Sources and location of the battle A number of sources report in various degree of detail on the events before and during the battle: chapter 240 of the chronicle of
Ramon Muntaner; the various versions of the
Chronicle of the Morea (sections 540 and 548 of the French version, verses 7263–7300 and 8010 of the Greek version, and sections 546–555 of the Aragonese version), Book VII section 7 of the history of the Byzantine writer
Nikephoros Gregoras, and brief accounts in Book VIII of the
Nuova Cronica of the
Florentine banker and diplomat
Giovanni Villani, in the
Istoria di Romania of the Venetian statesman
Marino Sanudo and in letter of the latter that remained unpublished until 1940. On the other hand, the versions of the
Chronicle of the Morea place the battle at "Halmyros", apparently the
town of the same name in southern Thessaly, where there was
another city known as Thebes. The former localization had been long favoured in scholarship; in his standard history of Frankish Greece, William Miller rejected Halmyros on the basis of the topography described by Muntaner, a view that continues to be repeated in more recent works. Several proposals by modern scholars for the exact site of the battle in the Cephissus valley exist, ranging from the vicinity of
Orchomenos and the vicinity of Copais to locations further north, around the villages of
Chaeronea and
Davleia, or even
Amfikleia and
Lilaia. mountains The critical examination of the primary sources by more recent scholars has reversed the situation. Muntaner was himself a member of the company until 1307, but was posted as governor of
Djerba when the battle occurred and only compiled his chronicle in 1325–1328, leading to some serious errors in his account. Gregoras, although a contemporary of the battle, wrote his history even later, in 1349–1351, relying mostly on second-hand sources; his understanding of the company's activities during the years before the battle is sketchy and inaccurate, and his account of the battle itself is very close to that of Muntaner, indicating perhaps that Gregoras drew on a Western source. On the other hand, the original French version of the
Chronicle of the Morea, on which all other versions draw, was written between 1292 and 1320, and the abridged French version surviving today was compiled shortly after by a well-informed author in the
Morea. The Greek and Aragonese versions, compiled later in the century, contain essentially the same information as the French version. A critical piece of evidence was the discovery and publication in 1940 of a 1327 letter by Marino Sanudo, who was a galley captain operating in the
North Euboean Gulf on the day of the battle. Sanudo clearly states that the battle took place at Halmyros ("...
fuit bellum ducis Athenarum et comitis Brennensis cum compangna predicta ad Almiro"), and his testimony is generally considered reliable. The Catalan cavalry were mostly of Turkish origin (Sanudo reports that they numbered 1,800), both as
Turcopoles and
horse archers; serving under their own leaders, the Turks were divided into two contingents, one of Anatolian Turks under Halil, which had joined the Company in 1305, and another under Malik, who had defected from Byzantine service shortly after the
Battle of Apros. The members of the latter had been baptized as Christians. The sources differ considerably on the size of Walter's army: Gregoras reports 6,400 cavalry and 8,000 infantry, and the
Chronicle of the Morea puts it at "more than" 2,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry, while Muntaner asserts that it comprised 700 knights and 24,000 infantry, the latter mostly Greek. Modern scholars consider these numbers to be exaggerated, but they do suggest that the Athenian army had numerical superiority over the Catalans. , written on 10 March 1311 Faced with a numerically superior but less experienced enemy, the Company assumed a defensive position, taking care to select a battleground that favoured them. The Catalans chose a naturally strong position, protected by a swamp which, according to Gregoras, they enhanced by digging trenches and inundating them with water diverted from the nearby river. The Catalans took up positions on dry ground behind the swamp, arranging themselves in a solid line but the sources give no further details as to their dispositions. The Athenian army assembled at Zetouni (modern
Lamia). On 10 March 1311, Walter of Brienne composed his testament there and led his army forth. The presence of the Frankish army at Zetouni at this time is a further testimony in favour of locating the battle at Halmyros, as Zetouni lies north of the Cephissus but southwest of Halmyros. For Muntaner's and Gregoras' accounts to be correct, the Catalans would have to be behind the Duke's army; Gregoras furthermore writes that the Catalans passed through the
Thermopylae to arrive in Boeotia, which is extremely unlikely given the presence of strong Frankish garrisons at Zetouni and
Bodonitsa. On the eve of battle, the 500 Catalans in the Duke's service, stricken by conscience, went to him and asked for leave to rejoin their old comrades-in-arms, saying they would rather die than fight against them. Walter reportedly gave them permission to leave, replying that they were welcome to die with the others. The Turkish auxiliaries took up a separate position nearby, thinking the quarrel was a pretext arranged by the Company and the Duke of Athens to exterminate them. Walter was reputed for his bravery, bordering on recklessness, and was confident of success, as evidenced by his haughty reply to the 500 mercenaries. Walter's pride and arrogance, combined with his numerical advantage and his innate belief in the superiority of heavy noble cavalry over infantry, led him to fatally underestimate the Catalans and order a charge, even though the terrain was adverse to cavalry. Impatient for action, according to Muntaner, Walter formed a cavalry line of 200 Frankish knights "with golden spurs", followed by the infantry, and placed himself with his banner in the vanguard. The Frankish attack failed but the reason is unclear; Muntaner's description is short and provides no details, while in Gregoras, the heavy Frankish cavalry got stuck in the mud, with the Almogavars, lightly armed with swords and darts, dispatching the knights encumbered in their heavy armour. This is the commonly accepted version among scholars as well. The
Chronicle of the Morea implies that the battle was hard-fought—which, as military historian
Kelly DeVries notes, seems to contradict Gregoras—and that the marsh possibly merely reduced the impact of the charge, instead of bogging it down entirely. It is clear that the Catalans defeated the charge and that the Duke and most of his men fell. As the two lines clashed, the Turkish auxiliaries realised there was no treachery and descended from their camp upon the Athenian army, panicking and routing its remnants. Gregoras reports that 6,400 cavalry and 8,000 infantry fell in the battle, the same number he gives for Walter's forces. According to Muntaner, 20,000 infantry were killed and only two of the seven hundred knights survived the battle,
Roger Deslaur and Boniface of Verona. Like the number of troops involved in the battle, these losses are unverifiable and probably exaggerated, but they indicate the scale of the Athenian defeat. Both
David Jacoby and
Kenneth Setton have noted that the similarities between account of the battle in Muntaner and Gregoras and the descriptions of the earlier
Battle of the Golden Spurs in 1302, where the Flemish infantry defeated the French knights, down to the number of 700 knights slain "all with spurs of gold", as claimed by Muntaner. Jacoby in particular considers the creation of an artificial marsh to halt the cavalry charge as a possibly invented element in both cases, for the purpose of explaining the surprising defeat of French knights through the use of a "treacherous" trap. Some senior members of the Frankish nobility are known to have survived:
Nicholas Sanudo, later
Duke of the Archipelago, managed to escape, and a few others such as
Antoine le Flamenc, who is known to have participated in and survived the battle, were probably captured and later ransomed. Walter's head was severed by the Catalans and many years later was taken to
Lecce, in Italy, where his son
Walter VI buried him in the
Church of Santa Croce. == Aftermath ==