Advance The soldiers of the Coast Division clambered into their transports at
Roanoke Island on March 11, 1862, and got under way early the next morning, accompanied by 14 Navy gunboats and one gunboat of their own. One of the Navy vessels was detached to guard the mouth of the
Pamlico River, where it was incorrectly rumored that the Rebels were preparing two ships to cut off transports that might become separated from Navy protection. The main force traversed
Pamlico Sound, entered the
Neuse River, and anchored near the mouth of Slocum's Creek at dusk. The fleet that traveled up the Neuse River was full of infantry who left their ships and setup south of confederate soldiers at Fort Thompson. These confederate soldiers consisted of 4000 men who were behind temporary defenses. Branch was aware of their presence, and immediately ordered his forces to take up defensive positions. He sent Col. James Sinclair's 35th North Carolina Infantry to the landing at Otter Creek, in front of the Croatan work, with instructions to oppose enemy landings at that site. Colonel Zebulon Vance's 26th North Carolina was ordered into the Croatan work. Other units guarded the river upstream, and reserves were assembled at the intersection of the railroad and the Beaufort road. All units were instructed that if they were forced from their positions, they should fall back on the Fort Thompson line. At dawn on March 13, the Federal troops began to disembark. A small Rebel unit trying to contest the landing was quickly driven away by fire from the gunboats, as Col. Sinclair interpreted his orders to defend against a landing at Otter Creek narrowly. Burnside spent the morning getting men and equipment ashore. With the infantry came six boat (Navy) howitzers and two Army howitzers. Because of the weather, he decided to land his other artillery closer to the enemy lines, but dense fog soon closed in, and he could not communicate with the fleet. His remaining guns were not landed. A little after noon the Union soldiers began to move toward the Confederate lines, and at about the same time the rains began. The road was soon turned into mud, and the mere act of walking required great exertion. The gunners with the howitzers accompanying the infantry soon were exhausted trying to move their pieces, so a regiment of infantry (
51st Pennsylvania) were detailed to help them. Many of those foot soldiers long remembered this as the most arduous part of the battle. As the soldiers made their slow progress, the gunboats kept a short distance ahead, shelling places where Rebels might be waiting. Col. R. P. Campbell, in command of the Confederate right wing, interpreted the naval gunfire as preliminary to another landing that would take the Croatan work in reverse, so he ordered a general pullback to the Fort Thompson line. Thus, when the Federal army came upon the first Confederate breastworks, they found them abandoned. The Coast Division soon resumed its march. Leaving the Croatan work, First (Foster's) Brigade moved on the right, following the county road, while Second (Reno's) Brigade followed the railroad on the left. Third (Parke's) Brigade followed after the First. They continued until they came in contact with enemy pickets, about a mile and a half (2 km) away from the Fort Thompson line held by the Rebels. Daylight having been exhausted, Burnside ordered a halt and had the brigades bivouac in the order of their march: First Brigade on the right near the road, Second Brigade on the left near the railroad, and Third Brigade to the rear of the First. The howitzers did not arrive until 0300 the next morning.
The fight ''. 5 April 1862 The field was covered by a dense fog on the morning of March 14. Burnside ordered his forces to form and advance on the Rebel works. The Yankees did not have complete information concerning their opponents' disposition at this time; so far as they knew, the Confederate line extended only from the river to the brickyard. In keeping with this belief, Burnside ordered the First Brigade to engage the enemy left, while the Second Brigade would try to turn their right, at the brickyard. The eight howitzers were deployed across the county road. Third Brigade was held as a reserve. The Army also got some dubious support from the gunboats under Commander
Stephen C. Rowan, who shelled the Rebel positions although they were hidden by intervening forests. This gunfire greatly disturbed the North Carolinians, but it was inaccurate enough that Burnside eventually asked Cowan to change direction. Meanwhile, on the other side, General Branch had put his regiments into the line. From his left, at Fort Thompson, to the brickyard on his right, were the 27th, 37th, 7th, and 35th North Carolina regiments. His reserve was the 33rd Regiment. The right flank of the 35th was anchored in a brickyard kiln that was loopholed for artillery. The entire line beyond the railroad was occupied by a single regiment, the 26th North Carolina, plus a few companies of cavalry. The gap in his line created by the dogleg at the railroad was covered only by his weakest unit, a militia battalion with only two weeks of training, and armed with shotguns and hunting rifles. To give them additional support, he ordered up a two-gun battery of 24-pounders to the kiln, but they were not mounted when they came under attack. The First Brigade of the Union Army opposed them from the river to the railroad; right to left, the units were the 25th, 24th, 27th, and 23rd Massachusetts, and the 10th Connecticut. The Beaufort Road ran through the center of this line, and here General Foster placed the howitzers that had been dragged along. On the Federal left, General Reno, still unaware of the extension of the enemy lines beyond the railroad, ordered a part of the
21st Massachusetts to charge the brick kiln, while the 9th New Jersey and the 51st New York would engage the enemy in support. The 51st Pennsylvania was held in reserve. The charge was successful at first, but they then found themselves under fire from the whole line and were forced to pull back. Burnside at this time ordered his reserve, the Third Brigade, into the line to support Reno's Second Brigade. The 4th Rhode Island replaced the 21st Massachusetts, which had used up its ammunition. While trading places, Colonel
Isaac P. Rodman of the 4th Rhode Island was told by Lieutenant Colonel
William S. Clark of the 21st Massachusetts that he thought that another attack on the brick kiln would be successful. Rodman sent a courier to General Parke informing him that he was taking responsibility, then formed his regiment and ordered them to charge. Armed with better knowledge of the enemy, this charge was successful. The 4th Rhode Island captured nine brass field pieces, and found themselves in rear of the Rebel entrenchments. At this point, the Confederate line broke. The rupture started when the inexperienced militiamen fled and exposed the units on both of their flanks. Branch ordered his reserves to plug the gap, but they did not arrive in time. As the line was rolled up on both wings, each regimental commander in succession pulled his unit back to escape being slaughtered. General Branch ordered a retreat, which soon became a rout. The fleeing North Carolinians dashed across the bridge over the
Trent River into New Bern, then burned the bridge so precipitately that some of their compatriots were left behind and were captured. They also burned a fire raft in the river, which soon drifted against the railroad bridge and destroyed it. While the battle was in progress, Commander Rowan's ships had moved up the river to assist. They received only minor damage in passing the lower barrier, and then positioned themselves to shell Fort Thompson. When the fort was abandoned, they immediately passed the second barrier and moved on to New Bern. Because Branch's order to retreat included all of the Confederate river batteries, their guns were spiked and they were abandoned to the fleet. At the city, the fleet shelled the retreating Confederate troops, denying them the opportunity to regroup. The retreating units could not reform until they had fled all the way to
Kinston. With both bridges destroyed, Burnside's soldiers had to be ferried across the river by the gunboats. Branch had lost 64 killed, 101 wounded, and 413 captured or missing, compared to Burnside's 90 killed, 380 wounded, and a single man captured. ==Aftermath==