Armed Revolutionary Action

Use of violence In the meeting of the Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party held in December 1962, the question of using violence as a means of self-defense and its relation to mass actions was discussed for the first time. The position taken at this meeting was subsequently addressed and revisited in later meetings:The possible organization of actions of a special type is a task to be carried out by special organizations which, although acting in conjunction with the actions and demonstrations of the masses and to stimulate them, must develop their action entirely independently of the action of the masses themselves. That is, the action of the organisms or groups for special actions can never be confused, even in the eyes of the repressive forces, with mass action and demonstrations.For the PCP, the primary approach was peaceful mass actions aimed at achieving a "mass uprising," with armed struggle being a secondary and less emphasized aspect of their strategy, though it was still considered. The possibility of armed struggle was neither dismissed nor actively pursued; instead, it was viewed as a potential option to be used only when deemed appropriate. The April 1964 report Towards Victory endorsed the use of armed struggle but stressed that the main objective of the "Democratic and National Revolution" was to mobilize the masses to overthrow the regime and its repressive apparatus. The goal was to achieve the overthrow of the dictatorship through a "national mass uprising," although the conditions for such an uprising had not yet been met despite the growing popular opposition to the regime. According to the PCP, not being in a revolutionary situation meant that the masses were not yet prepared to undertake such action. For the PCP, its task was:not only to push forward the popular struggle which itself aggravates the crisis of the regime, but to prepare to be able to lead the country into the decisive and final struggle in the coming revolutionary situation. [...] Guided by Marxism-Leninism, defining our orientation supported by the facts, we work to hasten the creation of a revolutionary situation and to create the political and organizational conditions to rise to the demands of the situation.According to the PCP, if broad mass struggles lead to popular insurrection, the increasing confrontations between the repressive apparatus and the masses would necessitate that trained cadres transition to armed struggle. For the PCP, gaining the support of at least some segments of the military was crucial in this anti-fascist insurrection, as the military was a key pillar of the regime. Consequently, the PCP consistently sought to establish clandestine cells within various military divisions to focus on agitation, propaganda, mobilization, and organization among discontented military personnel. Within the leadership, there were differing opinions on the use of armed struggle. While some leaders favored mass struggles, others contended that armed actions were essential for overthrowing a repressive and violent regime. Ideological issues The PCP recognized the use of "special actions" as a means to deepen and intensify the political and social movement".Today, petty-bourgeois radicalism, verbal revolutionarism, insists on only one thing: immediate direct action, immediate violent action, immediate armed struggle. Some people talk like that and get sick when they hear about mass struggle and organization [...] This anarchist tendency is above all harmful because of the orientation it tries to give to the democratic struggle. It causes enormous harm in that it influences the democratic forces away from their essential, instantaneous, immediate tasks, without which they can never launch a victorious insurrection: the mass struggle and organization.The most radical sectors included students and workers from the South Bank of the Tagus River. The PCP did not rule out violence but sought to use it within the framework of a "national uprising", provided it was directed by the PCP and occurred in a context of radicalization and intensified mass struggle, potentially leading to a revolutionary environment to overthrow the dictatorship. After Álvaro Cunhal was released from prison, he strongly criticized the "right-wing policy" of Júlio Fogaça, and the possibility of armed insurrection was revisited. == Background ==

Formation of "special actions" The PCP decided to begin the process of forming a new organization, focused on "special actions", stating that:The worsening crisis of the fascist regime, the development of the political struggle of the masses, their radicalization, the brutality of the repressive apparatus, and the evolution of the colonial war, place a new task on the Party: the task of organizing actions of self-defense of the masses, actions aimed at hitting more directly the military apparatus of the colonial war, that create difficulties for the repressive apparatus, that hinder fascist propaganda and give new aspects to anti-fascist agitation and propaganda. The execution of such actions cannot be left to spontaneity. It must be faced on the practical ground.Rogério de Carvalho, a member of the Central Committee since 1963, was tasked with establishing the "special actions" organization, which began recruiting its original core in 1964. Raimundo Narciso, a student at the Instituto Superior Técnico (IST) in Lisbon, who had been involved in several political activities, was contacted and went underground. A militia officer was also approached but refused to participate. Almeida, who collaborated with the PCP from 1965 to 1966, also declined to go underground due to his academic commitments but agreed to remain a party militant and carry out the tasks assigned to him. Consequently, the "special actions" group initially consisted of only two members and the support of Almeida. In early 1965, Rogério de Carvalho and Raimundo Narciso traveled through the Soviet Union before proceeding to Cuba for military training. Both had previously served as militia officers in the Portuguese Army at different times. According to Raimundo Narciso, "the PCP intended to create a parallel structure, politically tutored and supported, which allowed the PCP to disengage from direct responsibility for the actions to be carried out." They spent two months in Cuba receiving training in weapon handling, explosives, and guerrilla techniques at a mansion in El Vedado, Havana. Upon their return to Portugal, Rogério de Carvalho and Raimundo Narciso sought to establish a support network. They made contact with António Pedro Ferreira (pseudonym "Morais"), a student at the Instituto Superior Técnico; Leonel (pseudonym), an engineer and veteran of the colonial war; and Mário Reis, a worker. Suppliers Paratrooper Lieutenant Cassiano Bessa, a PCP-linked officer and the main supplier of diverted materials from the barracks was denounced but managed to flee the country before his arrest. His escape was considered an "important loss" for the "special actions" group. Most of the equipment used by the "special actions" and later by the Armed Revolutionary Action, including weaponry and explosives, came from the Portuguese Army. This equipment was either diverted by militants, sympathizers, or military personnel opposed to the war. Mayer (pseudonym), the caretaker for a family with ties to the Estado Novo, served as the organization's supplier of chemicals necessary for making explosives. This included controlled substances such as concentrated sulfuric acid. Attack attempt After five months of recruitment involving Rogério de Carvalho, Raimundo Narciso, and the Portuguese Communist Party, the "special actions" group had assembled a team ready to commence operations. They also secured facilities for storing equipment, including a villa with a gunroom function in Mafra, a rented garage, and three storage rooms in Lisbon. After the wave of repression, several measures were implemented to safeguard the organization and its operatives, who were now only connected to the Portuguese Communist Party through Rogério, who was in prison. According to Raimundo Narciso, attempts to contact the PCP in Lisbon were conducted "with the utmost care to avoid approaching anyone being monitored by the PIDE and to ensure that our cautiousness was not mistaken for a trap by the political police". Due to the weakening of the PCP apparatus after the wave of repression, particularly in Lisbon, Rogério was informed by Ângelo Veloso that the PCP had decided to send him to the Soviet Union for political training. During this period, the "special actions" had to be suspended due to concerns about how much the International and State Defense Police (PIDE) knew about their activities. Additionally, a group of militants was sent to Cuba for military training, with the intention of integrating them into the "special actions" upon their return. Earlier, after completing their training, they met in Prague with Álvaro Cunhal, Manuel Rodrigues da Silva (both members of the Secretariat), and Carlos Brito. According to Carlos Brito, "It was a difficult meeting. The comrades were on a different wavelength. Influenced by the Cuban approach, they focused solely on 'special actions' and were primarily concerned with combating the colonial war apparatus". Restructuring of "special actions" When Narciso returned from Moscow in June 1967, he found the organization disorganized, weak, and disarticulated. He and Ângelo Veloso were tasked with restructuring the "special actions" group. They rented two storage rooms in Lisbon, a garage in Amadora, and a villa near Sintra for storing war materials and other equipment. In 1968, they purchased a farmhouse northeast of Torres Vedras to serve as a central gunroom, which remained operational until the Carnation Revolution on April 25, 1974. To protect the location from police scrutiny, a couple of clandestine PCP employees were appointed as caretakers. They posed as housekeepers for a landlord who visited only occasionally, which helped to avoid suspicion. Additionally, a group of militants, including three members of the PCP, was sent to Moscow for military training to integrate them into the "special actions. This group included Francisco Miguel Duarte, an individual known only by the pseudonym Almendra, and a third person described as a worker according to Almendra. At the time, Almendra was a student and a member of the Central Committee of the PCP, exiled in Paris. During their training in Moscow, they learned various skills, including ship sabotage, weapons handling, making and using bombs, grenades, Molotov cocktails, and military strategy. Almendra noted that the training required great preparation as well as physical and psychological resilience. Constitution of the ARA In 1968, Francisco Miguel and Almendra, whose pseudonym and the fact that he arrived married to a French woman are the only known details, arrived in Portugal to join what would later become the Armed Revolutionary Action. From 1968 to 1970, the "special actions" group grew to about 42 operatives, maintaining relative stability and securing their gunroom. During this period, their activities focused on logistics and reconnaissance. In July 1970, Jaime Serra, a member of the PCP Central Committee, was appointed to lead the ARA, with Joaquim Gomes serving as the link between the PCP and the ARA.They couldn't put in recent cadres or people who didn't give guarantees. These cadres generally didn't come, and the Party tended to send cadres they didn't want in other organizations. Generally, they didn't send the good cadres that were needed in other organizations. They sent people who had a propensity for special actions and who were sent here so that they could be framed and not cause problems in other organizations. The people who came to the ARA had to agree with the armed actions.The ARA also engaged in recruiting individuals close to the leaders based on trust. The organization employed strict compartmentalization; each cell operated independently and had no knowledge of the others, even among the leaders themselves. During this period, society experienced increasing radicalization, particularly among youth and students. Several groups emerged, advocating for armed struggle, including the Liga de Unidade e Ação Revolucionária, the Portuguese National Liberation Front, the Portuguese Revolutionary Joint, and the Brigadas Revolucionárias. Despite these developments, the ARA did not commence its armed struggle until 1970 due to the need for rigorous preparation, ongoing political repression, and internal disagreements about the use of violence. == Operations ==

Attack on Cunene The first armed action began to be planned and recognized in August 1970. By September, the target was defined and the plan was formulated, but due to the constraints of clandestinity, Gabriel Pedro could not reach Portugal in time. In October, the liner Vera Cruz and the "most modern cargo ship of the African lines", the Cunene, arrived in Portugal. Gabriel Pedro, along with Carlos Coutinho, was scheduled to board the Vera Cruz. Coutinho was responsible for installing the explosive charges on the ship. Gabriel Pedro, after further review, proposed amendments that led to a complete reformulation of the procedures. He had the central role in the operation: acquiring a rowboat and transporting Carlos Coutinho to the Vera Cruz. Gabriel Pedro, a 72-year-old veteran communist militant, had previously spent several years imprisoned in the Tarrafal concentration camp. Just before the operation, the explosive charges assembled by Narciso and Miguel in the ARA laboratory in Arruda dos Vinhos were moved to a secure location in Alcântara, with the clocks synchronized for 5 a.m. Start of operation On October 26, 1970, at 9:45 p.m., the operation began. After several meetings among the operatives, Carlos Coutinho and Gabriel Pedro rowed out from the Poço do Bispo dock in Marvila. Result The following day, news of an explosion on the Cunene appeared in the newspapers. O Século published a photograph of the ship showing visible damage. Meanwhile, Diário de Notícias reported an interview with several individuals, including the ship's commander, who suggested that "the rupture was likely caused by a leakage of diesel or gases in the hold". The "Triple Action" Preparation In the meetings following the Cunene action, new targets were proposed, including the PIDE/DGS headquarters. However, this idea was discarded due to the difficulty of accessing the location and the risk of causing casualties. Instead, the PIDE Technical School, located near Benfica Road, was suggested as a target. This choice was seen as a viable way to strike at the regime and its repressive apparatus. Additionally, several other targets were proposed. To symbolize opposition to American imperialism, the Cultural Center of the United States on Duque de Loulé Avenue was selected. To minimize risk further, the bomb was planted at 3:40 a.m., just twenty minutes before the scheduled detonation. However, the operation turned tragic when a 15-year-old boy, who had returned from work, encountered the device. It is unclear whether he attempted to move or open the box or was simply in the vicinity when the explosion occurred. This incident marked the only ARA action with a fatal outcome. The press reported the fatality alongside the explosions, and the PIDE/DGS attributed it to an ARA operative. The ARA viewed the fatality as a victim of repression and fascism and considered the placement of the explosive device outside the building a significant error. Consequently, the organization resolved never to conduct operations with targets near public roads again. United States Cultural Center The plan for the action at the American Cultural Center involved placing an explosive device inside the building, with the clock set to detonate at dawn. The bomb was concealed within a thick, spine-bound book to avoid detection. Romeo (pseudonym), a militia furir serving his mandatory military service in the Commandos, was assigned the task of executing this mission. The operation at the American Cultural Center began weeks in advance. Romeo visited the center to examine and plan his approach. He purchased a similar book in English from a bookstore to match the ones he had observed. Operation "Águia Real" (Royal Eagle) Preparation In the early morning of March 8, 1971, one of the ARA's most significant actions occurred: the sabotage of the Tancos air base, which led to the destruction of numerous military airplanes and helicopters. The planning for this operation began in August 1970, when Raimundo Narciso was introduced to Ângelo de Sousa, a young Air Force corporal undergoing mandatory military service at Air Base No. 3 in Tancos, through Jaime Serra. The plan involved ARA operatives disguising themselves as military personnel and being introduced to the base's guard as members from Ota Air Base. Once inside the complex, they intended to place bombs equipped with incendiary charges and electrical circuits on each aircraft, which would be detonated simultaneously. The operatives responsible for executing the action included Ângelo de Sousa, Carlos Coutinho, and António João Eusébio, who would be transported to the base by a hired car. Raimundo Narciso was in charge of coordinating the operation. Following the mission, Ângelo de Sousa was to stay in a safe apartment until arrangements could be made to get him abroad. Using the copied keys, they entered the hangar and proceeded to install the electrical and explosive systems according to their pre-acquired data. The final, critical step was connecting the charges to the batteries. Any mistake at this stage could trigger an immediate and catastrophic explosion. Photographs of Ângelo de Sousa were widely published in the press, accompanied by notes detailing several accusations against him. Following this high-profile operation, the PIDE/DGS began to connect the ARA to the PCP. The scale and sophistication of the sabotage were such that it suggested a well-organized and capable logistical and technical support structure. From the police's perspective, "only the PCP would possess the structures, operational capability, and resources necessary to execute such a complex operation successfully". The Central Committee of the PCP hailed the formation of the ARA as "an important political event in national political life." They emphasized the "political justness" of the ARA's struggle against colonialism, fascism, and imperialism. The Committee assessed that the ARA's actions had generated "a wave of enthusiasm and increased confidence in the popular struggle toward armed insurrection". Action against NATO meeting On June 3, 1971, several ministers from NATO member countries gathered in Lisbon, accompanied by hundreds of international journalists covering the high-profile meeting, which was enthusiastically promoted by Marcello Caetano. This meeting, the first of its kind in many years, provided an ideal opportunity for the ARA to draw international attention to the colonial war and the opposition struggle in Portugal. However, the electricity disruption did not proceed as planned due to insufficient explosive charges. Despite this, the operation succeeded in damaging several poles, leading to power outages in certain areas of Lisbon, including the Palace of Ajuda, where the NATO meeting was taking place. The operation was initiated after the Central Command learned of a significant cache of explosive material stored in an armory at the Loures quarry. Reconnaissance missions were conducted by Francisco Miguel, Raimundo Narciso (accompanied by his wife and daughter), António Pedro Ferreira, and Ramiro Morgado. The ARA viewed these facilities as a provocation and as evidence of NATO's support for the Portuguese dictatorship and its colonial wars. Therefore, attacking the headquarters would have significant symbolic value. To carry out the operation, the ARA needed to smuggle explosives past the guardhouse. Raimundo Narciso and Victor Eça conducted a reconnaissance of the site. Manuel dos Santos Guerreiro and Manuel Policarpo Guerreiro were selected to execute the plan, which was to be carried out in the early morning hours when there was a higher likelihood that the guards would be asleep. After retrieving the bomb, which was concealed in a wooden box decorated to resemble a birthday present, they proceeded to Oeiras, where Manuel Guerreiro was stationed. Manuel Policarpo Guerreiro received the bomb and was responsible for placing it in the building. Raimundo Narciso, Manuel Policarpo Guerreiro, and Manuel Guerreiro entered the premises by opening the gate. They first approached the guardhouse, where Narciso took cover, and then moved on to the main building to position the bomb. At 2 a.m., the bomb detonated, causing massive damage to the Comiberlant Barracks. The explosion resulted in the collapse of part of the facade and wall, as well as the destruction of windows, doors, nearly all furniture, and electronic devices. According to Raimundo Narciso, the censorship prevented any news about the explosion from appearing in the newspapers. Since the action occurred just two days before the scheduled commemoration, there was a concerted effort to repair the building's facade to conceal the damage. However, the extent of the destruction rendered the attempt ineffective. Consequently, the inauguration ceremony had to be relocated to the street and held on an improvised stage, which ultimately resulted in a fiasco. In their announcement, the ARA emphasized that there were no casualties and countered government claims, asserting that no operatives had been captured. Raimundo Narciso conducted a reconnaissance of the site, learning about the ships, access points, and security measures. To gather this information, Narciso took a vacation to Figueira da Foz beach with his wife. The plan, similar to the one in Cunene, involved planting an explosive on the hull of one of the ships. However, this time, it was necessary to reach the ship by swimming. ARA has never been able to clarify how the action took place. Operation "Short-Circuit" On August 9, 1972, the inauguration of Américo Tomás as President of the Republic was scheduled to proceed once again. Jaime Serra was assigned to oversee the execution in Porto, while Ângelo de Sousa was responsible for the four towers in Coimbra. According to Jaime Serra, the action "had great political repercussion and overshadowed the inauguration of the President of the Republic", and was broadcast with emphasis, being impossible to ignore. This was the last action of the ARA. End of ARA The ARA was suspended in May 1973. By this time, no operations had been conducted since August 1972. The decision to suspend the ARA, made by both the ARA Central Command and the Secretariat of the PCP Central Committee, was influenced by several factors. The ARA's statement explained that the suspension of certain actions was a strategic decision in light of the emerging broad political movement in the country, which was seen as crucial for weakening the fascist and colonialist dictatorship. The goal was to maximize the potential of other forms of anti-fascist popular struggle. Additionally, the organization had been significantly weakened by the arrest of six key operatives in 1970. Although the ARA operated independently from the PCP, there were several connections between the two organizations. For instance, M, a worker at the Port of Lisbon who had made contact with Jaime Serra, possessed critical information that could have facilitated an ARA sabotage action. However, upon arrest, he divulged all the information he had to the police. This loss, coupled with intensified persecution by the political police, severely impeded the execution of actions. In 1973, Augusto Lindolfo survived an assassination attempt, which the PIDE attributed to the ARA, although no one claimed responsibility for the attack. == Operational ==

Central command Main operational After the revolution After the Carnation Revolution on April 25, 1974, the ARA was dissolved, and its operatives returned to normal political life. According to one operative, "After April 25, the ARA was no longer necessary, it was no longer legitimate. Even if their operations had been justified, they lacked legitimacy in the emerging democracy". Regarding the use of lethality, ARA operatives maintained that "our actions would not create casualties, preventing the regime from labeling us as terrorists. They could never say that. The population could also distinguish us, as they were not attacked and were not confused by our actions." Reflecting on the FP-25 attacks in the 1980s, an ARA operative commented, "[...] they killed a man in Sacavém. That man was a scoundrel, who deserved to die five hundred times, but that operation should never have happened because it challenged [...] the collective conscience, questioning the nature of a left that wanted to be necessary, just, and ethical." Thus, while the targets of FP-25 were considered legitimate, the political violence employed by the group is viewed as counterproductive to the broader struggle. When Coutinho was arrested in 1973, he reported that he had been subjected to sleep deprivation torture for approximately 300 hours, divided into two periods: one lasting nine consecutive days and another lasting four days. He even attempted to find ways to commit suicide. Reflecting on the PIDE/DGS's response to the Tancos sabotage, Coutinho remarked: “To excuse their lack of effectiveness, the PIDE/DGS attributed to us a kind of 'superhuman ability,' superior to that of a James Bond. [...] These stories spread, with people discussing and commenting. In the Montecarlo coffee shop, which I frequented, the attack on Tancos and the 'superman' who supposedly carried it out were the main topics of conversation. I made a considerable effort not to laugh and eventually agreed with the narrative to avoid raising any suspicions". == See also ==