Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2

Before the United States and coalition partners launched the invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003, former US Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner and the US military had already laid out several plans for what to do with Iraqi security forces once they were defeated. Recognizing the danger posed by complete demobilization in an environment of high unemployment, poor security, and social unrest, the plan called for the dissolution of the Iraqi Republican Guard, the engagement of soldiers in the Iraqi Army in reconstruction efforts, and the foundation of a new army from three to five existing Iraqi divisions; this plan was presented to President George W. Bush by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith during a National Security Council (NSC) meeting on 12 May 2003. ==Formulation of the second order==

Upon arrival in Baghdad, Bremer and his senior advisor, Walter B. Slocombe, came to favor the dissolution of the Iraqi Army. In the words of Slocombe, "There was no intact Iraqi force to 'disband.'" However, Bush said in a later interview that the initial plan was to maintain the Iraqi Army, and he was not sure why that did not occur. In response to this report, Bremer provided The New York Times with a letter sent by him on 22 May through the Secretary of Defense to the President that described the measure, to which the President sent a thank you letter. Furthermore, Bremer stated that even before he arrived in Iraq, he sent a draft of the order on 9 May to Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then CFLCC Commander, Lieutenant General David McKiernan. Paul Bremer has said that instructions to disband the Iraqi army were given to him by Undersecretary of Defense Feith who told Bremer, “We’ve got to show all the Iraqis that we’re serious about building a new Iraq….And that means that Saddam’s instruments of repression have no role in that new nation.” A 2023 article in the journal Foreign Affairs declared that, “a more complete origin story is finally available”, regarding the order that disbanded the Iraqi army. The initial draft apparently originated in the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans led by Abram Shulsky, who recounted that, “There was not a real interagency process….It would have been informal at that point”. When Bremer presented it during a video conference with the president and NSC on May 22, 2003, no NSC members spoke up, and after a long period of silence Bush said to Bremer, “you’re the guy on the ground”. Bush thus deferred to Bremer, and Bremer issued the order the next day. UK input Several British generals later said that they raised concern about the disbandment and were personally against it, though Bremer responded that no UK officials voiced concerns in their meetings and that they regarded the effective demobilization of the Iraqi military as a "fait accompli". These claims were disputed by senior British officers. ==Aftermath==

CPA Order 2 led to protests and rioting from former Iraqi soldiers with some threatening attacks on coalition forces if their demands were not met. At a protest in Baghdad on June 18th, 2003, two former Iraqi soldiers were shot dead by US soldiers as they were allegedly throwing rocks. On June 15th, 2003, Bremer sent Donald Rumsfeld a memo with the title "should we pay the ex-military?". It stated "we have been studying the problems the disbanded Iraqi armed forces pose to force protection, general security, and law and order. When we dissolved the MOD and the old armed forces, we dismissed their employees. That has left some 230,000 officers and NCO's unemployed, some of whom have been protesting their not having been paid. This discontent among a respected group with training in weapons and with networks of contacts and loyalties presents a significant security threat". On 13 September Bremer amended the order through CPA order number 34, which stated that the Board of Supreme Audit was no longer to be considered a dissolved entity and should continue operations. In 2004, Iraq's interim president Ghazi Al Yawer blamed the deteriorating security situation in the country on the disbanding of the Iraqi military, saying that "We blame the United States 100 percent for the security in Iraq, they occupied the country, disbanded the security agencies and for 10 months left Iraq's borders open for anyone to come in without a visa or even a passport." lIn an interview with PBS's Frontline, Bremer went on record saying, "I think the decision not to recall Saddam's army, from a political point of view, is the single most important correct decision that we made in the 14 months we were there." President Bush however took a different view, writing in his memoir "Decision points" that "Thousands of armed men had just been told they were not wanted. Instead of signing up for the new military, many joined the insurgency". In his book "it worked for me: in life and leadership", Colin Powell was who secretary of state at the time wrote that CPA Order 2 "left thousands of the most highly skilled people in the country jobless and angry—prime recruits for insurgency." ==Dissolved entities==

Institutions • Ministry of Defense • Ministry of Information • Ministry of State for Military Affairs • Iraqi Intelligence Service • National Security Bureau • Directorate of General Security • Special Security Organization Entities affiliated with Hussein bodyguards: • Murafaqin (Companions) • Himaya al Khasa (Special Guard) Military organizations • Iraqi Army, Air Force, Navy, the Air Defense Force, and other regular military services • Republican Guard • Special Republican Guard • Directorate of General Military Intelligence • Jerusalem Army • Emergency Forces Paramilitaries • Fedayeen Saddam • Ba'ath Party Militia • Friends of Saddam • Saddam's Lion Cubs (Ashbal Saddam) Other • Presidential Diwan • Presidential Secretariat • Revolutionary Command Council • The National Assembly • The Youth Organization (al-Futuwah) • National Olympic Committee • Revolutionary, Special and National Security Courts ==References==