After receiving news of the crash, the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) sent five accident investigation experts to the scene of the crash, and more arrived in the following days. The investigators were divided into five teams, each with a specific field of investigation. CAB representatives said that they expected the investigation of the crash scene to take two or three weeks and that the purpose of the teams on the ground was to gather information rather than make conclusions. Investigators tagged the location of every piece of wreckage, no matter how small, and plotted the locations on a map before any of the pieces were moved. CAB officials restricted access to the Braniff offices in Dallas, and reporters were not allowed inside. Immediately after the accident, a spokesman from Braniff stated that the aircraft had been "blown open" in the air, and that there were signs that at least one section of the plane had buckled outward, stating that it appeared an explosion inside the plane had occurred. One unidentified investigator also suggested that the disintegration of the airliner might have been caused by an explosive loss of cabin air pressure from the aircraft. On the other hand, a CAB investigator told reporters that at that point, it wasn't even known whether or not the aircraft had been in one piece when it hit the ground, so the reports of explosions were premature. Searchers had found burn marks on some parts of the rear of the fuselage and tail, and the outside of some of the windows at the rear of the plane showed signs that they had been exposed to tremendous heat. Some of the recovered pieces of debris were sent to Washington, D.C. for further testing for traces of explosives, metal fatigue, overstress, and other causes. The FBI also began tracing the history of all of the cargo that had been carried in the rear cargo hold. However, by October 1, an anonymous FAA official told reporters that the theory that an explosive device had caused the crash had been ruled out. None of the bodies that had been recovered had any obvious signs of burns and did not have any odors that were consistent with explosives. Investigators also ruled out weather as a factor, saying the night was clear and calm. On October 6, investigators, still unable to find all of the wreckage of the aircraft due to the thick brush and heavy rains, announced that a crew of 280 soldiers from
Fort Hood would assist with the search for remnants. The soldiers would walk in a line, spaced apart, picking up everything they saw, even old litter, if there was a possibility that it had come from the aircraft. The search covered an area long and wide, and everything that was found was handed over to investigators. Meanwhile, rumors about the crash spread throughout the aviation community and in the news. A pilot for a foreign airline told colleagues that he had heard that a fighter plane had landed at a Texas Air Force base immediately after the crash with one of its
Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles missing. The story was relayed to CAB officials in Dallas, who passed it on to investigators in Washington. The CAB asked the Air Force and Navy to perform a complete inspection of all of its aircraft to see if any of them were missing any missiles. The check was completed, with both services being able to account for all of their munitions, and the pilot's story was dismissed as a hoax. In another instance, newspapers reported that an engineer who had flown from Chicago to Houston on the same plane just before the crash told reporters that he had felt a bulge in the floor under his seat in the ninth row as the plane took off.
First public hearing The CAB held a public hearing about the accident on October 21, 1959, in the Buffalo High School gymnasium. The CAB stated that the hearings were going to discuss the progress of the investigation only, and would not attempt to reach any conclusions as to the cause of the crash. A second set of public hearings was planned to be held about three or four weeks later in Dallas. About 100 people attended the hearing, including fifty experts from the CAB, Braniff Airlines, Lockheed, and the
Allison Division of General Motors, eight eyewitnesses to the crash and explosion of the flight, and about forty spectators. During the hearing, a representative of the CAB's Bureau of Safety testified that the destruction of the aircraft involved an in-flight disintegration, impact with the ground, and fire. An engineer from Braniff reported that when the aircraft departed Houston, it was in airworthy condition, although it had experienced various mechanical and electrical problems that whole day. He testified that after the plane left Houston, the fuel scavenger pump in engine number three had broken down. That pump ensures that a steady flow of fuel is available to the main fuel pump, and is also used to help cool the plane's hydraulic system. The pump failure was considered a "no-go" failure if it had malfunctioned before takeoff, and after landing, it would have prevented the plane from leaving Dallas until it was repaired. The engineer also reported that a generator on engine number three had been reported as malfunctioning three different times on the day of the crash, and that its most recent repair had been performed in Dallas before the inbound trip to Houston. A Braniff engineering specialist had volunteered to ride on the plane on the return from Houston to Dallas to monitor and troubleshoot the generator problem, and was one of the victims of the crash. Other problems that had been troubling the aircraft that day included a malfunctioning propeller solenoid valve on the number three engine, caused by improper insulation on a terminal strip in the propeller mechanism, and a faulty light in the secondary refueling system. The pilot of Flight 542 had reported the problem with the fuel scavenger pump and the propeller solenoid valve over the radio to the company only two minutes before the crash. However, the engineer reported that none of the reported problems would have affected the aircraft's airworthiness or performance in any significant way. Investigators presented signed statements by two Braniff crew members who had been in the flight immediately before the fatal one that said that the aircraft had seemed exceptionally noisy, and that the
flight engineer had experienced problems keeping the propellers synchronized. This was echoed by the statements of several witnesses, who testified that the aircraft's engines sounded "funny" and that the engines or propellers sounded like they were out of synchronization. One of the witnesses to the explosion, a former mechanical engineer for aircraft manufacturer
Convair and former Air Force test pilot, testified that he had heard an extremely loud noise coming from the airliner as it flew, seconds before it exploded. He estimated the noise to be as loud as 150 to 175
decibels, loud enough to cause discomfort when he heard it, saying that it sounded like a "jet engine with the
afterburner on." He said the noise stopped suddenly and then he saw the glow of an explosion. He saw the fire burn for ten to fifteen seconds, then it went out, and he heard the aircraft strike the ground about a minute later. Other witnesses to the crash also described the noise as extremely loud, using descriptions like "the clapping of two boards together", "the sound of thunder", and "the roar of a jet breaking the sound barrier". One farmer stated, "When the sound came, every coon dog for miles started howling." Investigators verified that statement with farmers around the area, and every one with a hound reported that the animal began howling shortly after 11:00p.m. The CAB had played twelve different known sounds to witnesses. The sounds included the sounds of jet aircraft, sonic booms, propellers spinning at supersonic speeds, and Electras in different flight configurations, such as normal flight, diving, and climbing. They also intentionally included noises that were completely unrelated to sounds that an aircraft would make. Without telling the witnesses what any of the sounds were, investigators asked them to pick out anything that was close to what they had heard. The witnesses chose two of the sounds; the sound of a propeller spinning at supersonic speed, and the sound of a jet aircraft. John Leak, from the CAB's Bureau of Safety, testified that the left wing had broken off during the flight, about a foot or two from where it attached to the fuselage. That wing tore free and landed more than a mile (2 km) away from any other wreckage. Efforts to determine why the wing broke off were made more complicated by the fact that when the wing fell to the ground, it struck with the broken edge first, which further damaged the wing. He said that although the agency had not completely ruled out the possibility of a bomb on the airplane, they had not found any evidence of a bomb explosion on any of the aircraft debris or recovered luggage and cargo. Investigators had recovered the rear baggage compartment largely intact and it showed no sign of bomb damage.
Additional searches and rumors After the initial examination of the wreckage did not reveal an obvious cause, CAB investigators disclosed that they would assemble a partial two-dimensional reconstruction of the aircraft. With this type of reconstruction, investigators would draw a chalk outline of the aircraft's structure, and the recovered pieces would be laid out in their relative positions within the outline. The investigator expressed hope that this partial reconstruction would help identify the cause of the crash. On October 7, CAB officials stated that they would begin removing the recovered parts of the aircraft from the accident site to a warehouse in Dallas for reconstruction. The exact location of the warehouse was withheld from the public to keep curious onlookers away. By October 12, all of the recovered wreckage had been removed to the warehouse, and by October 15, investigators stated that they had been able to lay out about ninety percent of the structural components of the aircraft. About 50 engineers, CAB officials, FAA specialists, pilots, manufacturing representatives, and other experts were involved in the reassembly. On October 22, CAB officials said they would be taking some of the sections of the plane and performing a three-dimensional reassembly. The three-dimensional model used a wooden frame in the shape of the section, covered with mesh wire, to which each fragment of wreckage would be attached at the place where it actually was situated before the crash. The reconstruction work was interrupted by other aviation accidents which took several CAB experts away from Dallas, but resumed in late November. After ruling out many possible theories about what had caused the crash, Lockheed and the CAB invited experts from other aircraft manufacturers to the Dallas warehouse to study the wreckage.
Boeing, Convair, and
NASA sent engineers to Dallas, who looked over the wreckage. They came up with new theories, but each theory was investigated and dismissed. On December 9, officials announced that they would conduct a second search for missing pieces of debris, conducted by 280 soldiers from Fort Hood walking in a line, an arm's length from each other. They appealed to the public to turn over any "souvenir pieces" that they may have picked up from the area after the crash. On January 17, 1960, the
Fort Worth Star-Telegram reported that an anonymous source, later identified as a "CAB source", had told a reporter that investigators believed that a runaway propeller was the cause of the mid-air breakup. According to the report, they felt that the propeller on the right inboard engine had gone into a flat pitch, which means that the angle of the adjustable propeller blades changes so the propellers essentially present a flat face to the direction of the airflow. At the Electra's high speed, they thought that the air resistance against the propeller was enough to tear the engine and wing off the plane. A CAB spokesman refused to confirm or deny the report, saying only that several theories about the accident were still being considered, but later that day, a high official with the CAB denied the report, saying that no cause had been determined yet.
Second public hearing The CAB held two days of public hearings in Dallas beginning on March 9, 1960, attended by about 150 people including government officials and representatives from the airline, aircraft manufacturers, and the Airline Pilots' Association. The hearings were announced to be the final public hearing that would be held on the technical phases of the inquiry. On the day before the meeting, the CAB held a private pre-hearing conference with representatives of the manufacturers and airlines, where a Board official admitted that the CAB was ready to give up trying to identify the cause. After objections from Braniff management and representatives from the Air Line Pilots Association, the CAB agreed to continue the probe. At the public hearing, several witnesses gave additional background information about the aircraft and about the investigation. An engineering technician for the CAB Bureau of Safety testified that during the testing phase that occurred before its delivery to Braniff, the aircraft had not experienced any major malfunctions, and that the only problems that had been encountered were with the radio and navigation equipment. He said that in the last few flights before the accident, general malfunctions had occurred, but that they had all been corrected. He said that at the time of the crash, the aircraft had only been flown for 122 hours and 38 minutes. A project engineer for Braniff Airlines testified that the ground impact had damaged the aircraft's components so completely that only a few of the instruments had been recovered. A Lockheed engineer testified about the possibility that a broken wire in part of the aircraft's autopilot had caused the plane to go out of control, but said that tests conclusively proved that a malfunction in the autopilot could not have caused the plane to break up the way it had. Testimony at the hearing revealed that several theories about the accident had been eliminated by the investigators. One theory had been that an inboard engine had seized up in flight, causing it to explode and rip off the wing. Another was that a propeller blade had broken off of an inboard engine and been thrown into the cabin, causing an explosive decompression. A CAB engineer testified that the aircraft had only broken up after the left wing had already failed. As the plane started falling, the right wing also failed, and a small in-flight fire from spilling fuel caused the windows on the left side of the fuselage to crack. He stated that the fire definitely was caused by the wing failures; the fire did not cause the wing failures. He said that most of the fire damage to the aircraft only occurred after the impact with the ground. Fire damage was more consistent with a quick explosive fire, and not a fire that burned for a considerable amount of time. A CAB power plant specialist testified that there was no evidence that any of the aircraft's engine components had failed during the flight, and said that the wing broke off the plane before any of the engines or propellers had been damaged. One theory that was identified as a possible cause was that excess pressure in one of the wing-mounted fuel tanks could have caused it to explode, leading to wing failure. A power plant engineer for Lockheed testified that under certain circumstances, it could have been possible for vapor pressure to increase inside the fuel tanks without the crew's knowledge. The aircraft was equipped with fuel tank pressure gauges, but they only registered pressures up to , and emergency release valves would not have started to operate until the pressure reached . The engineer testified that overfilling the fuel tanks could lead to excess pressure, and that an overfill valve that is designed to prevent overfilling the tanks was optional equipment that had not been purchased or installed on the crashed aircraft. However, a CAB engineer testified that there was no evidence that any of the fuel tanks had exploded. Another potential cause that was being looked into was whether a removable truss and rib section could have been left out of one of the wings during its manufacture or maintenance. The condition of the wreckage made it impossible to tell if the section had been in place at the time of the crash. A representative for Lockheed testified that the wings of the Electra would have been able to withstand forces of up to 4.7 times the
force of gravity that could have occurred in a dive. If the removable section was missing, the strength of the wing would have been decreased by a third. However, he said that Lockheed maintenance records showed that the removable section had been reinstalled in the aircraft. The hearings concluded on March 10 without identifying any definitive cause for the accident. The board stated that it did not plan to hold any more public hearings, but that the investigation would continue, and estimated that it might be as long as another year before a final report would be issued. On March 17, the CAB was prepared to tell Braniff that it could release the wreckage in the warehouse to its insurance underwriters, a sign that they had discovered everything that they hoped to find from the wreckage and that the investigation was winding down after six months of intense efforts. ==Northwest Airlines crash==