue to continue. This aided the eventual re-opening.. However, relations with Russia within the Council remain strained, and questions persist about how the Council will navigate its relationship with Russia moving forward. This period has underscored the increasing relevance of geopolitical considerations in the Council’s operations. While originally focused on
environmental protection and
sustainable development, the Arctic Council now finds itself grappling with the broader realities of
global power politics and their impact on regional governance. While observers lack decision-making power, their participation has raised concerns about the influence of powerful non-Arctic actors on the Council’s governance. This challenges the Council and its role, as it must balance relations inside and outside the Council. China’s growing interest in Arctic resources and
shipping routes has fueled broader strategic concerns. Some opinions view its participation as a necessary step toward fostering international cooperation, while others see it as a potential risk to
Arctic sovereignty. Military infrastructure is another point to consider. Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia are rapidly increasing their defence presence by building up their militaries in the Arctic and developing their building infrastructure. Arctic cooperation, however, is also adapting to these changes. While not directly tied to the Arctic Council itself, there has been examples of traditional rival countries participating in military exercises together, such as Operation Northern Eagle Although only a small majority of Russian respondents supported such measures, more than 80 percent of them agreed that the Arctic Council should cover peace-building issues. Paul Berkman suggests that solving security matters in the Arctic Council could save members the much larger amount of time required to reach a decision in
United Nations. When questioned, people who have been working within, or in close proximity to, the Council, showcase the view that its main impacts lay in specific working groups and products The focus on science and resource protection and management is seen as a priority, which could be diluted or strained by the discussion of geopolitical security issues. This scepticism is prevelant, also amongst those close to the organisation. The political tensions of the region challenge the Council’s effectiveness, as challenges are moved to national, rather than common interests. == See also ==