Battle of Ban Me Thuot

At the beginning of 1975, members of the North Vietnamese Political Bureau paid close attention to the military situation in South Vietnam to plan for their next major offensive. On January 8, two days after the PAVN 4th Corps had captured Phuoc Long on the northern edges of South Vietnam's III Corps Tactical Zone, North Vietnamese leaders agreed to launch an all-out military offensive, in order to win the war. Originally the North Vietnamese leaders expected the campaign would last two years, be completed in 1976, and pave the way for final victory. Their key objectives were to bring military pressure closer to Saigon, annihilate as many South Vietnamese military units as possible, and create favourable conditions on the battlefield so that combat forces could be deployed from their current localities. The Central Highlands Front fielded five infantry divisions (3rd 'Yellow Star', 10th, 316th, 320A and 968th Infantry Divisions) and four independent regiments (25th, 271st, 95A, and 95B Infantry Regiments). To support the aforementioned units, North Vietnam deployed the 273rd Armoured Regiment, two artillery units (40th and 675th Artillery Regiments), three air-defence units (232nd, 234th, and 593rd Air-Defence Regiments), two combat engineer units (7th and 575th Combat Engineer Regiments), and the 29th Communications Regiment. Offensive strategy Between February 17 and February 19, 1975, PAVN field commanders in the Central Highlands Front held a conference to plan for their upcoming offensive. In order to plan their combat strategy, PAVN commanders assessed the potential obstacles faced by the PAVN and the strength of the ARVN in the Central Highlands. Following extensive discussions, PAVN commanders concluded that the ARVN in the Central Highlands could mobilise about 5–7 regiment-sized units to counter the upcoming offensive. In the worst-case scenario, if ARVN units were not tied up elsewhere, North Vietnamese commanders thought that the ARVN could probably mobilise between nine and twelve regiments. North Vietnamese commanders believed the ARVN could deploy about one or two armoured brigades, three to five battalions of artillery, and 80 aircraft per day to support the army. The North Vietnamese commanders within the Central Highlands Front discussed the possibility of the United States re-entering the conflict, which they believed would see the commitment of about 100 fighter-bombers from the United States Seventh Fleet. Aside from dealing with the ARVN formations which South Vietnam might have deployed, the question of where and when to strike was the main problem that concerned the North Vietnamese. After the strength of both armies had been taken into account, the Central Highlands High Command came up with two offensive options. In the first option, the PAVN could avoid the outlying ARVN installations and strike directly at their primary target of Ban Me Thuot. For the first option to be successful, the PAVN had to secure Highways 14, 19, and 21 to isolate Ban Me Thuot, and stop potential ARVN reinforcements. The North Vietnamese favoured the first option, because it would give the ARVN 23rd Infantry Division and other support units little or no time to respond. At the same time, the first option would have enabled a quick victory without inflicting large-scale damage on the civilian population of Ban Me Thuot. In the second option, the North Vietnamese had to destroy all the outlying ARVN defences and then move on to Ban Me Thuot. The Central Highlands Front, under LTG Hoàng Minh Thảo's command, ordered all combat units to follow the second option and destroy the defences around Ban Me Thuot, but to be ready to switch to the first option when the opportunity presented itself. South Vietnamese preparations On February 18, 1975, Thiệu gathered all his commanders at the Independence Palace to discuss the Ly Thuong Kiet Military Plan, which was approved by the National Security Council in December 1974. During a briefing by ARVN Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung, Head of the ARVN General Staff, several important issues were brought to the attention of Thiệu and the ARVN Corps commanders: firstly, information gathered by the ARVN showed there were seven PAVN divisions in the northern areas of South Vietnam's I Corps Tactical Zone; secondly, there were signs which suggested that the PAVN might launch a large-scale attack during the spring–summer season of 1975; and, thirdly, the II Corps Tactical Zone was most likely North Vietnam's first target. On February 19 Phú returned to Pleiku to draw up a defence plan. During the next few days, reports from South Vietnamese intelligence showed that the PAVN 968th Infantry Division had arrived in South Vietnam's II Corps from Laos. Two divisions (10th and 320A Infantry Divisions) had taken up positions around Pleiku and Kon Tum, while the PAVN 271st and 202nd Regiments had set up their base in Quảng Đức. On March 2 a CIA officer flew out from Nha Trang to inform ARVN Colonel Nguyễn Trọng Luật of PAVN preparations to attack Ban Me Thuot, without offering information on the strength of the PAVN formations. In response to the CIA report, Phú ordered the 53rd Regiment to move from Quảng Đức to Ban Me Thuot and the 45th Regiment from Thuan Man to Thanh An-Don Tham. Phú did not make any further changes to the South Vietnamese order of battle in or around Ban Me Thuot. Thus, by the time the North Vietnamese opened fire on Ban Me Thuot, Phú had simply failed to implement an effective plan to save II Corps. ==Prelude==

Diversions In February 1975, during the midst of Tet New Year celebrations, a PAVN deserter surrendered to the ARVN 2nd Brigade Headquarters. Through extensive interrogations, the soldier revealed the whereabouts of the PAVN units; the 10th Infantry Division had encircled Duc Lap, while the 320A Infantry Division had arrived in Ea H'leo and were gearing up for an assault on Thuan Man, and an unknown unit was heading towards Ban Me Thuot. In late February, PAVN artillery began to shell Pleiku, which convinced Phú that the North Vietnamese would attack Pleiku instead of Ban Me Thuot. South Vietnamese military intelligence and information received from the American Embassy in Saigon showed the presence of about two or three PAVN divisions positioned about 20 kilometres away from Kontum and Pleiku. Personnel from local Viet Cong units infiltrated Kontum and Pleiku to spread rumours of a "big Communist offensive" on the aforementioned districts. On the night of March 5, the PAVN 25th Regiment ambushed an ARVN convoy at Chi Cuc and cut off Highway 21 west of Ban Me Thuot. To keep all the main roads open, Phú sent reinforcements to defend a section of Highway 19 at the eastern side of Peiku and ordered the ARVN 45th Infantry Regiment to march back from Thuan Man to defend Route 14 at southern Pleiku. The ARVN 53rd Infantry Regiment, under the command of Colonel Vũ Thế Quang, was redeployed from Quảng Đức Province to defend Ban Me Thuot. By March 8, the PAVN had completely isolated II CTZ from the rest of the country. Route 7, which had not been used for a long time due to neglect, was the only road still open. ==Battle==

Fall of Ban Me Thuot At 02:00 on March 10, 1975, the PAVN began their assault on South Vietnamese forces at Ban Me Thuot. The PAVN 149th and 198th Regiments spearheaded the attack by hitting the Phụng Dực Airfield, Mai Hắc Đế warehouse and the headquarters of the ARVN 53rd Infantry Regiment. The initial PAVN attack, which was marked by heavy artillery bombardment and actions initiated by the 198th Special Forces Regiment, had shocked ARVN Colonels Nguyễn Trọng Luật and Vũ Thế Quang. Despite the strength of the initial assault, Quang believed the PAVN only wanted to cause disruption and would withdraw their forces by daybreak. The PAVN 5th Battalion, 198th Special Forces Regiment continued their assault on South Vietnamese installations at Mai Hắc Đế warehouse and the headquarters of the ARVN 53rd Infantry Regiment. The 5th Battalion successfully overran the nearby ARVN artillery position and the tactical operations centre. By 05:00 all main roads leading into the city of Ban Me Thuot were completely under PAVN control. As the sun rose, the PAVN continued to pound South Vietnamese positions around Ban Me Thuot with heavy artillery to cover the next wave of infantry assaults. During the morning of March 10, PAVN infantry units attacked Ban Me Thuot from different directions along the main roads. The 174th Regiment, with one armoured battalion in support, marched through Chi Lang, Chu Di and Mai Hắc Đế from the northwest. As the 95B Regiment approached Ban Me Thuot from the northeast, the main formation of the 149th Regiment secured Chu Blom and marched towards Ban Me Thuot from the southeast. The 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 149th Regiment launched an assault on Phụng Dực Airfield from the northeast and southwest respectively. At the same time, the 2nd Regiment captured the South Vietnamese installation at Phuoc An. At around 17:30, an ARVN Ranger battalion was forced to abandon the nearby installation at Darlac after continuous assaults from the 95B Regiment. In the northeast, the ARVN 9th Ranger Battalion held off the PAVN 95B Regiment until they abandoned their positions the next day. In the western outskirts of Ban Me Thuot, eight A-37 Dragonfly bombers from the RVNAF 6th Air Force Division inflicted light casualties on the PAVN 24th Regiment, but failed to stop their momentum. In the southwest, Quang tried to retake Mai Hắc Đế warehouse by mobilising his reserve units with tactical air support. During the night of March 10, there was a lull in the fighting around Ban Me Thuot. ARVN soldiers consolidated to various points around the headquarters of the 23rd Infantry Division, the Phụng Dực Airfield and the radio station. Colonel Quang, in a desperate attempt to save Ban Me Thuot, called on Brigadier General Lê Trung Tường to send reinforcements; none were sent. In the early hours of March 11, the PAVN resumed their assault under continuous bombing runs from RVNAF A-37s. At 07:55, the RVNAF, while trying to stop a dozen PAVN tanks from advancing toward their objective, accidentally dropped two bombs on the headquarters of the 23rd Infantry Division. From that point on, the 23rd Infantry Division lost all contact with the ARVN 2nd Brigade Command Headquarters. The PAVN 149th Regiment launched another attack against the 53rd Regiment's positions on 11 March, but were forced back with numerous casualties. helicopter at Phụng Dực Airfield While the RVNAF was transporting the 23rd Infantry Division to the battlefield, their airbase at Cu Hanh was subjected to artillery bombardment from the PAVN 968th Infantry Division. The PAVN command had anticipated the South Vietnamese military's movements, so they built up their forces in and around Ban Me Thuot to prepare for a South Vietnamese counter-attack. On March 13, the PAVN 24th and 28th Regiments received two companies of armoured vehicles and one artillery battalion, which had begun raining artillery shells on Phuoc An. At dawn on 14 March, the 149th Regiment launched another attack on Phụng Dực supported by six tanks, the attack was again beaten back with the loss of one tank. On March 11 Thiệu convened a meeting with Prime Minister Trần Thiện Khiêm, Chief of the General Staff Cao Văn Viên, and Assistant for Security affairs Đặng Văn Quang to discuss the military situation in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. In this meeting, Thiệu decided to withdraw what was left of his army from the northern provinces to defend the Mekong Delta region, where most of the nation's population and vital economic resources were located. Thiệu justified his decision on the basis that the South Vietnamese military could not defend every inch of South Vietnam's territory, so the military had to be 'lightened at the top and heavy at the bottom'. Starting at 11:00 on March 14, Thiệu flew out to Cam Ranh for a briefing with Phú. The events which took place after this briefing would go down as one of the greatest failures in military history. The PAVN 9th Battalion, 64th Regiment, part of the 320A Infantry Division, was the first unit to be mobilised to intercept the South Vietnamese column south of Cheo Reo district. Subsequently, the entire PAVN 320A Infantry Division was sent to destroy the South Vietnamese column along Route 7, with the 2nd Tank Battalion of the 273rd Armoured Regiment, the 675th Regiment and the 593rd Anti-Aircraft Regiment in support. By the early hours of March 17, tanks from the ARVN 19th Armoured Cavalry Squadron and the 6th Ranger Battalion clashed with the PAVN 9th Battalion, 64th Regiment at Tona Pass, about four kilometres away from the district of Cheo Reo. During the evening of March 17, Tất organised a counter-attack against the PAVN 9th Battalion with support from fighter-bombers, tanks and artillery, but his troops were repeatedly beaten back in their attempt to keep the road open. By the early hours of March 18, the entire PAVN 64th Regiment had blocked all the routes around Tona Pass, while the 48th Regiment and elements of the PAVN 968th Infantry Division began closing in on Cheo Reo from three directions. In the afternoon, Phú sent the 25th Ranger Battalion and the 2nd Armoured Cavalry Brigade to reopen Route 7. At the same time the PAVN 675th Artillery Regiment began shelling the main South Vietnamese column in Cheo Reo as three infantry regiments attacked the convoy from all sides. Unfortunately for the South Vietnamese, all their attempts to organise strong resistance were stifled by the chaos created by PAVN artillery bombardments. At 15:00, Tất was ordered to destroy all heavy weaponry so the North Vietnamese could not make use of it. About 30 minutes later, a UH-1 helicopter landed on the grounds of Phu Bon primary school to pick up Tất and flew off to Nha Trang. At 09:00 on March 19, all ARVN soldiers in the district of Cheo Reo stopped fighting. The 6th Ranger Battalion and the 19th Armoured Cavalry Squadron became the only units to arrive at their destination at Cung Son with only light casualties. , located in Đắk Lắk province ==Aftermath==

The loss of Ban Me Thuot and the subsequent evacuation from the Central Highlands cost South Vietnam's II Corps Tactical Zone more than 75% of its combat units—the 23rd Infantry Division, the Ranger groups, tanks, armoured cavalry, artillery, and combat engineering units. Overall about 3/4 of all ARVN soldiers were killed, wounded, deserted, or missing. PAVN casualties were light in comparison, with 600 soldiers killed and 2,416 wounded. South Vietnamese mistakes The collapse of South Vietnamese forces in the Central Highlands came as a result of three major factors. Firstly, during much of the war, Thiệu's confidence in the ARVN's intelligence could not be shaken. However, following the capitulation of Ban Me Thuot, Thiệu lost all faith in his own military intelligence agencies, when it became clear that the strength of the PAVN was far greater than what South Vietnamese intelligence agencies had gathered. The second factor was the inability of ARVN commanders to coordinate the withdrawal. In the process of pulling out from the Central Highlands, large numbers of ARVN soldiers and heavy military equipment were stretched out along the narrow corridor of Route 7. Behind the military formation were huge numbers of South Vietnamese civilians who were relatives of the military personnel, as well as government officials and their families. When the order was given to abandon the Central Highlands, the primary concern of South Vietnamese military personnel was not battlefield victories, but rather the welfare of their families, a phenomenon termed family syndrome by United States military forces. Consequently, when the North Vietnamese attacked South Vietnamese forces on Route 7, large numbers of South Vietnamese soldiers left the battlefield to search for their families amidst the chaos. During the final days of South Vietnam's existence, the average South Vietnamese soldier showed more loyalty to his family than to his commanding officer, which had a significant impact on his willingness to fight on. During the First Indochina War (1945 to 1954), both Viet Minh and French forces considered the Central Highlands to be their 'home', as it was considered the key to domination in Indochina. Both sides recognised that in order to occupy the Central Highlands, they had to possess a sufficient reserve of manpower with which to control the strategic areas within the region. By 1975, the South Vietnamese military could no longer afford to maintain a large strategic reserve. South Vietnamese units in II Corps were overstretched in various locations across the Central Highlands, and could easily be overrun by enemy forces. Although Thiệu's decision to abandon the region was made with the aim of saving the military formations of II Corps, the decision nonetheless turned into a death warrant for Phú's men and their families. The lack of coordination and poor organisation during the withdrawal operation not only led to the destruction of II Corps, but marked the beginning of the end for South Vietnam. ==Notes==