Within this basic framework of foundationalism exist a number of views regarding which types of beliefs qualify as
properly basic; that is, what sorts of beliefs can be justifiably held without the justification of other beliefs. In
classical foundationalism, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they are either
self-evident axioms, or evident to the senses (
empiricism). However
Anthony Kenny and others have argued that this is a
self-refuting idea. • In modern foundationalism, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they were either self-evident axiom or
incorrigible. One such axiom is René Descartes's axiom,
Cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am"). Incorrigible (lit.
uncorrectable) beliefs are those one can believe without possibly being proven wrong. Descartes argued that beliefs about the external world based on the senses can be mistaken, but many classical foundationalists still treat direct experiential senses, such as feeling pain or having a visual sensation, as incorrigible and properly basic. • In what
Keith Lehrer has called "fallible foundationalism", also known as "moderate foundationalism", the division between
inferential and non-inferential belief is retained, but the requirement of incorrigibility is dropped. This, it is claimed, allows the senses to resume their traditional role as the basis of non-inferential belief despite their fallibility. • In
Reformed epistemology, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they are reasonable and consistent with a sensible
world view.
Anti-foundationalism rejects foundationalism and denies there is some fundamental belief or principle which is the basic ground or foundation of inquiry and knowledge. ==See also==