Chinese preparations at Pyongyang Although the Chinese were defeated by the Japanese at
Seonghwan, the bulk of the Chinese forces in Korea was not stationed near Seonghwan but in the northern city of
Pyongyang. The city lies on the right bank of the
Taedong River, which was large enough to provide a shipping route to the sea. Of the Chinese troops deployed at Pyongyang, eight thousand arrived at the city by sea and another five thousand made the overland journey from Manchuria. The forces in Pyongyang were joined by retreating Chinese troops from Asan under
Ye Zhichao. By Chinese standards, the troops in Pyongyang had received modern training and equipment. Some of the infantry carried American
Winchester rifles, and they also had four field artillery pieces, six machine-guns and twenty-eight mountain guns. These weapons, however, were not standardized and a major concern was the proper supply of ammunition. Between early August and mid-September, the Chinese troops in Pyongyang reinforced the walled stronghold with massive earthworks, and the location of the city itself contributed to a substantial defensive position. Directly to the north were hills, and the highest of these – Moktan-tei – overlooked the entire area. To the east and south was the broad Taedong river, where forts had been built to deter any enemy from crossing. The terrain was open only to the southwest; this was where the Chinese had constructed solid redoubts.
Japanese advance to Pyongyang After the victory at Seonghwan, the Japanese reinforced a brigade of 8,000 soldiers – under the command of General Oshima. More than 7,000 of these troops were concentrated at
Seoul and
Chemulpo. The Japanese now controlled the southern and central part of the country. However, as the Chinese still had most of their troops in the northern Korea, the Japanese military situation required an immediate deployment of reinforcements to Korea. Since the main objective of the Japanese was the Chinese force concentrated at Pyongyang, they had four routes on which to deploy their troops to Pyongyang – one through via Chemulpo, another through
Pusan, one from
Wonsan on the eastern coast of Korea or by landing directly at the mouth of the Taedong River in the immediate vicinity of Pyongyang. Since the Japanese were hard pressed for time, as part of their strategy they needed to drive the Chinese troops from Korea before winter to avoid prolonged military operations. Thus the route through Pusan was rejected. Although transporting the troops there would not have been a problem for the Japanese as the transports would remain safely beyond the reach of the Chinese Fleet. The Japanese troops would have to travel over 650 km by land to reach Pyongyang; however, the condition of Korean roads required much time to reach Pyongyang. The Japanese decided to transport their forces to Chemulpo on the west coast and with some to
Wonsan, on the east. It was still not easy to reach Pyongyang from Wonsan, again due to the condition of Korean roads, but the distance was only about 160 km and the harbour was completely safe as Japanese transports could sail there without escort. The Japanese did exclude the idea of landing troops at the mouth of the Taidong River; however, due to the risk of such operation, it was considered a last resort. In Japan, a fleet of 30 transports had been commandeered for the conflict, assembled near the port of
Hiroshima – the primary harbour for embarkation to Korea. They were to depart in groups, heading to Korea without escort, transports to Chemulpo would be escorted by warships. The number of transports allowed the Japanese to redeploy no more than 10–15,000 troops to Korea at a time, this was also taking into consideration the fact that apart from soldiers there were substantial numbers of coolies, equipment and supplies to be transported meaning that the Japanese were able to redeploy one brigade at a time.
Japanese strategy The 10,000 troops (not confirmed) of the Imperial Japanese
1st Army, under the overall command of Marshal
Yamagata Aritomo consisted of the 5th Provincial Division (
Hiroshima) under Lieutenant General, and the 3rd Provincial Division (
Nagoya) under Lieutenant General
Katsura Tarō. Japanese forces had landed at Chemulpo (modern
Inchon,
Korea) on 12 June 1894 without opposition. After a brief sortie south for the
Battle of Seonghwan on 29 July 1894, the First Army moved towards Pyongyang, rendezvousing with reinforcements, which had landed via the ports of
Busan and
Wonsan. Although the Japanese forces were under the overall command of General Yamagata and he was responsible for orchestrating the strategy at Pyongyang, Yamagata did not land with his forces at Chempulo until 12 September. Lieutenant-General
Nozu Michitsura commanded the Japanese troops involved in the attack on Pyongyang; which included the Wonson column under Colonel Sato Tadashi, the Sangnyong column under Major-General Tatsumi Naobumi, the Combined Brigade under Major-General Oshima Yoshimasa and finally the Main Division under Nozu himself. The plan of attack was for the Combined Brigade to make the frontal assault from the south, while the Main Division attacked from the southwest. Flanking actions would then be carried out by the two columns. If the Chinese tried to retreat, the Wonson column was given the duty of intercepting and harrying the enemy as it fled to the northeast. ==The battle==