The raid coincided with a British
thousand-bomber raid on
Duisburg, the second on that city within 24 hours, a previous British attack having been made in daylight. The aircraft of No. 5 Group took off as planned at around 11pm on 14 October. The main force of the group were 233 four-engined
Mark I and III
Lancasters heavy bombers, each with a bomb load of about . The Lancasters were accompanied by 7 Mosquito fast light bombers. The bombers bound for took a course that ran to the south to avoid the
Ruhr area, which was heavily defended by anti-aircraft batteries and fighter aircraft. Near
Paderborn, the force turned towards the north, overflying
Hanover and proceeding to . As was usual, the British actions for the night included a number of sorties to deceive the German defences about the true targets for the night. 141 training craft flew simulated attacks on
Heligoland, 20 Mosquitos went to
Hamburg, 8 to
Mannheim, 16 to
Berlin and 2 to
Düsseldorf. They were supported by 140 special operations aircraft of
100 Group RAF, which deployed electronic warfare measures against German night-fighter defences.
Strips of tinfoil (codenamed "Window") were scattered into the air in large amounts to jam the German air defence system's radar stations, thereby rendering them nearly useless. The feint against Mannheim, which German forces expected to be the main target, left the attack unopposed. The
siren signal alerting to an air raid was sounded at about 1:50am on 15 October.
Target marking The Mosquitos of No. 5 Group marked the target for the main force. No. 5 Group had developed its own techniques separate to the
Pathfinder Force and was using "sector bombing". It used the cathedral as a reckoning point for the "master bomber" in the lead plane. Over the the site of
Braunschweig Cathedrala green flare was dropped, a so-called
blind marker. Other Mosquitos dropped their markers of various colours, lighting the target up. The first red flare fell south-west of the city centre. The same aircraft then dropped about 60 flares from a height of , which slowly floated down to the ground, each burning for about 3–7 minutes. Those lit markers were called () by the Germans, due to their characteristic appearance. Given the clear night, the problem-free overflight, and the flawless marking of the target, the conditions for the attack were optimal, from the British point of view. The green marker on the served to guide the
bomb aimers in all following aircraft, who flew in over it from various directions in a fan-shaped formation, whereupon they dropped their bombs.
RAF filming during night beginning 14 October 1944. A
Lancaster drops "Window" to confuse enemy radar (left), then incendiary bombs and a
"cookie". This raid on was filmed by a Lancaster of the RAF Film Production Unit, outfitted for the task with three
Eyemo-type cameras. The camera plane flew over , along with the rest of the bombers, at a height of at . The time of the onset of the attack was noted as 2:33am. A copy of the film is held by the The film is accompanied by the following note:
The firestorm About of bombs were dropped on the city. First to be deployed were about 12,000 explosive bombsso-called
blockbustersin a
carpet bombing of the old
timber-framed town centre to start the intended firestorm by smashing up the wooden houses. Blast waves blew the roofs off houses, exposing the insides, blew windowpanes out, splintered the inner structure, broke walls down, tore electricity and water supplies up, and drove firefighters and rescue service personnel into cellars and bunkers, along with damage observers. After the wave of explosive bombs, about 200,000
phosphorus and incendiary bombs were dropped, which were designed to ignite the destroyed buildings and create the firestorm, which would still be burning long after the bombers had returned to
England. By about 3:10am, about 40 minutes after the first explosive bombs had been dropped, the attack was over. A hot mass of air rose rapidly upwards due to the powerful
thermal generated by the conflagration. Cooler air rushed in to replace it, creating a
windstorm. Winds blowing from all directions worsened the fires, further strengthening the winds, which became strong enough to sweep up small pieces of furniture and toss people about. Around three and a half hours later, towards 6:30am, the firestorm reached its peak in the city core. About of historic old were going up in flames. The city's tallest church steeplesthose of St. Andrew's were about tallcould be seen burning far beyond the town, and they also rained embers down over the whole city. The ruins of the city centre were littered with unexploded incendiary bombs, greatly hampering fire engines and rescue vehicles. The city burned so intensely and brightly that the light from the fire could be seen far and wide. From all directions, helpers and firefighters thronged into the burning town to help. They came from, among other places,
Hanover to the west and
Helmstedt in the east, from
Celle to the north and
Quedlinburg to the south. Within the 24 hours of Operation
Hurricane, the RAF dropped a total of about of bombs on Duisburg and .
Rescue of 23,000 trapped people About 23,000 people had sought refuge from the attack in six large
bunkers and two
air raid shelters in the area. While these thousands of people waited in seeming safety inside their thick-walled but quite overfilled shelters for the all-clear signal, the many fires in the city centre quickly merged into one widespread conflagration. The
fire brigade very soon realized the threat to these peoplethe fire was growing ever hotter, and the
oxygen in the bunkers and shelters thereby ever thinner. The danger was clearly that the victims would either
suffocate for lack of oxygen if they stayed in their bunkers, or be burnt alive if they tried to leave and escape through the firestorm outside. Towards 5am, before the firestorm had reached its full intensity, the idea of building a () was suggested by lieutenant of the fire brigade. This alley would allow the people to flee their shelters for safer areas of the city. It consisted of a long hose that had to be kept under a constant water mist to shield it against the fire's tremendous heat as the firefighters led the hose through to the shelters where the people were trapped. The reach of each of the little jets issuing from the holes in the hose overlapped each other, making a continuous, artificial "rain zone". The bunkers were reached towards 7am Sunday morning, after the fire storm had reached its greatest intensity. All the trapped people were still alive, but had no idea what lay outside for them. All 23,000 managed to reach safer areas, such as the museum park. Only at the air shelter did help arrive too late: 95 of the 104 people inside had suffocated by the time the fire brigade reached them. The firestorm had been so intense in this particular part of the city that it had used up nearly all the oxygen, making saving more than 9 people impossible.
Effects A large part of 's tightly packed city centre was made up of about 800
timber-frame houses, many of which dated back to the
Middle Ages. The city also had stone buildings dating mainly to the 17th and 18th centuries. The old cathedral, which the RAF had used as a reckoning point for the whole operation, remained standing. However, many significant historic buildings were largely or completely destroyed. The next morning, 16 October, lay under a thick cloud of smoke. A British
reconnaissance aircraft sent to take photographs of the bombing's aftermath for analysis had to return to England, as its mission had been rendered impossible by the opaque pall that hung over the town. By the evening of 17 October, the last of the fire's main hotspots had been put out, but it took another three days to quench lesser fires, until 20 October. 80,000 of the townsfolk were left homeless by the attack. The destruction was so widespread and thorough that ordinary people and experts alike, even years after the war, were convinced that the attack had come from one of the dreaded thousand-bomber attacks, such as the one that had laid Cologne waste. The extent of the damage could seemingly not otherwise be explained. Only after the British opened their military archives did it become plain that it had been "only" 233 bombers.
Casualties The exact number of victims of the 15 October attack is unknown. Estimates ranged from 484 to 640 dead, 95 of those by suffocation at the shelter alone. However, historians now put the number at more than a thousand. These "light" lossescompared with those suffered in the great air raids on
Dresden, Hamburg,
Pforzheim and other German citiesaccording to expert opinions stem from various factors. For one thing, lay on the direct flight path, that is, the "lane" leading to
Magdeburg and
Berlin, and right near the armament industry centres of
Salzgitter () and
Wolfsburg (Volkswagen factory), meaning that s were used toeven in a sense "trained for"quickly responding to alarms (there were 2,040 warnings and 620 air raid alarms between 1939 and 1945). This may have prepared them for the attack, even though many of the earlier attacks from which they had sought shelter actually targeted other cities. Furthermore, the city also had at its disposal a great number of the latest type of air raid bunkers and
blockhouses known as . Lastly, the fire brigade's water alley alone saved the lives of about 23,000 people. The RAF lost a single Lancaster bomber to anti-aircraft fire that night.
Bunkers in Braunschweig Braunschweig Armour had, compared to other German cities, a great number of the most modern air raid bunkers, some of which were (), which nevertheless suffered from regular overcrowding as the war wore on. As modern and robust as they were, the fact is that the so-called
Braunschweig Armour was developed at the Institute for Building Materials, Massive Construction and Fire Protection of the
Technical University of Braunschweig. It became a kind of safety standard for building air raid bunkers throughout the Reich.
Fire brigades from Braunschweig and other cities deployed against the firestorm According to estimates, especially during the night of the bombing as well as in the next six days until the last fires were put out, about 4,500 firefighters were deployed. They came from up to away, and included not only members of city fire brigades from, among other places,
Blankenburg,
Celle,
Gifhorn,
Hanover,
Helmstedt,
Hildesheim,
Peine,
Salzgitter,
Wernigerode and
Wolfenbüttel, but also volunteers and members of plant fire brigades at the various factories in and the surrounding area. Due to their efforts the city was not utterly burnt that night. ==Aftermath==