The Supreme Court found, in a majority decision, that: • Against respondent's claims that it had no jurisdiction: citing
Orr v. Orr (1979), whether the arguments in inferior courts were federal law arguments was irrelevant, and moreover the Minnesota Supreme Court had used federal law and respondent had relied on First Amendment protection. •
Promissory estoppel being a
state action, the
Fourteenth Amendment applies, and hence the First Amendment is triggered, citing
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964). However, since the state principle of promissory estoppel is a generally applicable principle, there is no specific application of the First Amendment to the press, over and above that of any other citizen, citing
Associated Press v. NLRB (1937). Cohen had not used the promissory estoppel argument to avoid the hurdle of a libel case, but for identifiable pecuniary losses, distinguishing the case from
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell (1988). Consequently, any restriction on reporting was "incidental, and constitutionally insignificant" result of applying a generally applicable law. • Deciding whether the claim under promissory estoppel was valid, and whether the state constitution shielded the press, was a matter for the Minnesota Supreme Court, and on that basis the request for reinstatement of damages was denied, and the case remanded to the inferior court.
Dissents Justice Blackmun's dissent focussed on the proposition that applying promissory estoppel punished the publication of truth.
Justice Souter's dissent was based on the balance of "the importance of the information to public discourse" to the other interests involved. In this case the potential effect of the publication of Cohen's identity on an election for public office was thought to be compelling. ==See also==