Prior to the
Tunisian revolution,
Internet censorship in
Tunisia was extensive. Tunisia was on
Reporters Without Borders' "Internet enemies" list. The
OpenNet Initiative classified Internet filtering as pervasive in the political, social, and Internet tools areas and as selective in the conflict/security area in August 2009. Ben Ali promised, "a removal of internet restrictions," among several other promises in a speech shortly before he was forced out. In addition to filtering Web content, the government of Tunisia utilized laws, regulations, and surveillance to achieve strict control over the Internet. For example, journalists were prosecuted by Tunisia's press code, which bans offending the president, disturbing order, and publishing what the government perceives as false news. The government also restricted the media by controlling the registration of print media and licensing of broadcasters, refusing permission to critical outlets, and controlling the distribution public sector advertisement. Journalists are also charged in courts with vague violations of the penal code. The
OpenNet Initiative carried out tests in Tunisia using the ISPs Planet Tunisie and TopNet. Similar to 2006-2007 test results, 2008-2009 testing revealed pervasive filtering of Web sites of political opposition groups such as: • Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberty (www.fdtl.org) • Al-Nadha Movement (www.nahdha.info) • Tunisian Workers' Communist Party (www.albadil.org) • Democratic Progressive Party (pdpinfo.org) Also blocked were Web sites run by opposition figures such as activist Moncef Marzouki and Web sites that contain oppositional news and politics such as: • www.nawaat.org • www.perspectivestunisiennes.net • www.tunisnews.com • www.tunezine.com Web sites that publish oppositional articles by Tunisian journalists were also blocked. For example, ONI verified the blocking of the French daily Libération Web site in February 2007 because of articles by Tunisian journalist Taoufik Ben Brik critical of President
Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali appeared on the site. Also blocked were Web sites that criticize
Tunisia's
human rights record. These include the web sites of: •
Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org) •
Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org) •
Reporters Without Borders (www.rsf.org and www.rsf.fr) • International Freedom of Expression eXchange (www.ifex.org) • the Islamic Human Rights Commission (www.ihrc.org) • the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (www.hrinfo.org) Although the home page of
Human Rights Watch (HRW) was accessible, the
Arabic and
French versions of a Human Rights Watch report on Internet repression in Tunisia were blocked. The prominent video sharing Web sites
youtube.com and
dailymotion.com were blocked, apparently because Tunisian activists used them to disseminate content critical of the regime's human rights practices. The Web site of the OpenNet Initiative (opennet.net), which researches and documents state filtering and censorship practices, was blocked. Also blocked was the Web site of Global Voices (globalvoices.org), a non-profit global citizens’ media project. Most of the tested sites in the anonymizers and circumvention tools category were also blocked. These include: • Psiphon (https://web.archive.org/web/20080101102040/http://psiphon.civisec.org/) • TOR (https://www.torproject.org/) • Anonymizer (www.anonymizer.com) • email privacy service provider Steal the Message (www.stealthmessage.com) • Guardster (www.guardster.com/) • JAP (anon.inf.tu-dresden.de) The filtering regime pervasively filtered
pornographic content, several
gay and lesbian information or dating pages, and several online translation services. Also blocked were a few Web sites that criticize the
Quran (thequran.com) and
Islam (www.islameyat.com), though the small number points to limited filtering of religious content in Tunisia. Starting in May 2010, the popular
Skype VOIP application that is heavily used by Tunisian expats to stay in touch with their families went offline in Tunisia due to ATI's throttling of SIP traffic. ATI's blocking of SIP traffic has made life very difficult for
call centers, whose main business is taking calls to/from
French speaking Europe. Most (if not all) call centers serving Europe used SIP, often with minutes bought from European (mostly French) providers. Blocking SIP traffic resulted in many job losses in Tunisia.
Surveillance during the Ben Ali regime The Tunisian authorities practiced different sorts of Internet surveillance and request that service providers such as Internet cafés be partners in controlling Internet use. For example, the authorities monitored Internet cafés, required Internet users to show IDs before they could use the Internet in some regions, and held Internet café operators responsible for their clients’ online activities. There was also technical surveillance where downloading or e-mail attachments went through a central server. In order to protect public order and national security, a 1998 post and telecommunications law allowed authorities to intercept and check the content of email messages. Filtering of e-mail messages of government opponents has been reported.
Global Voices Advocacy Director and Tunisia Activist Sami Ben Gharbia conducted a test from the Netherlands with two Tunisia-based activists and confirmed by logging into their e-mail accounts from the Netherlands that what he saw was not what the activists saw when they logged in from Tunisia, and that they could not access all of the messages they received. In early 2011 there was increasing evidence that the private e-mail accounts of Tunisian citizens along with login details of their Facebook pages had been targeted by phishing scripts put in place by the government. There were increasing incidences of censorship in this manner as many dissidents were blocked from using the internet. ==Censorship following the Tunisian revolution==