The council, per Hitler's decree, was given the right to issue decrees "with the force of law" for the whole period "of the current foreign policy tension". The council, upon coming into existence, immediately began issuing decrees touching on all aspects of Reich defense. Following the outbreak of the war on 1 September 1939, it appointed Nazi Party
Gauleiters to the position of
Reich Defense Commissioner (
Reichsverteidigungskommissar) in each of the 15 Military Districts (
Wehrkreis) to organize civil defense and mobilization. Later in the war (16 November 1942) the council would decree a change in jurisdiction from the
Wehrkreis to the Gau level, and all 42
Gauleiters became Reich Defense Commissioners. (See image.) Another decree, issued on 5 September 1939, increased the penalties for certain criminal acts against persons or property during wartime. Another, issued on 7 September 1939, involved a ban on listening to foreign radio broadcasts. Despite these decrees, the council had little real practical impact, aside from reducing even further the policy influence of the individual ministries, continuing the trend of turning each into a mere technical apparatus which implemented decisions from above. The Council met on only a small number of occasions, and not after mid-November 1939, Göring having essentially lost interest in it. Historian
Martin Broszat points out that: In theory this new War Cabinet could have become a new collegiate organ of the Reich government with Göring at the head of the cabinet. in practice, however, Göring did not make use of such possibilities. Instead, like Hitler, he soon urged that any extensive legislative schemes should be shelved during the war. On 5 June 1940, a Führer decree was also issued that ordered 'that all laws and regulations which are not directly relevant to the defense of the Reich must be postponed indefinitely'. Although Broszat refers to the council as a "war cabinet", Hitler biographer, historian
Ian Kershaw, points out that a true war cabinet would have included
Joseph Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda, and the Foreign Minister,
Joachim von Ribbentrop. In Kershaw's assessment: ...Hitler's own sharp antennae towards any restriction on his power, any limitation to the principles of his untrammeled personalized rule, vitiated from the outset the possibility of a true delegation of the head of government's role to Göring and the erection of a genuine 'war cabinet'. Such was Hitler's sensitivity to anything which might impose limits on his own freedom of action, or constitute a possible internal threat to his position, that he would block Lammer's feeble attempts to reinstate cabinet meetings in 1942, and even refuse permission for ministers to gather occasionally for an evening around a beer table. ==Postwar indictment==