An idea to trade IRCs Ponzi set up a small office at 27
School Street, Boston, in the summer of 1919 attempting to sell business ideas to contacts in Europe. He received a letter from a company in
Spain asking about the advertising catalog which included an
international reply coupon (IRC), leading Ponzi to find a weakness in the system which, at least in principle, gave him an opportunity to make money. Postal reply coupons allowed a person in one country to pay for the postage of a reply to a correspondent in another country. IRCs were priced at the cost of postage in the country of purchase, but could be exchanged for stamps to cover the cost of postage in the country where redeemed; if these values were different, there was a potential profit. Inflation after
World War I had greatly decreased the cost of postage in Italy expressed in U.S. dollars, so that an IRC could be bought cheaply in Italy and exchanged for U.S. stamps of higher value, which could then be sold. Ponzi claimed that the net profit on these transactions, after expenses and exchange rates, was in excess of 400%. This was a form of
arbitrage, or profiting by buying an asset at a lower price in one market and immediately selling it in a market where the price is higher, which is legal. refused to lend him money. Subsequently, Ponzi set up a stock company to raise money from the public. He also went to several of his friends in Boston and promised that he would double their investment in 90 days, in an environment when banks were paying only 5% annual interest. The great returns from postal reply coupons, he explained to them, made such incredible profits easy to accomplish. Some people invested and were paid as promised, receiving $750 in interest on initial investments of $1,250. to promote the scheme. In the first month, 18 people invested in his company with a total of $1,800. He paid them promptly, the very next month, with money obtained from a newer set of investors. Ponzi began depositing the money in the Hanover Trust Bank of Boston (a small bank on
Hanover Street in the mostly Italian
North End), in the hope that once his account was large enough he could impose his will on the bank or even be made its president; he bought a
controlling interest in the bank through himself and several friends after depositing $3 million. By July 1920, Ponzi had made millions. Some of his investors had been mortgaging their homes and investing their life savings. Most did not take their profits but reinvested. Ponzi's company, meanwhile, had set up branches from
Maine to New Jersey. Ponzi's initial investors consisted of working-class immigrants like himself. Gradually, news travelled upwards, and many well-to-do
Boston Brahmins also invested in his scheme. In its heyday, nearly 75% of
Boston's police force had invested in the scheme. Ponzi's investors even included those closest to him, like his chauffeur John Collins and his own brother-in-law. Ponzi was indiscriminate about whom he allowed to invest, from young newspaper boys investing a few dollars to
high-net-worth individuals, like a banker from
Lawrence, Kansas, who invested $10,000. and maintained accounts in several banks across New England besides Hanover Trust. He bought a
Locomobile, one of the finest car of that time. Ponzi also bought a macaroni company and part of a wine company in an attempt to gain profits that could be used to repay the investors of his IRC scheme.
Suspicion Ponzi's rapid rise naturally drew suspicion. When a Boston financial writer suggested there was no way Ponzi could legally deliver such high returns in a short period of time, Ponzi sued for
libel and won $500,000 in damages. As libel law at the time placed the burden of proof on the writer and publisher, this effectively neutralized any serious probes into his dealings for some time. Nonetheless, there were still signs of his eventual ruin. Joseph Daniels, a Boston furniture dealer who had given Ponzi furniture which he could not afford to pay for, sued Ponzi to cash in on the gold rush. The lawsuit was unsuccessful, but it did prompt people to begin asking how Ponzi could have gone from being penniless to being a millionaire in a short span of time. There was a
run on the Securities Exchange Company, as some investors decided to pull out. Ponzi paid them and the run stopped. On 24 July 1920,
The Boston Post printed a favourable article on Ponzi and his scheme that brought in investors faster than ever. At that time, Ponzi was making $250,000 a day. Ponzi's good fortune was increased by the fact that just below this favorable article, which seemed to imply that Ponzi was indeed returning 50% return on an investment after only 45 days, was a bank advertisement that stated that the bank was paying 5% returns annually. The next business day after this article was published, Ponzi arrived at his office to find thousands of Bostonians waiting to give him their money. Despite this reprieve,
Post acting publisher
Richard Grozier (who was running the paper in the absence of his father
Edwin, its owner and publisher) and city editor Eddie Dunn were suspicious and assigned
investigative reporters to look into Ponzi. He was also under investigation by Massachusetts authorities, and, on the day the
Post printed its article, Ponzi met with state officials. He managed to divert the officials from checking his books by offering to stop taking money during the investigation, a fortunate choice, as proper records were not being kept. Ponzi's offer temporarily calmed the suspicions of the state officials.
Collapse of the scheme On 26 July, the
Post started a series of articles that asked hard questions about the operation of Ponzi's money machine. The paper contacted
Clarence Barron, the financial journalist who headed
Dow Jones & Company, to examine Ponzi's scheme. Barron observed that though Ponzi was offering fantastic returns on investments, Ponzi himself was not investing with his own company. Barron then noted that to cover the investments made with the Securities Exchange Company, 160 million postal reply coupons would have to be in circulation. However, only about 27,000 actually were. The
United States Post Office stated that postal reply coupons were not being bought in quantity at home or abroad. Despite the substantial gross profit margin in percent on buying and selling each IRC was colossal, the
overhead required to handle the purchase and redemption of these items, which were of extremely low cost and were sold individually, would have exceeded the gross profit (see #Infeasibility of Ponzi's scheme). The
Post articles caused a panic run on the Securities Exchange Company. Ponzi paid out $2 million in three days to a wild crowd outside his office. He canvassed the crowd, passed out coffee and doughnuts, and cheerfully told them they had nothing to worry about. Many changed their minds and left their money with him. However, this attracted the attention of
Daniel Gallagher, the
U.S. Attorney for the
District of Massachusetts. Gallagher commissioned Edwin Pride to audit the Securities Exchange Company's books—an effort made difficult by Ponzi's bookkeeping system consisting merely of index cards with investors' names. In the meantime, Ponzi had hired a publicist,
William McMasters. However, McMasters quickly became suspicious of Ponzi's endless talk of postal reply coupons, as well as the ongoing investigation against him. He later described Ponzi as a "financial idiot" who did not seem to know how to add. The investigation into Ponzi began in late July, when McMasters found several highly incriminating documents that indicated Ponzi was merely
"robbing Peter to pay Paul". McMasters went to Grozier, his former employer, with this information. Grozier offered him $5,000 for his story, which was printed in the
Post on 2 August 1920. McMaster's article declared Ponzi hopelessly
insolvent, reporting that while he claimed $7 million in liquid funds, he was actually at least $2 million in debt. With interest factored in, McMasters wrote, Ponzi was as much as $4.5 million in the red. The story touched off a massive run, and Ponzi paid off in one day. He then sped up plans to build a massive conglomerate that would engage in banking and import/export operations. in Seattle, declares, "Don't Be Ponzied". At this point, further trouble came from an unexpected quarter. Massachusetts Bank Commissioner Joseph Allen became concerned that if major withdrawals exhausted Ponzi's reserves, it would bring Boston's banking system to its knees. Allen's suspicions were further aroused when he found out a large number of Ponzi-controlled accounts had received more than $250,000 in loans from Hanover Trust. This led Allen to speculate that Ponzi was not nearly as well-financed as he claimed, since he was getting large loans from the bank he effectively controlled. He ordered two bank examiners to keep an eye on Ponzi's accounts. On 9 August, the bank examiners reported that enough investors had cashed their checks on Ponzi's main account there that it was severely
overdrawn. Allen then ordered Hanover Trust not to pay out any more checks from Ponzi's main account. He also orchestrated an
involuntary bankruptcy filing by several small Ponzi investors. The move forced
Massachusetts attorney general J. Weston Allen to release a statement that there was little to support Ponzi's claims of large-scale dealings in postal coupons. State officials then invited Ponzi noteholders to come to the
Massachusetts State House to furnish their names and addresses for the purpose of the investigation. On the same day, Ponzi received a preview of Pride's audit, which revealed Ponzi was at least $7 million in debt. On 11 August, the
Post published with a front-page story about his criminal activities in Montreal 13 years earlier, including his forgery conviction and his role at Zarossi's scandal-ridden bank. That afternoon, Bank Commissioner Allen seized Hanover Trust due to numerous irregularities. The commissioner thus inadvertently foiled Ponzi's plan to borrow funds from the bank vaults as a last resort in the event all other efforts to obtain funds failed. The following day, Ponzi's
certificate of deposit at Hanover Trust, which had been worth $1.5 million, was reduced to $1 million after bank officials tapped into it to cover the overdraft. Even if he had been able to convert it into cash, he would have had only $4 million in assets. Amid reports that he was about to be arrested any day, Ponzi surrendered to federal authorities and accepted Pride's figures. He was charged with
mail fraud for sending letters to his marks telling them their notes had matured. He was originally released on $25,000
bail and was immediately re-arrested on state charges of
larceny, for which he posted an additional $10,000 bond. After the
Post released the results of the audit, the bail bondsman feared Ponzi might flee the country and withdrew the bail for the federal charges, sending Ponzi back to prison. Attorney General Allen declared that if Ponzi managed to regain his freedom, the state would seek additional charges and seek a bail high enough to ensure Ponzi would stay in custody.
Magnitude of losses The news brought down five other banks in addition to Hanover Trust. Ponzi's investors were practically wiped out, receiving less than 30 cents to the dollar. They lost about $20 million in 1920 dollars (approximately $ million in dollars). By comparison,
Bernie Madoff's
similar scheme that collapsed in 2008 cost his investors about $18 billion, 53 times the losses of Ponzi's scheme. == Prison and later life ==