Boris Yeltsin 1991 presidential campaign

On March 17, 1991, the all-Russian referendum on the introduction of the post of President of Russia was held. More than 70% of citizens voted for the introduction of the post of President, elected by direct vote. On 24 April 1991, the Supreme Council of Russia adopted the law "On the President of the RSFSR". Boris Yeltsin served as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and was the head of the Russian SFSR. He had had strong favorability. Heading into the election, he was the most popular candidate. He was widely viewed to be the only candidate with a real chance to become president.{{cite news|url=http://tass.ru/spec/eltzin25 |title=Смел, напорист, гоним... 25 лет назад Борис Ельцин был избран первым президентом России |language=ru |first1=Виктор |last1=Дятликович |first2=Анатолий |last2=Петров |first3=Мадина |last3=Сагеева |first4=Алексей |last4=Угаров The alliances which would form the Democratic Russia apparatus which supported Yeltsin's candidacy, had been forged prior to his presidential candidacy, originally working in support of Yeltsin's successful push to create an office of the presidency. ==Campaign strategy==

The leader of the RSFSR, Yeltsin essentially campaigned as an incumbent. His greatest support was found in Russia's cities. He also found strong support among those who were most disadvantaged under the Soviet system. Yeltsin's campaign and its backers decided to conduct a low-key campaign. Rather than heightening emotions of voters, they sought to instead calm them. A key reason behind the decision to opt for a low-key campaign was a desire to avoid fatigue among voters. For instance, when Democratic Russia held rallies attended by several hundred thousand supporters each on May 20 and June 10 in Moscow's Manezh Square, rather than riling voters up about key issues, those speaking at the rallies spoke lightheartedly and expressed their confidence in Yeltsin's chances of winning the election. Steering largely away from issues, only occasional criticisms of Yeltsin's opponents and of the communist order were delivered at these events. Organizers of Yeltsin's campaign had decided that they will wait until June before fully ramping up their efforts. They did this in the belief that Russians had become tired of politics, and that it would be off-putting to overly-campaign. With Yeltsin having a strong lead, they deemed it unnecessary to conduct much beyond a "minimal campaign". Rather than employing the sorts of frenzied rhetoric that his opponents were using, Yeltsin instead opted to act the part of a measured statesman during the campaign period. This was intended to solidify the perception of Yeltsin as a capable leader and enhance the dynamic in which he was running as a de facto incumbent. Yeltsin's campaign apparatus had immense access to printing resources, and, come the election, was able to flood the nation with posters and leaflets. Opponents, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, lacked access to comparable resources. ==Campaigning==

Yeltsin was the only candidate of the democratic forces. Among the organizations that supported him were the Democratic Russia movement, the Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party. On May 3, the RSFSR Social Democratic Party nominated Yeltsin at their national conference. The Social Democratic Party also nominated Galina Starovoytova to be Yeltsin's running mate if he were to accept their nomination. Yeltsin refused both nominations. Rather of accepting any one party's nomination, Yeltsin instead opted to run as an independent. However, while refusing their nominations, Yeltsin received support from both parties. On April 29, during a meeting in Novokuznetsk with approximately 600 miners and local officials, Yeltsin took the opportunity to issue a number of promises aimed at earning the votes of miners. On the same day, Democratic Russia organized an event in Moscow in which thousands of supporters rallied for Yeltsin and collected signatures for his registration. Yeltsin was officially registered as a presidential candidate on May 20. He started his campaign travels with a trip to Murmansk, where he was reported to have been hounded by enthusiastic crowds waving the flag of pre-revolutionary Russia and shouting "We love you, Boris Nikolaevich!". At the rally, chess champion Garry Kasparov delivered a speech encouraging a large turnout in support of Yeltsin. Democratic Russia leader Nikolai Travkin confidently spoke of Yeltsin's prospects. On the day of the election Yeltsin's campaign deployed a vast number of poll watchers to observe voting stations across the country, in order to keep an eye out for any voter fraud that the Communist Party might conduct against him. It was reported that Yeltsin had reached an agreement with Bakatin for him to serve as his running mate, but that Bakatin had backed out after being convinced by Mikhail Gorbachev to instead challenge Yeltsin for the presidency. According to Yeltsin, until the last minute he had intended to choose between his two closest associates at time, which were Ruslan Khasbulatov and Gennady Burbulis. However, he ultimately felt they lacked charisma and were too unpopular with voters. Rutskoy was a celebrated military veteran, a People's Deputy, and the leader of the newly-formed Communists for Democracy movement. The choice of Rutskoy was unexpected to many. Most of the candidates that had been widely anticipated were from the same political camp as Yeltsin. Yeltsin praised Rutskoy for his ability to understand the needs of military veterans and for his creation of the "Communists for Democracy" movement. He saw his lowest share of votes in the Republic of Tuva (where he took third place, with 15.25% of the vote) and also in three national regions (Altai Republic, North Ossetian Republic and Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug) where he was supported by less than 30% of voters. ==Platform==

While Yeltsin had outlined some policy proposals during his campaign, he kept many of his positions intentionally vague. In order to appeal to a broader array of voters, Yeltsin mostly avoided answering questions about his specific political ideology. Yeltsin unveiled his campaign's platform at a June 1 meeting of the Democratic Russia movement. He pledged to improve Russian living conditions within a two-year timeframe. He called for many aspects of Russia's government would be transferred from the purview of the Soviet Union to the government of the RSFSR. During his campaign, Yeltsin also pledged that his government would return all property that had been confiscated from the Russian Orthodox Church. He also opposed using the army for domestic policing. He was the only candidate to support depoliticization of the armed forces. On June 9 in Sverdlovsk, Yeltsin declared that he would make Russia's military industries fund themselves. ==Campaign organizations==

The organizations which facilitated Yeltsin's campaign had descended from organizations that had earlier been developed to support his push for the RSFSR to establish a presidency. The campaign organization consisted of two leading entities, the official campaign committee and the Democratic Russia-run national initiative group. While Yelstin officially ran as an independent candidate, the latter organization nonetheless played a critical role in his campaign operations. Structure The campaign consisted of two components, a national initiative group and an official campaign committee. In the national initiative groups's chain of command was that neighborhood and factory organizations answered to district level committees, which answered to regional public committees, which answered to the committee's logistics group. A strategy group acted independent of the logistic group's authority. In the chain of command of the official campaign committee, regional representatives answered to the central office. Regional representatives of the official campaign coordinated with regional public committees of the national initiative group. Official campaign committee The chairperson of the official campaign committee was Gennady Burbulis. He directly oversaw a staff of one hundred "trusted persons". Central office The campaign's central office was staffed by thirty paid staff as well as approximately 200 technical specialists and volunteers. Regional representatives Representatives of the campaign were located in each of Russia's federal subjects. They acted as the official conduit between the official campaign and regional public committees. National initiative group (Democratic Russia) The campaign's national initiative group, run by Democratic Russia, was chaired by Aleksandr Muzykansky, who, at the time, was the Vice Chairperson of the Moscow City Soviet. Muzykansky had previously been the lead organizer of Yeltsin's campaign in the 1989 legislative election. The national initiative group was a continuation of an existing Democratic Russia apparatus which had been formed (in advance of the March 1991 referendum) to support Yeltsin's push to establish a presidency. On May 18 and 19, national, regional, and district level organizers from Democratic Russia met in Moscow with a team of five campaign experts, led by Paul Weyerich and Robert Krieble from the United States-based Committee for a Free Congress. The experts provided them with campaign advice. Strategy group Members of the strategy group consisted of Democratic Russia's five co-chairpersons and a number of advisors. Lev Ponomar was a member, as he was one of Democratic Russia's five co-chairpersons. Logistics group The logistics group had between five and eight paid staff members, whose efforts were supplemented by a number of volunteer staff members. The logistics group commanded field operations as the direct superior to the regional public committees. Regional public committees Regional public committees were located in each of Russia's federal subjects, overseeing the campaign's field operations in each subject. They were each run either by regional chapters of Democratic Russia, by affiliated political parties, or by both. The regional public committees were the key component of the campaign's operations, conducting a bulk of the work. Neither the regional public committees nor their subordinate units (district level committees, neighborhood and factory organizations) conducted canvassing. The campaign had opted against canvassing because, in many regions, they lacked enough volunteers to conduct impactful canvassing efforts. They also decided against it because they believed that, in the regions where they would be able to find enough volunteers, too many volunteers would be extremist democrats. They feared that such volunteers would be harmful if they represented the campaign to voters. The campaign instead relied on using advertising mail to distribute campaign literature to voters, often by having volunteers anonymously drop leaflets into mailboxes. District level committees District level committees were sub-regional committees tasked with overseeing campaign efforts in a number of districts. They were each run either by regional chapters of Democratic Russia, by affiliated political parties, or by both. Neighborhood and factory organizations Neighborhood and factory organizations were, respectively, local organizations dedicated to overseeing field operations and individual neighborhoods or efforts targeting the workforce in individual factories. They were run by local volunteers alongside either regional chapters of Democratic Russia, affiliated political parties, or by both. ==See also==