Military situation After the
Battle of Perryville in
Kentucky on October 8, 1862, Confederate Gen.
Braxton Bragg's
Army of Mississippi withdrew to
Harrodsburg, Kentucky, where it was joined by
Maj. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith's army of 10,000 on October 10. Although Bragg's newly combined force was up to 38,000 veteran troops, he made no effort to regain the initiative.
Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, the Union commander at Perryville, was equally passive and refused to attack Bragg. Frustrated with his prospects in Kentucky and low on supplies, Bragg withdrew fully from Kentucky through the
Cumberland Gap, passed through
Knoxville and
Chattanooga, turned northwest, and eventually stopped in
Murfreesboro, Tennessee. His army, joined with Smith's
Army of Kentucky and together renamed the
Army of Tennessee as of November 20, took up a defensive position northwest of the city along the West Fork of the
Stones River. During a visit by
Confederate president Jefferson Davis on December 16, Bragg was ordered to send the infantry division of Maj. Gen.
Carter L. Stevenson to
Mississippi to assist in the defense of
Vicksburg. The loss of Stevenson's 7,500 men would be sorely felt in the coming battle. Bragg reorganized his army, and Kirby Smith left for
East Tennessee. Bragg commanded two corps, under Maj. Gen.
William J. Hardee (divisions of major generals
John C. Breckinridge,
Patrick R. Cleburne, and
John P. McCown) and Maj. Gen.
Leonidas Polk (divisions of major generals
Benjamin F. Cheatham and
Jones M. Withers), and a cavalry command under
Brig. Gen. Joseph Wheeler. Bragg had to deal with a command problem that became typical for him during the war: a virtual revolt of his senior generals, who petitioned Jefferson Davis to relieve him in favor of Gen.
Joseph E. Johnston, the commander of all armies in the Western Theater. Davis refused to relieve either Bragg or the rebellious generals. On the Union side,
President Abraham Lincoln had become frustrated with Buell's passivity and replaced him with Maj. Gen.
William S. Rosecrans, victor of the recent battles of
Iuka and
Corinth. Rosecrans moved his
XIV Corps (which was soon after designated the
Army of the Cumberland) to
Nashville, Tennessee, and was warned by
Washington that he, too, would be replaced if he did not move aggressively against Bragg and occupy eastern Tennessee. However, Rosecrans took ample time to reorganize and train his forces (particularly his cavalry) and resupply his army. He did not begin his march in pursuit of Bragg until December 26.
Initial movements While Rosecrans was preparing in Nashville, Bragg ordered
Col. John Hunt Morgan to move north with his cavalry and operate along Rosecrans's lines of communications, to prevent him from foraging for supplies north of Nashville. The
Battle of Hartsville, at a crossing point on the
Cumberland River about 40 miles (64 km) upstream from Nashville (north of Murfreesboro) was an incident in Morgan's raid to the north, before Rosecrans had the bulk of his infantry forces on the move. The relatively small battle that followed Morgan's surprise attack was an embarrassing Union defeat, resulting in many captured Union supplies and soldiers. The Union also engaged in a strategic cavalry raid. On December 26, the day Rosecrans marched from Nashville, a small force under Brig. Gen.
Samuel P. Carter raided the upper Tennessee Valley from
Manchester, Kentucky. Until January 5, Carter's men destroyed railroad bridges and fought a few skirmishes, including a serious one on December 28 at Perkins's Mill (also known as Elk Fort). But none of the cavalry raids, Confederate or Union, had any significant effect on the Stones River Campaign. The Army of the Cumberland marched southeast the day after
Christmas in three columns, or "wings", towards Murfreesboro, and they were effectively harassed by Wheeler's Confederate cavalry along the way, which delayed their movements. Although Rosecrans had reported his army to have 81,729 effectives in Nashville, his force on the march was barely more than half of that since he needed to protect his base and supply lines from the harassment of the Confederate cavalry. The left wing of 14,500 men under Maj. Gen.
Thomas L. Crittenden (divisions of Brig. Gens.
Thomas J. Wood,
John M. Palmer, and
Horatio P. Van Cleve) took a route that was parallel to the
Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, passing through
La Vergne and south of
Smyrna. The right wing of 16,000 men under Maj. Gen.
Alexander M. McCook (divisions of Brig. Gens.
Jefferson C. Davis,
Richard W. Johnson, and
Philip H. Sheridan) marched south along the Nolensville Turnpike to
Nolensville, south to
Triune, and then eastward to Murfreesboro. The center wing of 13,500 men under Maj. Gen.
George Henry Thomas (divisions of Maj. Gen.
Lovell H. Rousseau and Brig. Gens.
James S. Negley,
Speed S. Fry, and
Robert B. Mitchell) moved south along the Wilson Turnpike and the Franklin Turnpike, parallel to the Nashville and Decatur Railroad, then eastward through Nolensville and along the same route used by Crittenden south of the Nashville and Chattanooga. Union cavalry under Brig. Gen.
David S. Stanley (a single cavalry division under Col. John Kennett) preceded each of the three columns. The separation of the wings was designed to conduct a
turning movement against Hardee at Triune, but when the U.S. march began, Bragg moved Hardee back to Murfreesboro to avoid a confrontation.
Geography and location Murfreesboro was a small town in the Stones River Valley, a former state capital named for a
colonel in the
American Revolutionary War,
Hardy Murfree. All through the war it was a center for strong Confederate sentiment, and Bragg and his men were warmly welcomed and entertained during the month of December. It was located in a rich agricultural region from which Bragg planned to provision his army and a position that he intended to use to block a potential Union advance on Chattanooga. Hardee noted afterward that "The field of battle offered no particular advantages for defense." Despite this, Bragg was reluctant to move farther south, say to the arguably more defensible
Duck River Valley, or farther north, to Stewart's Creek, where Rosecrans thought Bragg would defend. Sensitive to the political requirements that almost no Tennessee ground be yielded to Federal control, he chose the relatively flat area northwest of the politically influential city, straddling the Stones River. Portions of the area, particularly near the intersection of the Nashville Pike and the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, were characterized by small but dense cedar forests, in places more impenetrable to infantry than the
Wilderness of Spotsylvania in
Virginia. Short limestone outcroppings, separated by narrow cracks as if rows of teeth, impeded the movement of wagons and artillery. Hardee's Corps was initially placed in Triune, about 20 miles (32 km) to the west, Polk's on the west bank of the river, and a detached division from Hardee's Corps under Maj. Gen.
John C. Breckinridge on the low hills east of the river. None of the troops were ordered to construct field fortifications.
Disposition of armies By the time Rosecrans had arrived in Murfreesboro on the evening of December 29, the Army of Tennessee had been encamped in the area for a month. By nightfall, two thirds of Rosecrans's army was in position along the Nashville Turnpike, and by the next day Rosecrans's army numbered about 41,000 and Bragg's 35,000. The odds were closer than those figures would indicate. Bragg had the advantage of the detached, but cooperating, cavalry commands under Forrest and Morgan, who raided deeply behind Union lines while Wheeler's cavalry slowed the Union forces with hit-and-run skirmishes. (Part of Rosecrans's reluctance to move from Nashville was the inexperience of his cavalry forces in comparison to their Confederate counterparts.) On December 29, Wheeler and 2,500 of his men rode completely around the Union army, destroying supply wagons and capturing reserve ammunition in Rosecrans's trains. They captured four wagon trains and 1,000 Union prisoners. On December 30, the Union force moved into line two miles (three km) northwest of Murfreesboro. The two armies were in parallel lines, about four miles (six km) long, oriented from southwest to northeast. Bragg's left
flank was weak at the start, and Rosecrans could have attacked there when he arrived and wheeled left, around the flank and directly into the town of Murfreesboro, but he did not know the full disposition of Bragg's forces because of the skillful screening of the Confederate cavalry during the Union march. In a manner similar to the previous year's
First Battle of Bull Run, both commanders devised similar plans for the following day: envelop the enemy's right, get into his rear, and cut him off from his base. Since both plans were the same, the victory would probably go to the side that was able to attack first. Rosecrans ordered his men to be ready to attack after breakfast, but Bragg ordered an attack at dawn. Bragg's forces were situated with
Leonidas Polk's corps on the west side of the river, and
William J. Hardee's men on the east. He had expected Rosecrans to attack on December 30, but when that did not happen, his plan was to drive Hardee's corps and the cavalry under Brig. Gen.
John A. Wharton deep into the Union rear. He began moving the bulk of Hardee's corps across the river to his left flank to prepare for the next morning's attack. This left Breckinridge's division in reserve on the east side of the river on the high ground.
Plans Rosecrans intended to have Crittenden cross the river and attack the heights east of the river, which would be an excellent artillery platform to bombard the entire Confederate lines. However, Crittenden—facing Breckinridge on the Union left—failed to notify McCook (on the Union right) of these troop movements. McCook, anticipating the next day would begin with a major attack by Crittenden, planted numerous campfires in his area, hoping to deceive the Confederates as to his strength on that flank, and to disguise the fact that his flank was not anchored on an obstacle (the nearby Overall Creek). Thomas, in the center, was ordered to make a limited attack and act as the pivot for Crittenden's wheel. The armies bivouacked only from each other, and their bands started a musical battle that became a non-lethal preview of the next day's events. Northern musicians played "
Yankee Doodle" and "
Hail, Columbia" and were answered by "Dixie" and "
The Bonnie Blue Flag". Finally, one band started playing "
Home! Sweet Home!" and the others on both sides joined in. Thousands of Northern and Southern soldiers sang the sentimental song together across the lines. ==Opposing forces==