As the
mortgage situation in the United States became more serious,
market participants became unwilling to purchase ABCP. This caused trouble for
financial institutions that had relied on sales of ABCP to obtain funds for use in longer-term investments (see
maturity mismatch). For example, as one form of the ABCP program, the
structured investment vehicles (
SIVs) set up by some
commercial banks financed their longer-term, higher-yield investing through sales of ABCP. This had been very profitable when ABCP was considered safe (so that ABCP buyers accepted a low interest rate). When some asset prices dropped, investors were less willing to buy or rollover ABCP. This forced
SIVs to quickly liquidate their longer-term investments at a substantial loss. In
Canada, the financial sector reforms undertook in the years preceding the
2008 financial crisis helped strengthen the country's banking system. However, and with an estimated value of CAD 33 billion in ABCP, the consequences of the collapse of the ABCP market could have been very damaging if the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec (CDPQ) and the Bank of Canada had not stepped in. In the summer of 2007, Henri-Paul Rousseau, then President and CEO of CDPQ had envisioned and negotiated a unique Canadian solution that consisted in converting the ABCP into long-term bonds with the major players signing the Accord de Montréal. This agreement has prevented a forced liquidation, which would have resulted in losses of CAD $20 billion. ensured the completion of what would be considered the largest restructuring in Canadian history. In 2008, RBC Dexia positioned the Caisse in the first quartile for returns amongst the large pension funds. Recently, investors that had purchased ABCP could recuperate as much as 95 cents for every dollar initially invested. In the end, the impact was minimal for institutions such as la Caisse de dépôt who recorded a negative impact of 0.1% on the return of depositors. ==See also==