Neopatrimonialism As previously stated,
neopatrimonialism is one of the main causes of corruption in
Cameroon. D. Beekers, and B. van Gool (2012) define
neopatrimonialism as "
a type of regime in which ruling elites use the state for personal enrichment and profit from a public administration that is patently unstable, inefficient, nontransparent, and that fails to distribute public resources to large segments of the population." In a neopatrimonial state, real power and real decision-making lie outside its institutions (Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). Here, power is held not by high-ranking government officials, but by those who have connections/clientelist networks that exist inside and/or outside state structures (Cammack, 2007). Office power is used by
civil servants who are void of the concept of the superior interest of the nation and instead motivated by personal interests and gains. Furthermore, government officials and
members of parliament (MPs) account upwards to the president rather than downwards to the people. In this way, the president can control the local branches and institutions to prevent these local institutions/branches from ‘rebel’ against him. This is done by the central power (the government in general or the president) in a bid to maintain a firm grip on power at all costs, even if it means slowing down policy implementation. In
Cameroon, the central government's fear of losing power to local institutions is showcased by the lethargic ‘implementation’ of the
decentralisation law passed in 2004, but actually, the
constitution of 1996 already mentioned the creation of a decentralised state. Till today, this law has never been fully implemented and in the meantime, the government has found a way to regain control of local institutions (should this law be fully implemented one day) by creating a position called
délégué du gouvernement (Government delegate). Local institutions (the mayor, etc.) will be under this government delegate and will report to him. The government delegate is appointed by the
president of the republic and he reports to the central government. In this way, the end product of the 2004 decentralisation law will resemble more the false product of a
political devolution than anything else.
Tribalism Very close to
neopatrimonialism is the patronage system in
Cameroon, in which local elections, for example, are done based on particularistic divisions – like
ethnicity,
religion – in addition to how well the candidate is related to and has access to resources from the central government. In other words, they vote for the candidate who will best provide for them, based on the previously mentioned factors (ethnicity, religion, or both). This puts the population in a position of weakness and silence in the face of corruption. Nevertheless, this patronage system is equally beneficial to the local population because basic
government services and access to
basic necessities are difficult to obtain. This therefore, privileges the route of corruption when choices are made and naturally deviates from transparent,
meritocratic bureaucracies.
Other causes Cameroonian academics and political analysts have criticised the pervasive lack of accountability for corruption in
Cameroon. This is because government officials report upwards to the president, rather than downwards to the local people. This creates a situation where government officials are free to do what they want without fear of public judgement. Another reason, as coined by Fometeu J. (2001) is that the laws that sanction corruption are not adapted to the corruption environment of Cameroon. Cameroonian laws punish both the corrupter and the corrupted. This way of punishment does not encourage people to denounce corrupt acts and further hinders the evidence of the offence. This is because, firstly, almost all civil servants in Cameroon are corrupt and citizens have to bribe for the most basic government services (Fometeu J., 2001; p. 348). Secondly, in order to obtain evidence of corruption made, the locals have to accept the bribery propositions made by civil servants. With this evidence, if they decide to denounce civil servants, both of them shall be convicted, which is wrong. Only the civil servant should be convicted because he is in a position of power and he is the one who further proposed to be bribed. Fometeu further argues that there is a lack of a conviction system proportional to the severity of the act of corruption committed, the unwillingness of political leaders to submit themselves to scrutiny, that denunciation should be done freely without fear of backlashes, and the judiciary should be totally independent. Also, there is no strong opposition to condemn corruption acts because opposition leaders always switch sides based on their interests and when they do they condemn embezzlement, they are violently repressed. The police is instrumentalized against any political opposition. In addition to this is the almost non-existence of the opposition party in the National Assembly and Senate in Cameroon. The legislative is basically the
ruling party's (CPDM/RDPC) playground. == Corruption under Paul Biya's administration ==