The campaign officially commenced on 25 September 1933, when the first Nationalist Army assault on Communist positions was launched. Just three days later, the Communists lost control of
Lichuan. Although Communist forces managed to halt the Nationalist advance southwest of Lichuan, subsequent operations proved disastrous. On 9 October 1933, the 24th Division of the Red Army attempted to capture Siaoshi Township (), but the town remained firmly in Nationalist hands. Over the following days, Communist troops were forced to withdraw, sustaining heavy casualties in the process. Witnessing this success, Chiang Kai-shek issued a new directive on 17 October 1933, instructing his forces to adopt the principle of tactical defence, strategic offence in order to perfect the Blockhouse Strategy. In contrast, the Communist leadership failed to revise their tactical approach and continued launching ineffective frontal assaults on NRA blockhouses. Between 25 September and mid-November 1933, the Red Army failed to achieve any major victories, suffering significant losses not only from combat, but also due to defection and disease.
The Blockhouse Doctrine As commander-in-chief of the Nationalist forces,
Chiang Kai-shek established his headquarters in
Nanchang. Alongside the mobilisation of regional warlord troops, Chiang adopted a strategy of systematic encirclement of the
Jiangxi Soviet through the use of fortified
blockhouses. This strategy—commonly referred to as the Blockhouse Doctrine ()—sought to apply gradual, methodical pressure on Communist-held territories through static defence and incremental territorial gains. Although this approach is often attributed to German military advisers such as
Hans von Seeckt and
Alexander von Falkenhausen, later analysis suggests the strategy was a synthesis of both foreign guidance and domestic planning. In early 1933, General von Seeckt recommended to Chiang that the Red Army be targeted not through rapid offensives, but by avoiding direct confrontation and instead advancing slowly with strong defensive support. He advised that even if only one kilometre were gained per day, the Communist Central Revolutionary Base Area could be fully subdued within a year. At a military strategy conference held in Nanchang in June 1933, Chiang officially endorsed this approach. The plan proposed by Nanchang Headquarters staff officer Liu Weiyuan () was adopted, advocating a shift from rapid offensives to a block-by-block advance, with fortifications and roads constructed en route. A special section for blockhouse construction was established under Liu's direction. By July, Chiang expanded the initiative with a formal officer training programme at
Lushan, where the tactical doctrine was further refined to compress and gradually erode the Jiangxi Soviet: "Blockhouses were to be constructed in a grid, like pattern, advancing cautiously with a focus on area denial, Advance one step, then hold one step." () Between 1933 and the autumn of 1934, the Nationalist Army reportedly constructed 14,294 blockhouses across the front, with the highest concentration around
Fuzhou. A defensive line was formed stretching some 400 kilometres from the eastern boundary of Lichuan to the western approaches of
Ji'an and
Jizhou, sealing off key transport routes into the Jiangxi Soviet. In eight counties alone—
Yihuang,
Nancheng,
Le'an, Lichuan,
Jinxi,
Chongren,
Zixi, and
Nanfeng—over 2,000 blockhouses were established. aircraft, modified by local Chinese engineers and technicians as bomber aircraft. Such type of aircraft had been used extensively during the air raid of Guangchang. On 27 April, the NRA launched its final assault on Guangchang. By the evening of 28 April, the Nationalist Army had taken complete control of the town. The battle resulted in 5,093 Communist casualties. Remaining Red Army forces retreated south and west under cover of darkness. More than ten Red Army regimental commanders and officers of higher rank were captured, while over 200 Communist officers below the regimental level surrendered. It was considered one of the most decisive victories achieved by Nationalist forces during the five encirclement campaigns. Among the most notable losses of the defending communist forces, was one battalion from the Red 3rd Army Corps' 4th Division, which held out in a fortified position at Qingshuitang (). After withstanding multiple assaults, the position was ultimately destroyed by aerial bombardment, resulting in the complete annihilation of the unit. As Communist General Peng Dehuai later vividly recounted the battle:"The enemy attacking Guangchang numbered seven divisions and one artillery brigade. Every day some 30 to 40 sorties of aircraft supported their advance. Dragging 'turtle shells' (blockhouses), they advanced step by step, covering only 1,000 to 2,000 metres at a time. Under complete fire superiority, they would halt, fortify their position with fieldworks and firepower, and then resume their advance. Each wave of six or seven aircraft bombed in turn from 8 or 9 in the morning until around 4 in the afternoon. So-called permanent fortifications were levelled. We launched several assaults that day but failed, with nearly 1,000 casualties. One battalion assigned to defend within Otto Baurn's so-called permanent fortifications was completely wiped out, none survived!" The Battle of Guangchang marked a decisive moment in the Fifth Encirclement Campaign. It underscored the shortcomings of the temporary Communist Central Committee leadership under Bo Gu and Otto Braun, who had rejected Mao Zedong's strategy of mobile warfare in favour of static positional defence. Their insistence on defending Guangchang at all costs—motivated partly by political concerns about abandoning key territory—contributed to the Red Army's heavy losses.
Final Phase Following the capture of Guangchang, the NRA advanced further into the Jiangxi Soviet. Red Army forces mounted rearguard actions at Gaohunao () and Wannian Pavilion (), but were unable to halt the Nationalist advance. By October 1934, worsening military conditions forced the Communists to abandon their base in Jiangxi. In early July 1934, the Communist leadership—still led by the three-man committee of Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai, and Otto Braun—divided the main Red Army into six separate groups. On 5 August, nine Nationalist divisions launched renewed offensives from fortified positions, seizing areas north of Yiqian () and surrounding regions. By late September, the Jiangxi Soviet was reduced to a few scattered areas including
Ruijin,
Huichang,
Xingguo,
Ningdu,
Shicheng,
Ninghua, and
Changting. In October 1934, Chiang Kai-shek flew to Lushan to secretly convene a high-level military conference with provincial commanders from five regions. There, the Iron Bucket Encirclement () plan was adopted, aimed at achieving the total annihilation of the Central Red Army. Under this strategy, half a million Nationalist troops would coordinate a multi-front encirclement of the Communist stronghold centred on Ruijin, Huichang,
Yudu, and Xingguo. The plan envisioned a tightening siege over a 150-kilometre radius, to be completed within months. Before the blockade was sealed, twelve divisions were instructed to skirmish with the Red Army to delay and mislead them. Once the encirclement was complete, these divisions would withdraw to prevent any leakage of information and sever supply routes. According to the plan, for every 0.5 kilometres of advance toward Juichin, one layer of barbed wire was to be installed, and every 5 kilometres a blockhouse line would be constructed. In total, over 300 layers of barbed wire and 30 lines of blockhouses were projected. Up to 1,000 American 10-ton trucks stationed in
Nanchang were placed on standby to rapidly deploy reserves and prevent any breakout. This highly secret meeting, however, was compromised.
Mo Xiong, then Commissioner of the Fourth Administrative District of Northern Jiangxi and concurrently Security Commander, was secretly sympathetic to the Communist cause. Several underground agents from the CCP's Shanghai intelligence branch had been placed in his office in key roles. After the conference ended, Mo Xiong passed the multi-pound dossier of strategic plans to a Communist agent named , whose public cover was Deputy Commander of Northern Jiangxi's Security Forces in
De'an. To safely deliver the intelligence, Hsiang disguised himself as a travelling schoolteacher and painstakingly copied the documents onto silk paper. His route from De'an to Ruijin crossed eight counties, spanning nearly 1,000 kilometres of mountainous terrain. Travelling mostly at night to avoid suspicion, he reportedly even knocked out four of his own front teeth with bricks to further obscure his identity. Upon arriving in Ruijin, Hsiang delivered the intelligence directly to Zhou Enlai. According to some accounts, Zhou barely recognised him due to his altered appearance. With this critical warning, the Red Army made a hasty yet organised withdrawal on the night of 10 October 1934, just before the encirclement could be completed. Approximately 86,000 troops broke out of the collapsing Soviet base and embarked on what would become known as the
Long March. Later, Mao Zedong would remark that it was the Communist intelligence network that ensured the survival of the Central Red Army and preserved the revolution's core. ==Conclusion==