The principal plan for invading Piedmont was devised by Lt-Gen
Pierre Joseph de Bourcet, who was France's leading expert in alpine warfare. The main problem for any army invading
Piedmont was the problem of surmounting the alpine passes that guarded its approaches. Even a small number of defenders could effectively block an advance. De Bourcet's reasoning was that with a numerical superiority of 33,000 to 25,000 the best result would be obtained by separating the attacking force into several columns, which would then attack outlying outposts in a multi-pronged advance. Using infiltration tactics, it would be easy to envelop the Piedmontese positions, allowing attacks to be launched where most unexpected. Finally, by putting pressure along the whole front it was reasoned that the Piedmontese defence perimeter would crack at some point, and then the columns could re-unite and push through the gap. With this in mind, the Franco-Spanish army began to regroup in the
Dauphiné region in June. Once concentrated, the attacking columns lay on a front between Briançon and St. Etienne. On 5 July the Franco-Spanish army broke camp and headed in nine separate columns towards the heart of Piedmont. Despite bickering between Conti and La Mina, the Franco-Spanish army experienced several early triumphs. Entering the
Stura valley, the route passed through a 6 m
defile known as the Barricades. Following De Bourcet's advice, troops to the north and south of the position emerged throughout the mountains onto the rear of the Piedmont position, and rather than being caught in a trap the Piedmontese evacuated the valley without a fight. In accordance with instructions, the Franco-Spanish army now converged on the Stura Valley in order to take advantage of the gap in Charles Emmanuel's defences. The Franco-Spanish army triumphed again on 19 July when it won the
Battle of Casteldelfino; to cap it all, the town of
Demonte, the last outpost before Cuneo, surrendered to Conti on 17 August 1744. ==Siege of Cuneo==