The need for the Combined Production and Resources Board was underscored in 1942 when it called on the War Department for details on the material requirements of the Army (including the Air Force) for the next 18 months. Each unit in the War Department had been accustomed to ordering directly from industry, giving out high priorities based on rough estimates, with no coordination or overall picture. Some 28,000 man-hours of work analyzed 17,000 items of procurement, and discovered what would be needed and when. The result was revolutionary, as haphazard methods gave way to systematic statistical results, broken down quarterly, that showed what the Army would purchase in terms of production, construction, and maintenance. It coordinated activity with two similar combined boards, the
Combined Food Board and the
Combined Raw Materials Board. Political scientists who have studied the Board say that on the whole it was ineffective. The official history of the
War Production Board says the CPRB "never realized" its opportunity: :Despite early efforts, CPRB did not engage in comprehensive
production planning or in the long-term strategic planning of economic resources. The American and British production programs for 1943 were not combined into a single integrated program, adjusted to the strategic requirements of the war. CPRB's isolation from the sources of decision regarding production objectives, its failure to develop an effective organization, its deference to other agencies and its tardiness in asserting its jurisdiction, the inadequacy of program planning by the agencies upon whom CPRB relied for forecasts of requirements, the delay of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in formulating strategic objectives for 1943—all these contributed to a result that saw adjustments in the American and British production programs for 1943 made by the appropriate national authorities in each case, rather than through combined machinery. ==Staff==