Background Australia's involvement in the
Vietnam War was driven largely by the rise of
communism in Southeast Asia after
World War II, and the fear of its spread, which developed in Australia during the 1950s and early 1960s. Following the end of the World War II, the French had tried to reassert control over
French Indochina, which had been occupied by Japan. In 1950, the communist-backed
Việt Minh, led by
Ho Chi Minh, began to gain the ascendency in the
First Indochina War. Also in early 1950, Australia recognized the anti-communist
State of Vietnam, an
associated state within the
French Union. In 1954, after the defeat of the French Union at the
Battle of Dien Bien Phu, the
Geneva Accords of July 1954 led to the splitting of the country geographically, along the
17th parallel north of latitude: the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) (recognised by the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China) ruling the north, and the
State of Vietnam (SoV) (recognised by the non-communist world) ruling the south. Before losing the North to the communists within a month, the State of Vietnam became a fully independent member within the French Union. The Geneva Accords imposed a deadline of July 1956 for the governments of the two Vietnams to hold elections, with a view to uniting the country under one government. In 1955,
Ngô Đình Diệm, the prime minister of the State of Vietnam, deposed the head of state
Bảo Đại in a
fraudulent referendum and declared himself President of the newly proclaimed
Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). He then refused to take part in the elections, claiming that the communist
North Vietnam would engage in election fraud and that as a result they would win because they had more people. After the election deadline passed, the military commanders in the North began preparing an invasion of the South. In September 1957, Diem visited Australia and was given strong support by both the ruling
Liberal Party of Australia of Prime Minister
Robert Menzies and the opposition
Australian Labor Party (ALP). Diem was particularly feted by the Catholic community, as he pursued policies that discriminated in favour of the Catholic minority in his country and gave special powers to the Catholic Church. By 1962, the situation in South Vietnam had become so unstable that Diem submitted a request for assistance to the United States and its allies to counter the growing insurgency and the threat that it posed to South Vietnam's security. Following that, the US began to send advisors to provide tactical and logistical advice to the South Vietnamese. At the same time, the US sought to increase the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government by instituting the
Many Flags program, hoping to counter the communist propaganda that South Vietnam was merely a US puppet state, and to involve as many other nations as possible. Thus Australia, as an ally of the United States, with obligations under the
ANZUS Pact, and in the hope of consolidating its alliance with the US, became involved in the Vietnam War. Between 1962 and 1972, Australia committed almost 60,000 personnel to Vietnam, including ground troops, naval forces and air assets, and contributed significant amounts of
materiel to the war effort. Given the experience that Australian forces had gained in Malaya, it was felt that Australia could contribute in Vietnam by providing advisors who were experts in the tactics of jungle warfare. The Australian government's initial response was to send 30 military advisers, dispatched as the
Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV), also known as "the Team". The Australian military assistance was to be in jungle warfare training, and the Team comprised highly qualified and experienced officers and
NCOs, led by Colonel
Ted Serong, many with previous experience from the Malayan Emergency. Their arrival in South Vietnam, during July and August 1962, was the beginning of Australia's involvement in the war in Vietnam. Relationships between the AATTV and US advisors were generally very cordial, but there were sometimes significant differences of opinion on training and tactics. For example, when Serong expressed doubt about the value of the
Strategic Hamlet Program at a US Counter Insurgency Group meeting in Washington on 23 May 1963, he drew a "violent challenge" from US Marine General
Victor "Brute" Krulak. Captain Barry Petersen's work with raising an anti-communist
Montagnard force in the
Central Highlands between 1963 and 1965 highlighted another problem. South Vietnamese officials sometimes found sustained success by a foreigner difficult to accept. Warrant Officer Class Two Kevin Conway, of the AATTV, was killed on 6 July 1964, side by side with Master Sergeant Gabriel Alamo of the
USSF, during a sustained
Vietcong (VC) attack on
Nam Dong Special Forces Camp, becoming Australia's first battle
casualty.
Increased Australian commitment, 1965–1970 In August 1964 the
Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) sent a flight of
Caribou transports to the port town of
Vũng Tàu. By the end of 1964, there were almost 200 Australian military personnel in South Vietnam, including an engineer and surgical team as well as a larger AATTV team. To boost the size of the Army by providing a greater pool for infantrymen, the Australian Government had introduced
conscription for compulsory military service for 20-year-olds, in November 1964, despite opposition from within the Army and many sections of the broader community. Thereafter, battalions serving with in South Vietnam all contained National Servicemen. With the war escalating the AATTV increased to approximately 100 men by December. On 29 April 1965, Menzies announced that the government had received a request for further military assistance from South Vietnam. "We have decided...in close consultation with the Government of the United States—to provide an infantry battalion for service in Vietnam." He argued that a communist victory in South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia. "It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans", he added. The question of whether a formal request was made by the South Vietnamese government at that time has been disputed. Although the South Vietnamese Prime Minister,
Trần Văn Hương, made a request in December 1964, Hương's replacement,
Phan Huy Quát, had to be "coerced into accepting an Australian battalion", In that regard, it has been argued that the decision was made by the Australian government, against advice of the Department of Defence, to coincide with the commitment of US combat troops earlier in the year, and that the decision would have been made regardless of the wishes of the South Vietnamese government. As a result of the announcement, the
1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR) was deployed. Advanced elements of the battalion departed Australia on 27 May 1965. Accompanied by a
troop of
armoured personnel carriers from the
4th/19th Prince of Wales's Light Horse, as well as logistics personnel, they embarked upon and, following their arrival in Vietnam in June, Throughout 1965, they undertook several operations in
Biên Hòa Province and subsequently fought significant actions, including
Gang Toi,
Operation Crimp and
Suoi Bong Trang. Meanwhile, 1 RAR's attachment to US forces had highlighted the differences between Australian and American operational methods, and Australian and US military leaders subsequently agreed that Australian combat forces should be deployed in a discrete province. That would allow the Australian Army to "fight their own tactical war", independently of the US. In April 1966,
1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) was established in
Phước Tuy Province, based at
Nui Dat. 1 ATF consisted of two (and, after 1967, three) infantry
battalions, a troop, and later a
squadron, of armoured personnel carriers from the
1st Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron, and a detachment of the
Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), as well as support services under the command of the
1st Australian Logistic Support Group (1 ALSG),
based in Vũng Tàu. A squadron of
Centurion tanks was added in December 1967. The New Zealand battery and a battery from the U.S
35th Field Artillery Regiment were integrated into the task force. New Zealand infantry units were deployed in 1967 and, after March 1968, were integrated into Australian battalions serving with 1 ATF. The combined infantry forces were thereafter designated "ANZAC Battalions". 1 ATF's responsibility was the security of Phước Tuy Province, excluding larger towns. During the war, RAAF
CAC-27 Sabre fighters from
No. 79 Squadron were deployed to
Ubon Air Base in Thailand as part of Australia's
SEATO commitments. The Sabres took no part in direct hostilities against North Vietnam, and were withdrawn in 1968. The
Royal Australian Navy (RAN) also made a significant contribution, which involved the deployment of one
destroyer, on six-month rotations, deployed on the gun-line in a shore bombardment role. The
RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam and a RAN
Clearance Diving Team were also deployed. The ageing aircraft carrier, HMAS
Sydney, after being converted to a troop-ship, was used to convey the bulk of Australian ground forces to South Vietnam. Female members of the Army and RAAF nursing services were present in Vietnam from the outset and, as the force grew, the medical capability was expanded by the establishment of the
1st Australian Field Hospital at Vũng Tàu on 1 April 1968. during a patrol in September 1967 From an Australian perspective, the most famous engagement in the war was the
Battle of Long Tan, which took place on 18 and 19 August 1966. During the battle, a company from
6 RAR, despite being heavily outnumbered, fought off an assault by a force of regimental strength. 18 Australians were killed and 24 wounded, while at least 245 VC were killed. It was a decisive Australian victory and is often cited as an example of the importance of combining and coordinating infantry, artillery, armour and military aviation. The battle had considerable tactical implications as well, being significant in allowing the Australians to gain dominance over Phước Tuy Province and, although there were other large-scale encounters in later years, 1 ATF was not fundamentally challenged again. Regardless, during February 1967, 1 ATF sustained its heaviest casualties in the war to that point, losing 16 men killed and 55 wounded in a single week, the bulk of them during
Operation Bribie. 1 ATF appeared to have lost the initiative and, for the first time in nine months of operations, the number of Australians killed in battle, or from friendly fire, mines or booby traps, had reversed the task force's
kill ratio. Such losses underscored the need for a third battalion, and the requirement for tanks to support the infantry, a realisation which challenged the conventional wisdom of Australian counter-revolutionary warfare doctrine, which had previously allotted only a minor role to armour. Yet, it was nearly a year before more Australian forces finally arrived. To Brigadier
Stuart Graham, the 1 ATF commander, Operation Bribie confirmed the need to establish a physical barrier, to deny the VC freedom of movement and thereby regain the initiative. The subsequent decision to establish an
barrier minefield from Đất Đỏ to the coast increasingly came to dominate task force planning. Ultimately, that would prove both controversial and costly for the Australians. Despite initial success, the minefield became a source of munitions for the VC to use against 1 ATF and, in 1969, the decision was made to remove it. during the
Operation Santa Fe As the war continued to escalate following further American troop increases, 1 ATF was heavily reinforced in late 1967. A third infantry battalion arrived in December 1967, and a
squadron of
Centurion tanks, and more Iroquois helicopters, were added in early 1968. In all, a further 1,200 men were deployed, taking the total Australian troop strength to over 8,000 men, its highest level during the war. This increase effectively doubled the combat power available to the task force commander. Although primarily operating out of Phước Tuy, the 1 ATF was also available for deployment elsewhere in the
III Corps Tactical Zone. As Phước Tuy progressively came under Australian control, 1968 saw the Australians spending a significant period of time conducting operations further afield. The communist
Tet Offensive began on 30 January 1968 with the aim of inciting a general uprising, simultaneously engulfing population centres across South Vietnam. In response, 1 ATF was deployed along likely infiltration routes to defend the vital Biên Hòa–
Long Binh complex northeast of
Saigon, as part of
Operation Coburg between January and March. Heavy fighting resulted in 17 Australians being killed and 61 wounded, while communist casualties included at least 145 killed, 110 wounded and 5 captured, with many more removed from the battlefield. Tet also affected Phước Tuy Province and, although stretched thin, the remaining Australian forces there successfully repelled an attack on
Bà Rịa, as well as spoiling a harassing attack on
Long Dien. A sweep of Hỏa Lòng was conducted, killing 50 VC and wounding 25, for the loss of five Australians killed and 24 wounded. In late February, the communist offensive collapsed, suffering more than 45,000 killed, compared with allied losses of 6,000 men. Regardless, Tet proved to be a turning point in the war and, although it was a tactical disaster for the communists, it proved a strategic victory for them. Confidence in the American military and political leadership collapsed, as did public support for the war in the United States. Tet had a similar effect on Australian public opinion, and caused growing uncertainty in the government about the determination of the United States to remain militarily involved in Southeast Asia. Amid the initial shock, Prime Minister
John Gorton unexpectedly declared that Australia would not increase its military commitment in Vietnam. The war continued without respite and, between May and June 1968, 1 ATF was again deployed away from Phước Tuy in response to intelligence reports of another impending offensive. In May 1968, 1 RAR and
3 RAR, with armour and artillery, support fought off large-scale attacks during the
Battle of Coral–Balmoral. 25 Australians were killed and nearly 100 wounded, while the North Vietnamese
People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) lost in excess of 300 killed. The fighting lasted 78 days and was one of the longest out-of-province operations mounted by the Australians during the war. From May 1969, the main effort of the task force refocussed on Phước Tuy Province. Later in June 1969,
5 RAR fought one of the last large-scale actions of the Australian involvement in the war, during the
Battle of Binh Ba, north of Nui Dat in Phước Tuy Province. The battle differed from the unusual Australian experience, because it involved infantry and armour in close-quarter house-to-house fighting against a combined PAVN/VC force, through the village of Binh Ba. For the loss of one Australian killed, the PAVN/VC lost 107 killed, six wounded and eight captured, in a hard-fought but one-sided engagement. in 1968. At least 16 such parades were conducted to welcome units back during the war, with many attracting large crowds. Due to the losses suffered at Binh Ba, the PAVN was forced to move out of Phước Tuy into adjoining provinces and, although the Australians did encounter main force units in the years to come, the Battle of Binh Ba marked the end of such clashes. Yet, while the VC had largely been forced to withdraw to the borders of the province by 1968–69, control of Phước Tuy was challenged on several occasions in the following years, including during the 1968 Tet Offensive, as well as in mid-1969, following the incursion of the PAVN
33rd Regiment, and again in mid-1971, with further incursions by the 33rd Regiment and several VC main force units and, finally, during the
Easter Offensive in 1972. Attacks on
South Vietnamese Regional Force outposts, and incursions into the villages, had also continued. Large-scale battles were not the norm in Phước Tuy Province. More typical was company-level patrolling and
cordon and search operations, which were designed to put pressure on enemy units and disrupt their access to the local population. To the end of Australian operations in Phước Tuy, that remained the focus of Australian efforts, and that approach arguably achieved the restoration of South Vietnamese government control in the province. Australia's peak commitment at any one time was 7,672 combat troops and New Zealand's, 552, in 1969. 43 Australian army nurses served.
Australian counter-insurgency tactics and civic action Historian Albert Palazzo comments that when the Australians entered the Vietnam War, it was with their own "well considered ...concept of war", and this was often contradictory or in conflict with US concepts. The 1 ATF light infantry tactics such as patrolling, searching villages without destroying them (with a view to eventually converting them), and ambush and counter ambush drew criticism from some US commanders. General
William Westmoreland is reported to have complained to Major General
Tim Vincent that 1 ATF was "not being aggressive enough". By comparison, US forces sought to flush out the enemy and achieve rapid and decisive victory through "brazen scrub bashing" and the use of "massive firepower." Australians acknowledged they had much to learn from the US forces about heliborne assault and joint armour and infantry assaults. Yet the US measure of success—the
body count—was apparently held in contempt by many 1 ATF battalion commanders. In 1966, journalist Gerald Stone described tactics then being used by Australian soldiers newly arrived in Vietnam: Looking back on ten years of reporting the war in Vietnam and Cambodia, journalist
Neil Davis said in 1983: "I was very proud of the Australian troops. They were very professional, very well trained and they fought the people they were sent to fight—the Viet Cong. They tried not to involve civilians and generally there were fewer casualties inflicted by the Australians." Another perspective on Australian operations was provided by
David Hackworth: "The Aussies used squads to make contact... and brought in reinforcements to do the killing; they planned in the belief that a platoon on the battlefield could do anything." For some VC leaders there was no doubt the Australian jungle warfare approach was effective. One former VC leader is quoted as saying: "worse than the Americans were the Australians. The Americans style was to hit us, then call for planes and artillery. Our response was to break contact and disappear if we could...The Australians were more patient than the Americans, better guerrilla fighters, better at ambushes. They liked to stay with us instead of calling in the planes. We were more afraid of their style." According to Albert Palazzo, as a junior partner, the Australians had little opportunity to influence US strategy in the war: "the American concept [of how the war should be fought] remained unchallenged and it prevailed almost by default." Overall, the operational strategy used by the Australian Army in Vietnam was not successful. Palazzo believes that like the Americans, Australian strategy was focused on seeking to engage the PAVN/VC forces in battle and ultimately failed as the PAVN/VC were generally able to evade Australian forces when conditions were not favourable. Moreover, the Australians did not devote sufficient resources to disrupting the logistical infrastructure which supported the PAVN/VC forces in Phước Tuy Province and popular support for them remained strong. After 1 ATF was withdrawn in 1971 the insurgency in Phước Tuy rapidly expanded. Historians Andrew Ross, Robert Hall, and Amy Griffin, on the other hand make the point that Australian forces more often than not defeated the PAVN/VC whenever they met them, nine times out of ten. When the Australians were able to set ambushes, or openly engage the enemy, they defeated them and killed or destroyed the units that opposed them. Meanwhile, although the bulk of Australian military resources in Vietnam were devoted to operations against the PAVN/VC forces, a civic action program was also undertaken to assist the local population and government authorities in Phước Tuy. This included projects aimed at winning the support of the people and was seen as an essential element of Australian counter-revolutionary doctrine. Australian forces had first undertaken some civic action projects in 1965 while 1 RAR was operating in Biên Hòa, and similar work was started in Phước Tuy following the deployment of 1 ATF in 1966. In June 1967 the 40-man
1st Australian Civil Affairs Unit (1 ACAU) was established to undertake the program. By 1970 this unit had grown to 55 men, with detachments specialising in engineering, medical, education and agriculture. Although extensive, these programs were often undertaken without reference to the local population and it was not until 1969 that villagers were involved in determining what projects would be undertaken and in their construction. Equally, ongoing staff and material support was usually not provided, while maintenance and sustainment was the responsibility of the provincial government which often lacked the capacity or the will to provide it, limiting the benefit provided to the local population.
Withdrawal of Australian forces, 1970–1973 The Australian withdrawal effectively commenced in November 1970. As a consequence of the overall US strategy of
Vietnamization and with the Australian government keen to reduce its own commitment to the war,
8 RAR was not replaced at the end of its tour of duty. 1 ATF was again reduced to just two infantry battalions, albeit with significant armour, artillery and aviation support remaining. The Australian
area of operations remained the same, the reduction in forces only adding further to the burden on the remaining battalions. By 1971 the province had been largely cleared of local VC forces, who were now increasingly reliant on reinforcements from North Vietnam. As a measure of some success, Highway 15, the main route running through Phước Tuy between Saigon and Vũng Tàu, was open to unescorted traffic. Regardless, the VC maintained the ability to conduct local operations. In November 1970, the unit's strength peaked at 227 advisors. Australian combat forces were further reduced during 1971. On 18 August 1971, Australia and New Zealand decided to withdraw their troops from Vietnam; the Australian prime minister,
William McMahon, announced that 1 ATF would cease operations in October, commencing a phased withdrawal. The
Battle of Nui Le on 21 September proved to be the last major battle fought by Australian forces in the war, and resulted in five Australians killed and 30 wounded. Finally, on 16 October Australian forces handed over control of the base at Nui Dat to South Vietnamese forces, while the main body from
4 RAR—the last Australian infantry battalion in South Vietnam—sailed for Australia on board HMAS
Sydney on 9 December 1971. Meanwhile, D Company, 4 RAR with an assault pioneer and mortar section and a detachment of APCs remained in Vũng Tàu to protect the task force headquarters and 1 ALSG until the final withdrawal of stores and equipment could be completed, finally returning to Australia on 12 March 1972. Australian advisors continued to train Vietnamese troops until the announcement by the newly elected Australian Labor government of
Gough Whitlam that the remaining advisors would be withdrawn by 18 December 1972. It was only on 11 January 1973 that the
Governor-General of Australia,
Paul Hasluck, announced the cessation of combat operations. Australian troops remained in Saigon guarding the Australian embassy until 1 July 1973. Six Australians were listed as
missing in action, although these men are included in the list of Australians killed in action and the last of their remains were finally located and returned to Australia in 2009. Between 1962 and March 1972 the estimated cost of Australia's involvement in the war was $218.4 million. In March 1975 the Australian Government dispatched RAAF transport aircraft to South Vietnam to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees fleeing the North Vietnamese
Ho Chi Minh Campaign. The first Australian
C-130 Hercules arrived at
Tan Son Nhat Airport on 30 March and the force, which was designated 'Detachment S', reached a strength of eight Hercules by the second week of April. The aircraft of detachment S transported refugees from cities near the front line and evacuated Australians and several hundred Vietnamese orphans from Saigon to
Malaysia. They also regularly flew supplies to a large refugee camp at An Thoi on the island of
Phú Quốc. The deteriorating security situation forced the Australian aircraft to be withdrawn to Bangkok in mid-April, from where they flew into South Vietnam each day. The last three RAAF flights into Saigon took place on 25 April, when the Australian embassy was evacuated. While all Australians were evacuated, 130 South Vietnamese who had worked at the embassy and had been promised evacuation were left behind. Whitlam later refused to accept South Vietnamese refugees following the
fall of Saigon in April 1975, including Australian embassy staff who were later sent to
re-education camps by the communists. The Liberals—led by
Malcolm Fraser—condemned Whitlam, and after defeating Labor in the
1975 federal election, allowed South Vietnamese refugees to
settle in Australia in large numbers. ==Protests against the war==