In November 1949, shortly after the test of their first nuclear device on September 23, 1949,
Andrey Vyshinsky, the Soviet representative to the
United Nations, delivered a statement justifying their efforts to develop their own nuclear weapons capability. He said: However the USSR did not immediately follow the U.S. lead in 1958 in establishing a program. Presumably, their position in support of a comprehensive
nuclear testing ban stalled any efforts to establish such a program until the mid-1960s. When Nuclear Explosions for the National Economy was finally formally established, Alexander D. Zakharenkov, a chief weapons designer, was appointed head of the program. Initially, the Soviet program was focused on two applications, nuclear
excavation and
petroleum stimulation, similar to the U.S. program. However, interest in other applications quickly developed, and within five years the Soviet program was actively exploring six or seven applications involving participation by some ten government departments. Once underway the Soviets conducted a much more vigorous program than the Americans'
Operation Plowshare, consisting of some 156 nuclear tests, some with multiple devices, between 1965 and 1989. These tests were similar in aims to the American effort, with the exception that six of the shots were considered of an applied nature, that is they were not tests as such, but were used to put out runaway gas well fires and a methane
blow out. There were in fact two programs: • "
Employment of Nuclear Explosive Technologies in the Interests of National Economy", also referred to as "
Program 6", involved industrial underground PNEs and testing of new PNE technologies. As part of the program, 124 tests with 135 devices were conducted. Primary objectives of the program were
water reservoir development,
dam and
canal construction, and creation of underground cavities for
toxic waste storage. • "
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions for the National Economy", also referred to as "Program 7", involved testing of industrial nuclear charges for use in peaceful activities. Nuclear detonations were conducted with the stated purpose of searching for useful mineral resources with
reflection seismology, breaking up ore bodies, stimulating the production of oil and gas, and forming underground cavities for storing the recovered oil and gas. The "Program" numbers come from the USSR's classification system of nuclear explosions, the first five programs designating various phases of
nuclear weapon development. All together, the
Program 7 conducted 115 nuclear explosions. Among them: • 39 explosions for geological exploration (trying to find new
natural gas deposits by studying
seismic waves produced by small nuclear explosions) • 25 explosions to intensify oil and gas debits • 22 explosions to create underground storage for natural gas • 5 explosions to extinguish large natural gas fountains that were burning • 4 explosions to create channels and dams (including the
Chagan test in Kazakhstan, and the
Taiga test on the potential route of the
Pechora–Kama Canal) • 2 explosions to crush
ore in
open-pit mines • 2 explosions to create underground storage for toxic wastes • 1 explosion to facilitate
coal mining in an underground mine • 19 explosions for research purposes (studying possible migration of the radioactivity from the place of the explosions). These explosions were financed by various ministries: 51 explosions were financed by the Ministry for Geology, 26 explosions were financed by the Ministry for Natural Gas, 13 explosions were financed by the Ministry for Oil, 19 explosions were financed by the
MinSredMash itself (the predecessor of the
Federal Atomic Energy Agency). There were two large explosions of 140 kilotons and 105 kilotons; all others were relatively small with an average yield of 12.5
kilotons. For example, one 30-kiloton explosion was used to close the
Uzbekistan Urtabulak gas well in 1966 that had been blowing since 1963, and on May 11th 1968 a 47-kiloton explosive was used to seal a higher pressure blowout at the nearby
Pamuk gas field. Gas fire blowouts like this occurred three more times over the following years. On July 9th 1972, during
Operation Fakel a 3.8-Kiloton explosive was used in
Krestishche gas field in
Ukraine, and a 5-Kilton explosive was used in the same gas field on August 6th of the same year, though on a separate well from the July operation. At
Kumzhinskoye gas field in Northern
Russia a fire that had been burning for more than a year before was extinguished on December 18th 1981 by a 37.5 Kiloton explosive. These successful experiments were later cited as possible precedents for stopping the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The last nuclear explosion by the Program 7, codenamed
Rubin-1, was performed in
Arkhangelsk Oblast on September 6, 1988. The explosion was a part of a seismic program for geological exploration. The
Soviets agreed to stop their PNE program at the end of 1988 as a result of then-president
Mikhail Gorbachev's disarmament initiative. There are proponents for continuing the PNE programs in modern Russia. They (e.g. A. Koldobsky) state that the program has already paid for itself and saved the USSR billions of rubles and can save even more if it would continue. They also allege that the PNE is the only feasible way to put out large fountains and fires on natural gas deposits, and it is the safest and most economically viable way to destroy
chemical weapons. Their opponents, including
Alexey Yablokov, state that all PNE technologies have non-nuclear alternatives and that many PNEs actually caused nuclear disasters. == Problems ==