Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense

The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense is co-chaired by former Secretary of Homeland Security and Governor Tom Ridge and former Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala. Former Senator Joe Lieberman co-chaired the Commission with Governor Ridge for ten years prior to his death in 2024. Sources: == Background ==

Between 2001 and 2014, the U.S. spent around $80 billion on biodefense. Beginning in fall 2014, the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense conducted meetings, interviews, and research. It studied the 2001 anthrax attacks and biodefense programs undertaken during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations, and continued with its examination of the activities undertaken during the Biden and Trump Administrations. In October 2015, the commission released its recommendations to publicly and submitted them to Congress in the form of the report, A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform Needed to Optimize Efforts. They concluded that the United States was not prepared to respond to a large scale biological event - naturally occurring, accidentally released, or intentionally introduced. As for the cause of the problem, the report said, "Simply put, the Nation does not afford the biological threat the same level of attention as it does other threats." ==A National Blueprint for Biodefense==

The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense conducted a year-long study of how the U.S. should address biological threats. The study covered human-generated (i.e., terrorism, warfare, accidents) and naturally occurring biological threats. The study culminated in a report to the public and Congress released on October 28, 2015. The group's report was titled A National Blueprint for Biodefense. The report described many biological threats, including those posed by the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, as well as nation states, and "mishandling of lethal biological agents by the U.S. government," as reasons for making biodefense a high national priority. • Major biological threats • Animal disease reporting • Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority • National Biodefense Strategy • Biosurveillance • Budgeting for biodefense • Cyber vulnerabilities to the life sciences industry • Food supply protection and response • Global health security and response • Medical countermeasures (MCM) innovation • Military-civilian biodefense collaboration • Origin of active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) • PHEMCE coordination of MCM efforts • Select Agent Program • Vulnerable populations == Major problems identified ==

. In the Blueprint for Biodefense report, the commission said that almost no urgency within the federal government for dealing with the risk of a biological event existed. to direct the federal government to execute this strategy. Together, they sought to improve the federal government's readiness and capability to respond to human-generated, naturally occurring, and accidentally released biological threats to the Nation. The Strategy was mandated by Congress and has five extensively detailed goals. It established a new cabinet-level Biodefense Steering Committee chaired by the scretary of health and human services. National Security Advisor John Bolton said, "The Biodefense Steering Committee will monitor and coordinate implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy across 15 federal agencies and the Intelligence Community." The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense commended the Trump Administration for creating the strategy in accordance with the commission's third recommendation in its National Blueprint for Biodefense. Need for a biological attribution apparatus The commission held a public meeting on October 3, 2017 about the biological attribution of crime, terrorism, and warfare, and continues to pursue this important topic. The continuing debate and uncertainty surrounding the origins of COVID-19 demonstrate the need for biological attribution. Biological attribution refers to the process of determining who and what was responsible for a biological attack. Perpetrators could be criminals, terrorists, or state actors. During this meeting, the commission learned about the federal government's existing capabilities to determine the sources and characteristics of deadly pathogens. The commission has taken a particular interest in the National Bioforensics Analysis Center (NBFAC). In fiscal year 2013, the NBFAC supported more than 45 investigations of potential biological crimes. Previously run by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the commission recommended that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assume management of the NBFAC, as all specimens going into the facility come from the FBI. In 2018, DHS and the FBI signed a memorandum of agreement that transferred NBFAC management to the FBI. Need to budget for biodefense In its February 2018 report, Budget Reform for Biodefense: Integrated Budget Needed to Increase Return on Investment, the commission noted increasing threats to the United States and its interests overseas, and determined that the U.S. government can no longer wait to commit sufficient federal funds to biodefense. Waiting is not in the best interest of the health of Americans nor the country's national security. The commission released its report to the public and Congress in 2018. One of the key budgeting issues identified by the commission is that all federal departments and many federal agencies have some biodefense responsibilities. Despite this multiplicity, there is not enough coordination. Lieberman said the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) does not know how much the federal government spends on biodefense because "the sad fact is, more than two dozen agencies are working in silos across biodefense; that increases our vulnerabilities. Once we have a strategy and match that strategy with budget reforms...that's the beginning of a much more effective biodefense national strategy." Economic impacts of a catastrophic outbreak could reach $1 trillion, Lieberman noted. Congress has yet to establish such a Group. The House of Representatives, however, has established a Biodefense Caucus. Need to prepare for large-scale biological events Commissioners and experts agreed during a public commission meeting held in Miami, Florida, in January 2018 that in order to respond effectively during a large-scale biological event due to a terrorist attack or natural disaster, the public and private sectors need to coordinate. The commission also noted that obstacles exist that highlight the Nation's vulnerabilities to such an event. The commission concluded that a comprehensive public health system that is able to respond before a biological disaster strikes is critical. In an op-ed in the Miami Herald on January 15, 2018, former secretary of health and human services Donna Shalala said that during a large biological event, "I know that the federal government would move resources to affected areas throughout the United States. But those resources are already too few, and the federal government does not respond quickly to multiple locations in distress." the commission recommended that the federal government "redouble its efforts to share information with SLTT governments" and described various action items to do so. Need for a One Health approach to biodefense The report also suggested that the government merge duplicate processes by including all biological threats, not just those from terrorism, into a national strategy. For example, the "One Health approach" is one recommendation made by the commission that would merge strategies for dealing with human, animal, and plant health biodefense programs. also known as The Farm Bill. The legislation addressed Commission recommendations to defend U.S. food and agriculture. The new law creates a National Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Program and a National Animal Vaccine and Veterinary Countermeasures Bank, and increases federal funding to stockpile medical countermeasures for animals. Need to address science and technology for biodefense The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense also called for the new Innovation Funds at the National Institutes of Health, and for ten percent of those funds to be dedicated to building technology that would allow multiple antigens in a countermeasure to be delivered from a single platform. Similarly, the commission called for ten percent of funds from the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) for the same purpose. == Recommendations from A National Blueprint for Biodefense ==

The National Blueprint for Biodefense laid out 33 recommendations and 87 associated action items. The primary actions the U.S. government should take, according to the commission's report, are the following: == Status of federal implementation of the commission's recommendations ==

On the anniversary of the arrival of COVID-19 in the United States, the commission released a report in March 2021 describing the status of federal implementation of recommendations from A National Blueprint for Biodefense. the commission noted that as of January 2021 and out of its 87 recommended action items, the federal government had completed 3, took some action to address 54, no action on 24, and emergency or crisis actions (that may or may not result in permanent change) on 6 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This new analysis from the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense reveals that the United States remains at catastrophic biological risk. The commission urges the administration and Congress to take more actions now to avoid another pandemic or biological attack. The report closely examines the extent of progress that has been made since the commission released its seminal National Blueprint for Biodefense “While the current spotlight on COVID-19 is necessary and urgent, it would be a costly mistake to focus solely on this pandemic to the exclusion of all other biological threats,” said commission co-chair, former secretary of homeland security Tom Ridge. “Nation-states such as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia continue to invest heavily in advancing biotechnology and could produce biological agents and weapons. Terrorist organizations also remain interested in learning how to attack enemies with biological agents. National biodefense must begin and end with strong national leadership. The efforts of all federal departments and agencies with responsibilities for biodefense need to be coordinated, and they must be held accountable, by the White House.” Among the eleven new recommendations in the report, the commission advises the president to establish a dedicated deputy national security advisor for biodefense, overseen by the vice president and supported by NSC staff. The commission clearly notes that one federal department cannot tell other departments and agencies what to do, especially in a critical area of responsibility like biodefense. A dedicated higher-level leader in the White House without responsibilities for multiple weapons of mass destruction, terrorist avenues, and national disasters is crucial. The commission also continues to recommend eliminating the ineffective BioWatch program. Current BioWatch technology performs poorly and is far from the deterrence mechanism it was originally intended to be. It uses limited, decades-old collection equipment that only provides data hours or days after a biological event. Congressional appropriators should deny further funding to BioWatch activities until proven replacement technology is identified and confirmed to meet the needs of the Biodetection 2021 acquisition program. == Other reports and publications ==

Since the release of its National Blueprint for Biodefense, the commission has released 14 other reports: Biodefense Indicators: One Year Later, Events Outpacing Federal Efforts to Defend the Nation (December 2016); Defense of Animal Agriculture (October 2017); Budget Reform for Biodefense: Integrated Budget Needed to Increase Return on Investment (2018); Holding The Line On Biodefense: State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Reinforcements Needed (October 2018); Diagnostics for Biodefense - Flying Blind with No Plan to Land (November 2020); The Apollo Program for Biodefense: Winning the Race Against Biological Threats (2021); Biodefense in Crisis: Immediate Action Needed to Address National Vulnerabilities (2021), Saving Sisyphus: Advanced Biodetection for the 21st Century, The Athena Agenda: Advancing the Apollo Program for Biodefense (April 2022), Boots on the Ground: Land Grant Universities in the Fight Against Threats to Food and Agriculture (May 2022), Box the Pox: Reducing the Risk of Smallpox and Other Orthopox Viruses (February 2024), The National Blueprint for Biodefense: Immediate Action Needed to Defend Against Biological Threats (April 2024) and its appendix, Proposed Congressional Hearings on the Recommendations of the 2024 National Blueprint for Biodefense: We are Still Dangerously Unprepared (May 2024), and Battle Rattle: Fast Movers for Military Biodefense (May 2025). In early 2019, author Max Brooks partnered with the commission to author and publish a graphic novel called GERM WARFARE: A Very Graphic History. Brooks is the author of World War Z and is a non-resident fellow at the Modern War Institute at West Point and at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. The novel "depicts previous biological warfare events, the possibilities for the future, and the continued need for public health security." Previously, the commission teamed up with the Alliance for Biosecurity, and Trust for America's Health to conduct a survey of Americans' thoughts about biosecurity. According to the Alliance, Americans are concerned about biological threats. == Congressional Hearings ==

The commission's bipartisan activities include meetings, research, issuing reports, meeting with officials at the White House and in every Administration, and testifying before Congress. Assessing the State of Our Nation's Biodefense: Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 114th Congress, 2015 Defending Against Bioterrorism: How Vulnerable is America?: Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, 114th Congress, 2015 Outside Views on Biodefense for the Department of Defense: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 114th Congress, 2016 Outbreaks, Attacks, and Accidents: Combating Biological Threats: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, 114th Congress, 2016 Safeguarding American Agriculture in a Globalized World: Hearing before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, U.S. Senate, 115th Congress, 2017 U.S. Biodefense, Preparedness, and Implications of Antimicrobial Resistance for National Security: Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Oversight and Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, 116th Congress, 2019 Defending the Homeland from Bioterrorism: Are We Prepared?: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, 116th Congress, 2019 Are We Prepared? Protecting the U.S. from Global Pandemics: Hearing Roundtable before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 116th Congress, 2020 Addressing the Gaps in America’s Biosecurity Preparedness: Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 117th Congress, 2022 Challenges and Opportunities to Investigating the Origins of Pandemics and Other Biological Events: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, 118th Congress, 2023 Surveying the Threat of Agroterrorism: Perspectives on Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, 119th Congress, 2025 == Grants ==

In September 2016, the Open Philanthropy Project gave the commission a $1.3 million grant in support of the panel's influential leadership role in the evaluation of the nation's biodefense systems. Governor Tom Ridge said, "It is troubling that we still do not have a comprehensive approach to preparing for and responding to biological events. That is why this grant from Open Philanthropy is so critical. It will allow us to push forward the recommendations detailed in our National Blueprint and seek to put them into action." In February 2018, the Open Philanthropy Project gave the commission a grant for $2.5 million to advance biodefense leadership and reduce catastrophic biological risk. “Estimates show that as many as 100 million people died in 1918 from pandemic influenza,” Senator Lieberman said. “That was before we were traveling as often as we do today, and well before commerce became globalized. Since then, the world has gotten smaller, but the threat has not. Far more needs to be done to prepare for another catastrophic biological event – whether manmade or from nature. With this in mind, the support we receive today from Open Philanthropy will allow us to further advance the recommendations the Panel identified in our National Blueprint for Biodefense and subsequent reports. We thank Open Philanthropy for their leadership and support on this critical issue.” On March 16, 2020, the Open Philanthropy Project gave the commission a grant for $2.6 million to help defend America against biological threats. About the timing of the grant, Governor Ridge noted that it, "...comes in the midst of our national response to novel coronavirus and other highly pathogenic diseases, the development of biological weapons by other nation-states, and the ongoing threat of bioterrorism." Added Senator Lieberman, "The biological threats to our Nation remain all too real." On August 25, 2022, the Open Philanthropy Project awarded the commission a grant for $5.2 million to strengthen efforts to improve preparation for biological incidents, ranging from pandemics and zoonotic diseases to biological terrorism and warfare. “The support we receive from Open Philanthropy is absolutely critical in our ability to continue working with the Administration and Congress to implement our recommendations,” said former Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Ridge, first secretary of homeland security and co-chair of the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense. “The world can no longer consider a devastating biological event like the COVID-19 pandemic to be a rare, once-in-a-lifetime occurrence. Naturally occurring biological threats will become more deadly and transmissible than we see now with COVID-19. Increasing air travel, mass market food production, climate changes, urbanization, and increasing human-wildlife interactions only add to the growing risk and frequency of natural infectious diseases.” “The biological threats to our Nation remain all too real,” added former U.S. Sen. Joe Lieberman, co-chair of the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense. “Our nation and the world are dealing with natural, accidental, and intentional biological threats simultaneously. Our Commission has made tremendous progress in getting recommendations in our initial Blueprint and subsequent Commission reports taken up by the Administration and Congress. We thank Open Philanthropy for their generosity and vision, which will allow this critical work to continue.” In January 2024, the Open Philanthropy Project awarded the commission a grant for $4.6 million to continue its work to provide for a comprehensive assessment of the state of U.S. biodefense efforts, and to issue recommendations that will foster change. The commission has also received grants from Smith Richardson Foundation and NTI, and unrestricted donations from a number of pharmaceutical and biotech companies, and academic institutions. == See also ==