Ex-ante vs. ex-post
Much debate in types of conditionality centers around ex-ante versus ex-post conditionality. In ex-post conditionality, the country receiving aid agrees to conditions set by the donor or lender that they will carry out
after they receive the aid. Later follow-ups determine whether they might receive more aid. If conditions are not met or other political differences between the donor and recipient materialize, aid may be suspended. Ex-ante conditionality requires a country to meet certain conditions and prove it can maintain them
before it will receive any aid. Traditionally, the IMF lends funds based on ex-post criteria, which might induce
moral hazard behavior by the borrowing country. The moral hazard problem appears when a government behaves in a risky manner in the anticipation that it can turn to the IMF in the case of a crisis. Institutional reforms of the IMF, such as the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) in 1999, attempt to reduce moral hazard by relying more on pre-set qualification criteria (i.e. ex-ante). =='Tied' aid==