File:NSA-diagram-001.jpg|thumb|right|Slide published by
The Guardian diagramming the high-level architecture of NSA's "Exploitation [Cracking] of Common Internet Encryption Technologies" Through the NSA-designed
Clipper chip, which used the
Skipjack cipher with an intentional backdoor, and using various specifically designed laws such as
CALEA,
CESA and
restrictions on export of encryption software as evidenced by
Bernstein v. United States, the U.S. government had publicly attempted in the 1990s to ensure its access to communications and ability to decrypt. In particular, technical measures such as
key escrow, a euphemism for a
backdoor, have met with criticism and little success. The NSA encourages the manufacturers of security technology to disclose backdoors to their products or encryption keys so that they may access the encrypted data. However, fearing widespread adoption of encryption, the NSA set out to stealthily influence and weaken encryption standards and obtain master keys—either by agreement, by force of law, or by computer network exploitation (
hacking).
The New York Times has reported that the random number generator
Dual_EC_DRBG contains a back door, which would allow the NSA to break encryption keys generated by the random number generator. Even though this random number generator was known to be insecure and slow soon after the standard was published, and a potential NSA
kleptographic backdoor was found in 2007 while alternative random number generators without these flaws were certified and widely available,
RSA Security continued using Dual_EC_DRBG in the company's
BSAFE toolkit and Data Protection Manager until September 2013. While RSA Security has denied knowingly inserting a backdoor into BSAFE, it has not yet given an explanation for the continued usage of Dual_EC_DRBG after its flaws became apparent in 2006 and 2007. It was reported on December 20, 2013, that RSA had accepted a payment of $10 million from the NSA to set the random number generator as the default. Leaked NSA documents state that their effort was “a challenge in finesse” and that “Eventually, N.S.A. became the sole editor” of the standard. Others have speculated that NSA has gained ability to crack 1024-bit
RSA/
DH keys. RC4 has since been prohibited for all versions of TLS by RFC 7465 in 2015, due to the
RC4 attacks weakening or breaking RC4 used in SSL/TLS. == Fallout ==