Battle of Kampala

In April 1979, Tanzanian forces and the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), a coalition of armed rebel groups united under the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), deposed the President of Uganda, Idi Amin. A new UNLF government was installed, but it was weak and exercised little control over the country. This was in part due to the UNLF's and its army's own internal divisions. The several-hundred strong Kikosi Maalum group was loyal to Milton Obote, who had served as president before Amin took power. Yoweri Museveni controlled the Front for National Salvation, which had about 3,000 members. Over time, power shifted to pro-Obote elements in the government and the army. Obote assumed power in 1980 through a disputed election, and ruled through repressive methods, including the incarceration and killing of dissidents. In February 1981, Museveni and a small band of rebels began attacking UNLA forces, signalling their entry in the Ugandan Bush War. Shortly thereafter a new rebel coalition was organised as the National Resistance Movement (NRM). Museveni was made vice-chairman of the National Resistance Council, the group's political body, and Chairman of the High Command of the National Resistance Army (NRA), the Movement's armed organ. By mid-1985, the NRA had been pushed out of its strongholds, and Museveni retired to Sweden. Regardless, the group inflicted a major defeat on the UNLA in the Battle of Kembogo, causing great frustration and unrest among the security forces. On 27 July, several officers of the UNLA launched a coup which overthrew President Obote. General Tito Okello assumed power in his place. The new regime was weak and unstable, and Okello made overtures to anti-Obote rebel groups to form a coalition government and end the fighting. Museveni took advantage of the disruption caused by the coup to return to East Africa and rebuild the NRA. In August the NRA launched a series of co-ordinated attacks that resulted in the capture of significant amounts of territory in central and western Uganda. In late September, the NRA laid siege to the UNLA troops in the provincial centre of Masaka and, soon thereafter, the town of Mbarara, both key urban areas in southern Uganda. In October, Museveni warned that, in the event of the failure negotiations ongoing between the NRM and the UNLF in Nairobi, "the NRA would take Kampala by force". On 3 December, Okello's government released a document allegedly seized from the NRA which carried an order from Museveni to the NRA Chief of Staff, Salim Saleh, to prepare to attack the Ugandan capital, Kampala, if a peace agreement did not materialise. The NRM did not comment on the disclosure. On 10 December, Masaka's garrison surrendered to the NRA. On 17 December, the UNLF and NRM concluded talks and signed the Nairobi Peace Agreement. The accord nominally ended the war and declared Okello and Museveni President and Vice President of Uganda, respectively, and required the demilitarisation of Kampala until a new army could be established. It also carried a provision which stipulated that one belligerent could disregard the agreement if the other was found to be violating human rights. The NRM accused the UNLA of failing to respect Ugandans' rights, and the NRA continued fighting. On 31 December the UNLF government accused the NRA of failing to uphold its terms of the peace agreement by launching attacks, impeding the flow of food to the Mbarara garrison, and refraining from nominating representatives to coordinate further peace measures with the government. The UNLA forces at Mbarara capitulated soon thereafter. == Prelude ==

Following their victories, the NRA was able to greatly expand its manpower, and gained access to important military equipment. In contrast, the UNLA's remaining forces were increasingly suffering from defections, low morale, and internal divisions along ethnic lines. The NRA's success at Masaka and Mbarara also solidified their control of the centre and south-western sections of the country and left Kampala vulnerable to attack. To take advantage of its improving military situation, the NRA High Command decided to launch an offensive to capture the city. Saleh drew up the plans of attack. About 9,600 fighters were allocated for this operation, many of which were UNLA defectors from the Masaka garrison. At the same time, the NRA's 9th, 15th, and 19th Battalions blocked the Masinda–Hoima Road, so that UNLA units which were still active in northern Uganda could not reinforce Kampala. Fearing that Zairian dictator Mobutu Sese Seko might sent his army to aid the UNLA, Museveni stationed the 21st Battalion under Benon Tumukunde at Kasese to fend off any Zairian attempt to reinforce Kampala. In truth, many of these alleged anti-NRA fighters were NRA spies and acted as a fifth column; the entire Uganda Freedom Army was probably a front organisation of the NRA. In addition, FUNA suffered from extensive indiscipline, and harassed civilians in the capital despite denials by its commander Isaac Lumago. Kampala's garrison was at least 12,000-strong. The UNLA also established a battery at Summit View on Kololo, a hill overlooking Kampala. Troops were deployed to strategic locations, including the Radio Uganda building, the Uganda Television building, the Nile Mansions, the Uganda International Conference Centre, and the Parliament building. UNLA forces also garrisoned the State House in Entebbe to the south-east. The garrison at Summit View was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Eric Odwar, head of the Southern Brigade, the forces in Kampala's center by Colonel John Kilama, and the troops guarding the Kampala–Entebbe Road by Colonel Joseph Obonyo. == Battle ==

was targeted by UNLA artillery on 20 January. On 17 January 1986, the NRA began advancing on Kampala. The NRA's 1st, 3rd, 5th and 11th Battalions moved along the main axis of attack from Masaka, Saleh and Museveni subsequently ordered their forces to attack. The 1st Battalion and 3rd Battalion were given the responsibility of conducting the main thrust into Kampala and equipped with most of the NRA's support weapons. The former pressed forward with the latter in support, and by nightfall had secured Rubaga. The 11th Battalion moved in behind them, while the 7th Battalion seized Ndeeba. The NRA encountered little resistance in this area, aside of a skirmish at the Rubaga-Ndeeba road junction. For the most part, the UNLA and FUNA soldiers defending the city were demotivated and poorly led; many deserted or outright defected to the NRA. On 25 January, the NRA's 7th Battalion attacked the UNLA barracks at Makindye and the 3rd Battalion assaulted the Lubiri barracks, while the 1st Battalion acted as a reserve. NRA artillery positioned on Mutundwe traded fire with the UNLA battery at Summit View. Radio Uganda broadcast a request from Okello to the NRA for a ceasefire and for the implementation of the Nairobi Peace Agreement. In the afternoon NRA artillery struck an armoury near the UNLA's headquarters, Republic House, causing a large series of explosions. As the fighting for Lubiri barracks raged, the 1st Battalion captured the Bulange, seized the Bakuli junction after heavy fighting, and advanced toward the city center. By the afternoon, UNLA troops still held out at the Nile Mansions, and the Parliament building. Around this time, Captain George Nkwanga, the military leader of FEDEMU, was killed in Kampala under disputed circumstances. While the 7th Battalion continued to battle the Makindye garrison, a UNLA force of about 1,000 men penetrated the NRA's 5th Battalion's roadblock along the Entebbe road, causing Museveni deep consternation. As the 1st Battalion was engaged near the Jinja road and the 11th Battalion was mopping up the UNLA presence on Kololo, he deployed his reserve—two companies of the 3rd Battalion—to stop the advance from Entebbe. Saleh ordered the NRA's 500-strong Special Force under Jet Mwebaze to redeploy from a roadblock on the Jinja road to assist Ivan Koreta's 13th Battalion in the northern section of the city near the Gulu road. After some fighting, the battalion reached and secured Kawempe. With the removal of the roadblock on the Jinja road, UNLA forces began retreating from Kampala, taking their families with them. Saleh accompanied the 3rd Battalion companies to Namasuba valley where they linked up with a company of the 5th Battalion and took up positions along the Entebbe road. Early in the evening the 7th Battalion captured the Makindye barracks, reportedly aided by the defection of local FEDEMU and UFM troops to the NRA. Museveni subsequently sent the 7th Battalion to the Kisubi roundabout to act as a reserve for the forces guarding the Entebbe route. As dusk fell, the 1,000 UNLA troops entered the Namasuba valley and were ambushed. They retreated, and the NRA forces advanced and occupied Zana hill. Another NRA company stationed at Kisubi began moving towards the UNLA force's rear. Fearing that they were about to be subject to a pincer attack, the UNLA men dispatched an emissary to Zana to offer their surrender. Saleh accepted, and at around 22:00 radioed news of the capitulation to Museveni. By the end of the day the NRA had secured Kampala. Okello fled via helicopter to Sudan with several members of his staff. FUNA commander Isaac Lumago went into exile in Zaire. == Aftermath ==

Analyses The Battle of Kampala was the largest battle the NRA had partaken in since its inception. Researcher Richard J. Reid described the UNLA's defense of Kampala as "brief but ferocious". Unlike previous, drawn-out engagements in the Ugandan Bush War, the NRA had won the battle through overwhelming force and direct attack. The removal of the NRA roadblock on the route to Jinja allowed many UNLA troops to escape the city and reorganise to launch a new rebellion eight months later. Saleh maintained that he had ordered the roadblock's removal in consideration of "humanitarian reasons", as there could have been "a blood bath and [UNLA troops'] families would perish in the fighting". In contrast, historians Tom Cooper and Adrien Fontanellaz regarded the roadblock's removal as the result of "a faulty order". Course of the war (pictured in 1987) was sworn in as President of Uganda following the Battle of Kampala. Overall, about 20 NRA and 80 UNLA/FUNA soldiers were killed in the fighting, while nearly 3,000 UNLA troops were captured. Most of the UNLA casualties were incurred as troops were shot while attempting to abandon their positions at Radio Uganda and Uganda Television and flee towards Kololo. About 9,000 UNLA soldiers and their families managed to escape from Kampala. Many of these troops retreated towards Jinja and Gulu, looting as they fled. Buildings along Kampala Avenue, the main road in the city, were left heavily damaged by the battle. Unlike previous military takeovers in Kampala, the NRA soldiers did not loot in the city. Following the battle, the NRA's 5th Battalion and one platoon from the 3rd Battalion captured Entebbe. Meanwhile, the FEDEMU and UFM reached an agreement with the NRM/NRA, and joined their forces. On 29 January Museveni was sworn in as President of Uganda in front of the Parliament building with a crowd of tens of thousands in attendance. In his inaugural address, he promised to support national unity, public security, and democracy, pledging that his government would schedule elections as soon as possible. His appointed cabinet consisted mostly of NRM members and civil servants. Despite Museveni's promises, many northerners in Kampala—viewed as beneficiaries of the Obote and Okello regimes—especially Acholi and Lango people, were subject to abuse and discrimination following the NRA's takeover; some were killed in the streets or forced out of their jobs or homes. Several NRA soldiers stole automobiles from them. Other northerners fled from the repression to their lands of origin. Museveni condemned the violence. Museveni's government sent an emissary to Sudan to entreat Okello to order the remaining UNLA forces to surrender, but he stated that he no longer controlled them. == Notes ==