Atomic sentences are of particular interest in
philosophical logic and the theory of
truth and, it has been argued, there are corresponding
atomic facts. An atomic sentence (or possibly the
meaning of an atomic sentence) is called an
elementary proposition by
Ludwig Wittgenstein and an
atomic proposition by
Bertrand Russell: •
4.2 The sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with possibilities of existence and non-existence of states of affairs. 4.21 The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs. — Wittgenstein,
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. •
A proposition (true or false) asserting an atomic fact is called an atomic proposition. — Russell, "Introduction to
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" • See also and especially regarding
elementary proposition and
atomic proposition as discussed by Russell and Wittgenstein Note the distinction between an
elementary/atomic proposition and an
atomic fact. No atomic sentence can be deduced from (is not entailed by) any other atomic sentence, no two atomic sentences are incompatible, and no sets of atomic sentences are self-contradictory. Wittgenstein made much of this in his
Tractatus. If there are any atomic sentences then there must be "atomic facts" which correspond to those that are true, and the conjunction of all true atomic sentences would say all that was the case, i.e., "the world" since, according to Wittgenstein, "The world is all that is the case". (TLP:1). Similarly the set of all sets of atomic sentences corresponds to the set of all possible worlds (all that could be the case). The
T-schema, which embodies the theory of truth proposed by
Alfred Tarski, defines the truth of arbitrary sentences from the truth of atomic sentences. ==See also==