The
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s
Guangdong Provincial Committee had been preparing for an uprising in Guangzhou since September 1927. It originally planned to use a large group of communist-leaning soldiers who were heading into Guangdong after taking part in the failed
Nanchang uprising. According to these plans, local workers and peasants were supposed to act as auxiliaries, while the soldiers would bear the brunt of the fighting. The troops from
Nanchang were defeated at
Shantou in early October, however, precluding any attempt to utilise them in the Guangzhou Uprising. CCP party head
Qu Qiubai consequently decided that the communists had to persuade soldiers who were stationed in Guangdong to join their cause. Upon receiving orders from
Joseph Stalin to launch the planned uprising in mid-December, over the course of November, a final plan for rebellion was worked out by the central party leadership and Guangdong secretary
Zhang Tailei in
Shanghai. Originally, the Chinese communist leadership opposed the plans, and made representations to the Soviet government to the effect that they had no chance at winning control of Guangzhou, but ultimately gave in to Soviet pressure. The CCP thought that fighting between the
Kuomintang-aligned warlords
Zhang Fakui and
Li Jishen was imminent in Guangdong, potentially providing them with an opportunity to exploit the ensuing chaos by launching multiple simultaneous rebellions to seize power in the province. Peasant insurgents were supposed to throw the countryside into chaos, while workers should take over the county seats, and a general strike would paralyze Guangzhou. A separate communist faction was to capture
Hainan island, and an army from the
Hailufeng Soviet attack
Huizhou, and then advance against Guangzhou. In the end, however, the communists in Guangzhou did not follow this plan. The conflict between Zhang Fakui and Li Jishen already broke out on 27 November, with the former capturing Guangzhou from the latter in surprise attack. Thereafter, however, Zhang moved most of his troops out of the city to resist Li's counter-attacks. When the Guangdong Provincial Committee thus converged on 27 November, it concluded that the time was ideal for an insurrection in Guangzhou itself. It remains strongly disputed who exactly was responsible for the further course of events. The communists in Guangdong later claimed that their insurrection was based on the plans discussed with the party leadership, though historian Hsiao Tso-Liang argued that the former still acted completely autonomous and without the knowledge of the latter. Other historians consider this view too extreme, and have put forth evidence which suggests that the CCP's central leadership was informed about the ongoing events in Guangdong. Furthermore, it has been argued that
Comintern agents who were present in the province might have decisively influenced the Guangdong Provincial Committee in its decisions about when and how to launch a rebellion. Regardless of who was responsible for the decision, the Guangdong Committee began to prepare its uprising in earnest from 27 November. A Revolutionary Military Council was appointed with
Ye Ting as commander-in-chief and Zhang Tailei as chairman. Sometime in early December, Comintern agent
Heinz Neumann arrived in Guangdong, joining the local communists. According to CCP leader
Zhang Guotao, Neumann came to wield great influence on the committee and took a leading role in the rebellion; others believe that he was just a messenger for Stalin. The core fighting force of the rebellion consisted of an
ad-hoc "Red Guard" formed by 2,000 armed workers, and a communist-infiltrated
cadet regiment of 1,200 soldiers. ==History==